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ABSTRACT 
This research called for an investigation into the legal, market and cultural 
impediments to developing the SME sector in Lagos Nigeria. The thesis 
contemplates the need for reform in the current approach to financing business. 
The thesis raises the question that this sought-after development within the SME 
sector is not only hindered by access to finance but also ancillary elements like 
the attributes of the community, the norms and values the individuals in the 
community share; the legal regime, such as bankruptcy and insolvency laws, 
property rights; and market problems like high interest rates, inflation, and how 
these institutions affect the terms and conditions on which a loan is given or 
accepted. 
To conduct this in-depth investigation, the thesis adopts a socio-legal method of 
enquiry. Drawing on the distinguished Noble Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s 
Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) Framework as the tool of analysis. The 
IAD framework has been described as a diagnostic tool in which the interaction 
of participants is determined by the structural features of their situation. With 
each participant adopting different strategies based on information available to 
produce outcomes. An analyst observes their interactions, assessing them against 
evaluative criteria. It is through mapping features identified through research into 
the Lagos SME sector, and the observation of the interactions produced through 
the model that this thesis makes its findings. 
To use the IAD framework, the thesis relies heavily on the discourse around SME 
policy in Nigeria, new institutional economics, game theory, market theory and 
rational choice theory. It is based on these theories that this thesis makes 
iv 
 
assertions as what possible interactions can occur, what strategies will be 
adopted, and what outcomes produced, and what the costs and benefits of these 
strategies are. The thesis builds on these foundations to diagnose what these 
impediments to the development of the Lagos SME sector are. 
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Chapter One: Introducing the Thesis 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Nigeria was one of the fastest growing African economies in the world,1 but its 
economy has been largely sustained through its export of crude oil. However, 
with the recent drop in the price of crude and in the demand for Nigeria’s oil, it 
has now become pertinent to ask how future economic developments can be 
sustained within the country beyond the drilling and exportation of crude oil. 
Currently, there is a rising acknowledgment of the important role small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) play in economic development.2 It has been stated 
that SMEs present a unique opportunity for unbridled economic growth. The 
potential and fundamental role SMEs play within the economy has been 
recognized globally,3 and they are often described as efficient and prolific job 
creators, the seeds of big businesses and the fuel of national economic engines.4 
As a result of this, the need to develop an endogenous SME sector in Nigeria 
cannot be overstated.  
The administration which was sworn in on the 29th of May 2015 recognised this 
need and reaffirmed its commitment to expand the SME sector as part of their 
development plan for the country. In an address by President Muhammadu 
Buhari, he restated his administration’s commitment to providing both short-term 
 
1 However, in 2016 the Country slipped into a recession, and is only now recovering from its effects. 
2 Mukole, Kongolo, ‘Job creation versus job shedding and the role of SMEs in economic development’ (2010) 4 
African Journal of Business Management 2288. This was a study carried out in South Africa regarding the 
contributions to job creation and development by SMEs in the country. The study concluded by reflecting on how 
SMEs remained a source of growth and development. 
3 Dalberg ‘Report on Support to SMEs in Developing Countries through Financial Intermediaries’ (2011) < 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/dalberg_sme-briefing-paper.pdf > Accessed on 10th December 2018.  
4 Benjamin, Asunka, ‘The significance of information and communication technology for SMEs in rural communities’ 
(2016) 4 Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship Development 29, 29. 
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and long-term loans to SMEs5 to aid in their growth and development. He further 
enjoined the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to create more incentives and ease 
credit terms to enable lending,6 and enhance the overall growth of the sector. It 
will be asserted in this work that the current legal environment, the cultural 
environment and market structure does not support this development of the SME 
sector. By market, this thesis adopts the new institutional economics perspective 
that the market does not automatically construct itself, but rather it is something 
that is constructed. The justification for taking this approach is that the market 
does not work for the financing of small and medium enterprises in Nigeria. We 
know this because the government has been trying to do this since independence 
as we shall see in Chapter Two of this work,7 and still has not created a viable 
sector to date. 
This thesis will assert that the failure of the SME capital market to function 
efficiently can be explained by the institutional problems which we shall analyse. 
Against the background premise of legal, cultural and market factors, this thesis 
will demonstrate that viability of the sector requires more than availability of 
finance and easing of credit terms as President Buhari proposes, but a 
combination of finance and a conducive institutional environment in which to do 
business. 
Thus, it now becomes pertinent to rethink how the overall growth of the sector 
can be achieved, moving away from the idea that finance is key, and looking to 
assess how this conducive environment can be created. However, before we do 
 
5 Sani Tukur ‘Buhari tables proposal for rescuing Nigeria’s troubled economy’ Premium Times (Nigeria, 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/200528-buhari-tables-proposal-rescuing-nigerias-troubled-
economy.html >Accessed on 10th December 2018 
6 Ibid 
7 The layout of most of these schemes focused on proving finance rather than anything else. 
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this, we must first unravel the nature of what constitutes an SME and examine 
its perceived role in achieving economic development.  
1.2. Defining SMEs 
 
Before we begin the investigation of the legal, market and cultural impediments 
to financing SMEs, it is relevant to first discuss what is meant by the term ‘SMEs’ 
in this thesis. It should be noted that the definition of SMEs differs from country 
to country, as each country has different yardsticks for defining the size of 
businesses. Definitions are important because they determine the level of access 
to capital such enterprises have. There have been many arguments surrounding 
what criteria should be used to classify businesses into small or medium 
enterprises.8 It has been proposed that benchmarks such as total net asset; sale 
and investment level;9 business turnover;10 the size of loan11 or a combination of 
such benchmarks could be used in the definition of SMEs. Notably, it was 
observed from a study of various definitions used across different countries12 that 
the most common criteria used in defining SMEs are the number of employees. 
It was noted that this is because “the number of employees does not vary with 
consideration to inflation rate compared to other criteria’s”,13 furthermore, the 
 
8 In this work, microenterprises have been excluded. The focus of this work is to examine the transition from small 
to medium and beyond. Note that in the European Union, the main factors determining whether a company is an 
SME are the number of employees and the turnover or balance sheet total. European Commission ‘What is an SME' 
<http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/busine The significance of information and communication technology for SMEs 
in rural communities’ ss-friendly-environment/sme-definition/index_en.htm > Accessed on 10th December 2018. 
9 Meghanna, Ayyagari, Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirguc-Kunt ‘A ‘Small, and Medium Enterprises from Across the 
Globe' (2007) Small Business Economics 415, 416. 
10 Joshua Abor and Peter Quartey ‘Issues in SME Development in Ghana and South Africa’ (2010) International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics 218, 219. 
11 Oyar Ardic, Nataliya Mylenko and Valentina Saltane, ‘Small and Medium Enterprises A Cross-Country Analysis 
with A New Data Set' (2011) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/967301468339577330/Small-and-medium-enterprises-a-cross-
country-analysis-with-a-new-data-set> Accessed 10th December 2018, 8. 
12 Countries like Ghana, Thailand, China, and the European Union etc. all use the number of employees to define 
SMEs. 
13 Maria-Madalina Buculescu, ‘Harmonization Process in Defining Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; Arguments 
for a Quantitative Definition Versus a Qualitative One' (2013) 20 Theoretical and Applied Economics 103, 107. 
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use of employees as the basis of definition gives a clear description and allows 
an easy comparison between companies.14 
However, the use of the number of employees as a tool for defining SMEs has 
also been subject to its own criticism.15 Nevertheless, it has still been used as a 
common denominator in all definitions. It has also been observed that utilising 
employees as a benchmark is usually an indicator used in combination with other 
criteria.  It must be noted, however, that because of the varying benchmarks 
used by different countries in defining SMEs, it has been concluded that there 
can be no true harmonization of the definition of SMEs. Reaffirming this point, 
Buculescu in his article stated that "the principal criteria according to which SMEs 
are classified include the number of employees, the turn over and the total 
balance sheet, so it is difficult to suppose that there will be a general quantitative 
SME definition which could satisfy all the characteristics of SME, regarding the 
different degree of development of economies around the world".16 
It is also worth mentioning that the number of employees is not a fixed constant 
across countries, this varies as well. Some start at ten employees for small 
businesses, thereby implying that anything below ten falls into the category of 
micro-business.17 However, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (hereafter UNIDO) are of a different opinion. They have concluded 
 
14 Maximillian Robu, ‘The Dynamic and Importance of SMEs in Economy’ (2013) 13 The USV Annals of Economics 
and Public Administration 84, 84. 
15 It has been argued that “The volume of turnover of a business is in general a more appropriate measure of its 
relative size than either of the more conventional measurements by number of employees or value of assets” See 
Tom Gibson and H.J Van der Vaart, ‘Defining SMEs: A Less Imperfect Way of Defining Small and Medium Enterprises 
in Developing Countries’ (2008) Brookings Global Economy and Development. Available at  < 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_development_gibson.pdf > Accessed 10th 
December, 2018, 3. 
16 Buculescu (n 13) 105. 
17 An area this work is not concerned with. 
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that small businesses can exist with less than ten employees,18 especially in 
developing nations. Hence, they have defined SMEs in developing nations as 
follows; micro businesses are businesses with less than 5 employees, small 
enterprises between 5 -19 employees and medium firms 20 – 99.19 However, this 
definition is not one that typically applies in a developing nation, rather each 
nation has sought to create their own definition as we shall see in the case of 
Nigeria.   
In Nigeria, although different schemes set up by the different government 
agencies (Federal or State) and different industries within Nigeria provide varying 
definitions,20 the CBN has nevertheless, provided its own comprehensive 
definition. The CBN has stated that a ‘small enterprise’ is an entity with an asset 
base of 5 million Naira and not more than 50 million Naira21 (excluding land and 
buildings) with between 10 and 49 employees, while a ‘medium enterprise’ is one 
with an asset base of 50 million Naira and not more than 500 million Naira 
(excluding land and buildings) with between 50 and 199 employees.22Therefore, 
a small-medium enterprise is one which has between 10-199 employees and an 
asset base of N5 million – N500 million (excluding land and buildings). While this 
 
18 Countries like Ghana have taken cognizance of the fact that there are small businesses which have less than 10 
employees without falling into the definition of a micro business. See Joseph, K. Nkuah, John P. Tanyeh and Kala 
Gaeten. ‘Financing Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana: Challenges and Determinants in Accessing Bank 
Credit’ (2013) 2 International Journal of Research in Social Sciences 12, 13. 
19 Dalitso Kayanula and Peter Quartey, ‘The Policy Environment for Promoting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
in Ghana and Malawi’ (2000) Finance and Development Research Programme Working Paper Series Paper No.15 < 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-the-policy-environment-for-promoting-
small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-in-ghana-and-malawi-2000.pdf> Accessed 10th December 2018, 9. 
20 As we will see when discussing the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund in Chapter Four, they classify SMEs 
through their turnover rate only.  
21 As at the exchange rate to the pound on the 6th of August 2019, that’s about £11, 000 and not more than £111, 
000 
22 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF) Guidelines (Revised – August 2014) 
Development Finance Department, Central Bank of Nigeria. Available at 
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2014/dfd/msmedf%20guidelines%20%20.pdf > Accessed on 10th December, 2018. 
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is the definition coined by the central bank, it is, however, pertinent to consider 
whether this truly reflects the nature of Nigerian SMEs. 
From the definition of SMEs given by the CBN, we can see that they are not of 
the same view as UNIDO. The CBN has taken a different approach in its 
definition; any business that has fewer than 10 employees come under the 
purview of a micro business. The Nigerian government does not recognize that 
small businesses can still exist with fewer employees than this number, or the 
fact that there is a viable informal economy that functions outside the coined 
definition of SMEs and contributes immensely to the economy. Nevertheless, for 
this research, we are more concerned with what the Nigerian government 
acknowledges as small businesses, and how legal, market and cultural 
impediments influence how they access capital. 
Notably, from the definition given by the CBN, we can see that the number of 
employees and assets (excluding land and buildings) of the enterprise have been 
used as a criterion to define the nature of SMEs. The CBN criteria for the definition 
of SMEs are in tandem with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD have based their definition of an SME on both 
the number of employees and assets, and in doing so, they have concluded that 
“small firms are generally those with fewer than 50 employees, while micro-
enterprises have at most 10”,23 reflecting the conclusion that a business is 
categorized as small when it hits the mark of 10 employees. With regards to the 
number of employees an SME should have, the CBN's definition is similar to that 
 
23 OECD ‘Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)' Available at < 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123 > Accessed 10th December 2018. 
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of the European Commission.24 While the Commission exceeds the Nigerian 199 
employee cut off, they do agree that small firms start when employees exceed 
ten (10). 
Nigeria also considers assets in conjunction with the number of employees, as 
does the OECD, the Philippine25 and Thai governments.26 Whilst the difference in 
currencies cannot provide for a more accurate comparison between countries, 
we must admit that 5- 500 million Naira in assets within the Nigerian context, is 
a large sum in business. There is no single right or perfect definition of SME.27 
Different countries work with different definitions based on their selected 
benchmark, and as we have seen most of these definitions do not recognise the 
fact that small businesses can exist with fewer employees than 10. The CBN 
definition is what generally applies in Nigeria; whether the definition is 
appropriate and needs reform will always be a topic for debate, however, we can 
accept that it adopts globally recognised yardsticks. An analysis of the Nigerian 
definition generates the question ‘whether or not inspiration should be drawn 
from standards set by OECD and EC' as these consist mostly of nations that are 
categorized as developed, or if the UNIDO characterization of an SME offers a 
more acceptable definition, as it seems it has been tailored for developing nations 
and reflects that small businesses exist below the benchmark of 10 employees.  
Based on the discussions above, we have noted that there can be no true 
harmonization when it comes to defining SMEs. There is a range of criteria to 
 
24 The European Commission classifies any business with fewer than 10 employees as a micro business, 10 to 50 
employees are classified as small, from 50 to 250 is classified as medium. See European Commission (n 8). 
25 Asterio Tenedero Miranda and Juneth Lourdes Fiel Miranda ‘Status and conditions of small and medium-sized 
enterprises as predictors in empowering rural communities in Samar Island, Philippines’ (2018) 12 Asia Pacific 
Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 105, 107. 
26 Harri Ramcharran ‘Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Thailand: The Importance of Bank Loans and 
Financing Diversification’ (2017) 19 The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 1, 11. 
27 Ruth Hillary, SME and the Environment: Business Imperative (Greenleaf 2000) 13. 
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base the definition on, and while very few countries agree on using the same two 
benchmarks, their definitions are not necessarily wrong. Authors have pushed for 
more multi-dimensional and differentiate definitions of SMEs.28 This implies that 
an SME definition should be based on the most commonly used number of 
employees, turnover, and capital, but it must also consider the field of activity 
such as transport, telecommunications, trade, etc. While the CBN definition fails 
to take into consideration many factors, they have, however, used acceptable 
justifiable criteria in their definition of an SME. It could be asked if this definition 
used by the CBN actually reflects the nature of SMEs operating in Nigeria. As 
noted above, the CBN constructs its definition using accepted yardsticks. 
Therefore, based on this and the CBN’s own survey of the sector, the government 
definitely thinks it is a true reflection of the Nigerian business environment. 
1.3. Forms of Business Organisations. 
 
Beyond defining the nature of SMEs, we must also consider what legal form these 
enterprises may choose to adopt while carrying out their activities. This is 
particularly important in the Nigerian environment because beyond the legal 
requirement to do so for some types of businesses, these businesses must 
function under the covering of corruption. Therefore, a shelter of legitimacy often 
needs to be established in order to conduct business internally and externally. 
This legitimacy is seen to be granted through the registration of the business; 
thus, a registration culture has been created, particularly in Lagos, Nigeria. This 
is not to say that every business being registered is free from engaging in illegal 
 
28 “I would rather be a supporter of multi-dimensional and differentiated approaches which points out the 
enterprise as a complex system, socio-economic, technical-material, dynamic and adaptive”. Robu (n 14) 84. 
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activities, or is always set up for valid purposes, but being registered casts a 
favourable view on the organisation by people or organisations who might want 
to engage with it. Interestingly, what has been observed from practice is that 
sometimes the legal registration does not reflect the nature of the enterprise’s 
activity,29 but rather covering the need to have the registration documents. 
As with Nigeria and the world in general, there are various types of organisations 
which can be used to carry out business. They often include the sole proprietor, 
partnerships and the Company. Each form of business has unique characteristics 
which have been assigned to it by law. It should be noted that Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom (UK) share a common origin with regards to applicable law. Both 
countries are governed by common law, and Nigeria as a former colony of the 
UK, has adopted most English laws and where necessary modified or created its 
own laws as lacunas were identified.  
1.3.1. The Sole Proprietor, the Partnership and Registration 
of Business Names. 
 
As the name implies the sole trader is a single person business. The sole trader 
is the exclusive owner of his business and shoulders all profit and loss. They 
contract in their own name and have personal liability for all the debts of their 
business. Under both Nigerian and UK law, there is no distinction between the 
personal asset of the sole trader and the business assets. For Partnerships, 
Section 1(1) of the UK Partnership Act of 1890 defines a partnership to be the 
‘relationship that subsists between persons carrying on a business in common 
 
29 It was observed from practice that forming a ‘Company’ was the most likely choice for individuals whether or not 
it was suitable for their purpose, “They simply wanted a company for business”. This need for a company for 
business has created a registration culture within Lagos especially. 
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with a view of profit’. This Partnership Act of 1890 generally applies in Nigeria, 
except in the western region which applies the Nigerian Partnership Law of 1958. 
It should be noted that a partnership is not a separate legal entity and partners 
are jointly liable for the firm’s debt and obligation without limit. However, in the 
UK30 in 2000, the Limited Liability Partnership Act (LLPA) was enacted and this 
created a hybrid form of partnership, ‘the limited liability partnership (LLP)’. The 
LLP is a body corporate with a legal personality separate from that of its 
members. This is in contrast with the general form of partnership where all 
partners share the liability of the firms’ debt. 
As noted above, partnerships in Nigeria are generally regulated by the United 
Kingdom Partnership Act of 1890. While the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
199031 (CAMA) also regulates the operations of partnerships in Nigeria, it does 
not repeal the English Act but limits the number of parties allowed in a 
Partnership to 20. Under the 1890 Act, only one type of partnership existed, that 
is the general form of partnership, where all partners are jointly liable for the 
debt of the firm, and no separate legal personality exists between the partners 
and the firm. 
It should, however, be noted that Lagos State has now enacted their own 
Partnership legislation. In Lagos, the Partnership Act of 2003 was enacted and 
was again revised in 2009. The revisions sought to add the concept of a Limited 
Liability Partnership. This New Act in Lagos brings the law in tandem with the 
 
30 Note that the UK also has the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 which allows for sleeping partners, so long as there 
is a general partner who is liable and manages the business. 
31 CAP C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
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current position under UK law in which Limited Liability Partnerships32 already 
exist. 
It should be noted that the Act does not actually define what a Limited Liability 
Partner is, but it does establish how it can be created and what the liability of the 
limited partner is. Specifically, Section 76 (3) (a) states that a limited liability 
partner shall not be liable for the debts; actions; or inactions of the Partnership 
or Limited Liability Partnership beyond the amount subscribed to by such Limited 
Liability Partner. Section 58 (5) notes that a judgement against the partnership 
is not by itself a judgement against a partner. A judgement against a partnership 
may not be satisfied from the partner’s asset unless there is also a judgement 
against the partner.  
This implies a separate personality is created from the members as we see under 
the UK Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2000. Thus, like the UK, a Limited 
Liability Partnership is a hybrid of a general partnership and the concept of limited 
liability. It is a kind of Partnership in which some partners have limited liability. 
It contrasts with the principles of general Partnership in that a limited partner is 
not responsible for the conduct or acts of the other partners. This distinguishes 
it from the traditional/general form of partnerships applicable in the rest of 
Nigeria for states that are yet to enact their respective Partnership Laws. 
Registration of Business names. 
Even when trading as a sole proprietor or in a Partnership, registration of the 
business name in Nigeria is compulsory when the business name does not include 
 
32 It is relevant to note that CAMA is currently being reviewed, the new CAMA 2018 bill introduces the Limited 
Liability Partnership and Limited Partnerships. Although this has not been passed into law yet since it is a Federal 
Legislation, its provisions will apply across the country. Also introduced by the bill is the single-member companies. 
12 
 
the true name of the owners. While registration gives no distinct personality i.e. 
the registered business name has no distinct legal personality different from that 
of the owner, it is still a requirement under law to be registered. Specifically, 
Section 573 (1) CAMA provides that: 
“Every individual, firm or corporation having a place of business in Nigeria 
and carrying on business under a business name shall be registered in 
the manner provided in this Part of this Act if;  
(a) in the case of a firm, the name does not consist of the 
true surname of all partners without any addition other than 
the true forenames of the individual partners or the initials 
of such forenames; 
(b) in the case of an individual, the name does not consist 
of his true surname without any addition other than his true 
forenames or the initials thereof; 
(c) in the case of a corporation, whether or not registered 
under this Act, the name does not consist of its corporate 
name without any addition.” 
There are however exceptions to the above, sub-section 2 highlights them as 
follows;  
a) the addition merely indicates that the business is carried 
on in succession to a former owner of the business, that 
addition shall not of itself render registration necessary;  
(b) two or more individual partners have the same surname, 
the addition of an "s" at the end of that surname shall not of 
itself render registration necessary; and  
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(c) the business is carried on by a receiver or manager 
appointed by any court, the registration shall not be 
necessary. 
In the UK, registration of a business name is not compulsory, but if registered 
with Companies House, it is protected from other businesses trying using the 
same name. It is relevant to note that in Nigeria, after registration, a certificate 
of registration is issued by the registrar of the commission. 
1.3.2. The Company 
 
The Company is always distinguishable from all other forms of business 
organisations. Creations of a company unlike the sole proprietor and general 
partnership create a distinct personality from the individual or group of individuals 
that create it. This principle was reflected on in the renowned case of Salomon 
v. Salomon Co. Ltd [1879] AC 22, where it was stated that: 
“the company is at law a different person altogether from its 
subscribers to the memorandum, and… the company is not 
in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them”. 
As previously stated, Nigerian law is rooted in English law and as such has 
adopted English principles with regards to their company law. A Company, both 
in UK and Nigeria, is formed by one or more persons subscribing their names to 
a memorandum of association and complying with the requirements of 
registration.  They can form an incorporated company, with or without limited 
liability and in the case of a company limited by shares, one which is either public 
or private. 
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Section 37 CAMA states that the effect of registering a company is that from 
the date of incorporation mentioned in the certificate of incorporation, the 
subscriber of the memorandum together with such other persons as may, from 
time to time, become members of the company, shall be a body corporate by the 
name contained in the memorandum, capable forthwith of exercising all the 
powers and functions of an incorporated company including the power to hold 
land, and having perpetual succession and a common seal. 
1.4. Problem Statement and Research Context 
 
Despite the potential role SMEs can play in developing the Nigerian economy, 
there are however legal, market, cultural and financial constraints which hinder 
the growth of the SME sector. These constraints affect the development of these 
SMEs, stopping the SME sector from truly becoming successful. This is concerning 
considering the current level of inflation in the country and the fact the country 
is still struggling out of a recession.33 Nigeria has recently been ranked as the 
poverty capital of the world, overtaking India in terms of the level of poor people 
in the country34 and without the necessary framework to sustain the SME sector, 
it is hard to see how development can be achieved and income generated, 
especially with the drop in demand for Nigeria’s oil. 
As we shall see over the course of the next few chapters, most SMEs in the 
country lack the right infrastructure, training, adequate information, collateral 
requirements and are often hindered by the government policies and regulations 
 
33 IMF ‘Nigeria: Out of Recession and Looking beyond Oil’ (2018) Available at < 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/03/15/na031518-nigeria-out-of-recession-and-looking-beyond-oil > 
Accessed 26th March 2019. 
34 Bukola Adebayo, ‘Nigeria overtakes India in extreme poverty ranking’ CNN Available at < 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html > Accessed 
10th December 2018. 
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put in place to aid their development. This study goes past the surface 
requirement of providing security/collateral as a means for obtaining loans, also 
examining the intricate relationship between rules, norms and all forms of human 
created constrictions as they affect the development of the sector. This study will 
show that the problems faced by SMEs is beyond the simple issue of obtaining 
finance- although this is part of it, but rather a combination of various factors of 
the legal and cultural environment which the enterprise is set in.  
The study will be limited to an observation of the Lagos State SME sector, 
because of the progressive nature of the state in terms of policy and law as 
compared to the other states within the federation. It is also seen as the business 
hub of Nigeria.35 Lagos also offers a somewhat clearer land registration system 
albeit problematic36 as compared with its counterpart states. It is envisioned that 
because Lagos already stands as a forerunner in terms of laws, policy and 
development, any problems identified in a study of Lagos would be likely to be 
found across other states. In addition to the practicality of using Lagos as the 
setting for the thesis, as a researcher who is a Nigerian national, who has lived 
and worked in the Lagos sector and with family and networks within the country, 
information from such networks and experiences from living in Lagos will also be 
used to inform on areas in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
35 Not only is Lagos the business hub of the country, it also acts as the home for technological advancement within 
the country. Because of the current innovations going on, the founder of Facebook paid a visit to discuss the 
learning science powering its developers. See Emmanuel Ogunsola, ‘Mark Zuckerberg inspires nearly 200 Nigerian 
Developers during Andela Lagos visit’ (2016) TechPoint Africa. Available at < 
https://techpoint.africa/2016/08/31/mark-zuckerberg-visits-andela-lagos/ > Accessed 26th March, 2019. 
36 We shall examine this problem more fully in chapter five of this thesis. 
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1.5. Aims of Research and Research Objectives. 
 
As stated earlier, there has been a renewed interest in the development of the 
SME sector in Nigeria, however, with this comes the potential danger of repeating 
the old mistakes of previous administrations that sought to develop the sector. 
This work aims to add to the existing body of knowledge by investigating and 
identifying the bottlenecks to creating sustainable growth in the SME sector. This 
will be done through an examination of not only historical antecedents of the 
SME sector, but also an examination of the institutions37 that act as a catalyst 
within the sector. This study sets out to establish that sustainability can be 
achieved not only through a refinement of the current policies, norms and laws, 
but also through enhancement of secured lending laws to incorporate a variety 
of collateral options, development of institutional trust, greater creditor protection 
through a review of the bankruptcy and insolvency laws, and through an adoption 
of mechanisms and incentives to motivate individuals to develop the sector. 
Aims: 
Succinctly, the work will conduct an analysis of the legal, market, and cultural 
elements affecting the provision of lending to SMEs in Lagos with an emphasis 
on: 
(I) The legal institutions that play a direct role, such as debt recovery, insolvency 
regime, business forms; policy and laws aimed at developing the SME sector. 
(II) The perceived failures in the sector and the resulting inadequacy to develop 
the sector. 
 
37 Which includes both the formal and informal rules, the norms and culture that influence the decisions people 
make. 
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Objectives: 
The objectives of the study include: 
1. Exposition of the relevant law of business form (corporate, partnership, sole 
trader), security law (mortgages), debt recovery, and insolvency law. 
2. Providing a historical narrative of the initiatives and schemes in Nigeria directed 
at improving finance to SMEs. 
3. Identifying the problems that hinder the financing of SMEs in the Lagos 
business environment, examining issues such as the low levels of trust, weak rule 
of law, and the knowledge derived from the history of past failures. 
4. Exposition of the analytical frame to be deployed in investigating the SME 
sector. 
5. Analysis of the finance of SMEs in Lagos using the Ostrom framework. 
6. Consideration of the results of the analysis. 
7. Reflection upon possible legal reforms informed by the analysis. 
1.6. Methodology  
 
The thesis adopts both a doctrinal and socio-legal approach to answering its 
question. Doctrinal because it focuses on the law (as we shall see in the thesis, 
Debt recovery law, Company law, different rules of the various courts in Nigeria 
and Case Law). The doctrinal approach included access to all internal hard and 
grey law sources recognised in the jurisdiction. It is from such sources that data 
and information were generated and used for the study. 
Access to such sources was obtained through libraries, relevant websites, and 
registries located in Nigeria (company & land registries for Lagos). Relevant 
reports by international bodies such as the World Bank, lending institutions, 
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business community organizations and law reform commissions in Nigeria were 
sought and used in determining what support for SMEs were available and if it 
was perceived as adequate; and if, as preliminary research indicates, support is 
not adequate, then what obstacles to the development of SMEs exist in the 
Nigerian – specifically Lagos context.  
The thesis however moves beyond the doctrinal analysis and also adopts a 
sociolegal framing as we move away from looking at the law and policy but also 
consider how they are applied and its effects in society, to build a more contextual 
analysis, because the law does not operate in a vacuum but rather influenced by 
other attributes of society such as norms. 
This socio-legal approach is specifically discussed through a new institutional 
economic perspective, that is an attempt to incorporate the theory how 
institutions play an important role in economic development. Generally, to do 
this, an empirical study would usually be required to test the merits of this 
theoretical assertion. However, given the limitations of the thesis, specifically an 
absence of any funding for fieldwork and my residence in the UK and not Lagos, 
it was decided that an actual empirical study could not be undertaken. Therefore, 
other methods akin to an empirical approach, which allowed for the same rigour, 
was required. Something that allowed for conducting the analysis of the sector 
but would also give an accurate, or as close to an accurate analysis of the Lagos 
SME sector and the problems within it, that an empirical study would reveal. 
Thus, Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis Development Framework (IAD) has been 
used as a substitute for the empirical study. What will observed from the thesis 
as we study Ostrom’s work and the use of her framework, is that the framework 
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allows for two possible applications, an actual empirical study; or a theoretical 
one where a conceptual community would be observed and assumptions about 
their behaviour and interactions would be made using behavioural theory. It is 
the latter application that this thesis adopts to make its findings. 
Thus, the methodology is a classic combination of doctrinal investigation subject 
to evaluative criteria informed by extra-legal policy, with a desire to generate 
prescriptive potential. 
1.6.1. Contribution to knowledge 
 
The originality of the work comes in two parts; the location in which the research 
is carried out, and the method of carrying out the research. It must be noted that 
Nigeria operates a Federal system of governance (i.e. power is divided between 
the Federal and State government), and while some states occasionally cater to 
the development of SMEs within their region, the development of the SME sector 
has been largely advanced by the Federal government. Given the Federal 
character of Nigeria, it can be stated without doubt that some states are more 
progressive than others. For example, compared to other states, Lagos has a 
more effective land registration system and extends its forms of business 
organisations to include Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Partnerships, 
an advantageous option for potential SMEs. The project will capitalise on the legal 
advancements made in Lagos, and its practices around SMEs to uncover policy 
and institutional changes that would be relevant to the Lagos SMEs but can also 
be extended to other states. Thus, contributing to the discourse on SME policy in 
Nigeria.  
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The thesis makes contributions to six distinct bodies of literature because of the 
specific context which the investigation is set in. The first being the SME policy 
literature already discussed above, the second being the discourse on law and 
development in the context of SME development and funding in Lagos. The third 
literature contribution is through the method used. Ostrom’s theory and 
modelling is novel in the realm of SME funding, and the use of it will also be 
unique to the Lagos SME sector. Furthermore, the analysis of the problem of 
finance from a socio-legal standpoint will add to the body of literature. 
The thesis further aims to contribute to knowledge by drawing on the discourses 
around Market Theory (that is, the discourse around self-generating and 
constituted markets). The discourse on Game Theory and New Institutional 
Economics, elaborating on them and how they influence the Lagos SME sector. 
Through game theory, the thesis will identify how the corrupt system in Nigeria, 
specifically Lagos, degrades the quality of interaction and the ability to build 
cooperation, identifying a relevant cultural problem impeding the development of 
the SME sector. What this thesis does is move away from the general narrative 
of the politically corrupt in Nigeria but examines corruption of the everyday level 
of interactions between lenders, borrowers and low-level state employees. 
Through New Institutional Economics, the importance of institutions, their 
structure, and their influence on the development and organisation of markets 
will be identified. This identification feeds into the proposed method of 
investigation and allows for the extension of Ostrom’s IAD framework into the 
Lagos SME sector. This extension is enabled by the synthesis of information from 
the Lagos SME sector with the framework. This synthesis will reveal that for the 
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sector to thrive, priority should be placed on building normative and structural 
institutions which support people in the absence of trust. 
Finally, it is asserted that methodological contributions will be made. The thesis 
generates a synthesis of legal doctrinal methods and NIE theory in an unusual 
and rigorous way, adding to the burgeoning socio-legal literature. The thesis also 
adds value through the use of life-world knowledge and the information networks 
available, creating a self-conscious reflection of the methodology and SME sector. 
1.7. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, chapter one is the introductory chapter, 
which gives a general introduction to the thesis and definition of concepts. The 
chapter introduces the methodology to be used and identifies what contribution 
the thesis aims to make through the objectives. Following this is chapter two, 
this second chapter gives the reader an understanding of the historical context 
of the topic, looking at what has previously been done with regards to developing 
the sector and what is currently being done. The chapter gives a review from 
1960 to date and draws preliminary conclusions on how most of the government 
interventions aimed at financing SMEs failed due to problems of mismanagement, 
corruption, high default rate by borrowers etc. This chapter demonstrates that 
there is no effective market for financing SMEs in Nigeria, or at least the market 
is inherently defective, thereby, highlighting specific challenges which makes the 
topic relevant and that the thesis will try to address.  
Chapter three gives an elaboration of the thought process used in selecting a 
methodology, it considers theories like New Institutional Economics, Free Market 
theory and how these feed into the overall framework of the thesis. Chapter four 
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is the longest chapter in the thesis, and it establishes the methodology of the 
thesis. This chapter introduces the reader to the model (Ostrom's IAD framework) 
that will be used to investigate the legal, market and cultural impediments to 
financing SMEs in Lagos. The chapter familiarises the reader with crucial 
terminologies and concepts that form the foundation of the model. It was crucial 
to be as clear as possible when writing this chapter, because Ostrom's model has 
technical terms which needed to be explained. The explanation is necessary 
because if the framework is to be used as a diagnostic tool to affirm the 
conjectures made about the SME sector, understanding the institutional 
environment and determining how markets can be constructed, while also 
developing incentive structures to encourage lending despite cultural issues, then 
a clear understanding of the intricacies of the model is critical. 
Chapter five gives a description of theoretical concepts that aid the use of the 
model. The chapter contributes to the thesis in three significant ways. The first 
contribution is the examination of game theory and rational choice theory which 
influences the actions and behaviours of the proposed actors in our model. The 
second contribution that this chapter makes, is to establish the significance of 
trust, that is, “Calculative trust” and the influence it has on an actor’s action to 
engage with others. Finally, in this chapter, we discuss the Nigerian Legal 
environment, and the enforcement of contracts during bankruptcy and 
insolvency. In a nutshell, this chapter establishes the conceptual underpinnings 
of the thesis which validate the decisions the actors in the arena make.  
In chapter six, the IAD framework is unpacked further, as is the evaluative criteria 
used in assessing the model. In this chapter I begin my first analysis of the Lagos 
SME sector and begin to identify issues hindering the development of SMEs, 
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drawing preliminary conclusions. The analysis done in this chapter acts as a 
foundation for the deeper analysis conducted in chapter seven. 
Chapter seven goes to the heart of the thesis. This chapter looks finally at the 
legal, market and cultural impediments to financing SMEs in Lagos. The thesis 
here examines the impact of these institutions on the SME sector and similar to 
chapter five, draws conclusions. This chapter completes the analysis of how the 
IAD framework can be used as a lens to view different policy and institutional 
elements. 
Chapter eight is the conclusion. It pulls together all the issues discussed in the 
previous chapters. It links back to what the research question tried to answer 
and provides a final perspective on the use of the model and the PhD overall. 
 
1.8. Concluding Statement 
 
In this chapter I outlined the overall background to the research and situated the 
context. This Chapter also highlighted the definition of SMEs which would be 
adopted. It was observed that SMEs have different definitions around the world 
and across industries because of different yardsticks used to determine their 
nature, thus, there can be no true harmonization of definitions. However, the 
chapter concludes by using the definition provided by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Also, in this chapter, the reader was fully familiarised with the research aims and 
objectives of the work. The aims being an examination of perceived policy failures 
and the resulting inadequacy to finance the sector, and discussion of the direct 
roles legal institutions play in developing the sector. Furthermore, the chapter 
briefly describes the methodology to be adopted which will be more fully 
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elaborated on in chapter three. Fundamentally, this chapter sets out the form 
which the ensuing chapters will take. 
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Chapter Two: A Succinct Overview of Schemes Aimed at 
Developing the Small-Medium Enterprise Sector in Nigeria 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, we gave a general overview of the nature and definition 
of SMEs. We noted that different countries defined SMEs using different 
benchmarks, and because of the variation of benchmarks, there could be no 
harmonization in the definition of SMEs. While agreeing with this conclusion, we 
nevertheless settled on a definition to be used within this work, and that was the 
one provided by the CBN.38 Beyond defining the nature of SMEs, we also 
considered the different forms of business organisation which an SME may use 
to conduct business and noted a growing business registration culture in Nigeria, 
particularly in Lagos, which is where this study is set. The chapter also set out 
the aims and objectives of this study and began to give a preliminary framing of 
the problems faced by SMEs and how the work intends to tackle the problem. 
However, before we can begin to tackle the perceived problems, we must first 
fully appreciate what they are. The aim of this chapter is to trace as far back as 
Nigerian independence in 1960 to present time, the SME financing initiatives 
created during each administration, and the contributions by some private sectors 
to SME development. This chapter will highlight briefly some of their features and 
 
38 According to the CBN, an SME is one which has between 10-199 employees and an asset base of N5 million – 
N500 million (excluding land and buildings). Central Bank of Nigeria ‘Credit Delivery to Small and Medium 
Enterprises: Post Bank Consolidation in Nigeria’ Occasional Paper No. 53 Available at < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2015/rsd/credit%20delivery%20to%20small%20and%20medium%20enterprises-
post%20bank%20consolidationin%20nigeria.pdf  > Accessed on 2nd February 2016, 8. 
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identify where possible, the reason or reasons for their failures, if they no longer 
exist.  
A large part of the history of SMEs in Nigeria can be tied to government 
interventions schemes or government financial grants to certain sectors or 
industries that have needed fiscal aid. This does not mean that there have been 
no private efforts to develop the sector,39 but the majority of the developmental 
efforts have been undertaken by the government, with the aim of utilizing the 
vast labour market in Nigeria to reduce poverty and develop the economy. The 
establishment of schemes to aid in the development of SMEs in Nigeria can be 
traced to as far back as 1962. These schemes, as stated above, were often 
government initiatives and were mostly funded by them or in conjunction with 
an international or local body. The schemes often focused on parts of the 
economy the government wished to generate the interest in and develop as part 
of their economic plan, for example, agriculture, manufacturing, etc. The 
different schemes that arose were created as part of each administration’s need 
to diversify the economy and eradicate poverty and were often tagged as 
“poverty alleviation programmes”. 
It is generally asserted that a robust interest in the financing of SMEs developed 
fully from 1970.40 Notwithstanding this, it is pertinent to mention that back in 
1962 the Nigerian government had appreciated the ability of SMEs to boost the 
 
39 We shall also consider some private interventions further on. 
40In 1970, the Central Bank of Nigeria expanded its credit guidelines to incorporate Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises with effect from January 1971. With the directive, at least 10% of bank loans and advances were 
allocated to Small and Medium Scale Enterprises. Emmanuel O. Oni and Abdulazeez A. Daniya, ‘Development of 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises: The role of Government and other Financial Institutions’ (2012) 1 Arabian 
Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter) 16, 20. 
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economy of a country,41 in light of this, Industrial Development Centres (IDC’s) 
were established within various states, later culminating in the creation of the 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank.  
Below we shall now consider some of the features of these initiatives introduced 
by the Government. The schemes will be considered under the different National 
development plans that were developed over the years. These plans were 
supposed to be broad programs aimed at promoting the welfare of Nigerians. 
 
2.1.1. Schemes under the First National Development Plan 
 
The first National Development Plan was supposed to last for a period of six 
years, this was to be from 1962 -1968. Under this plan, emphasis lay on 
promoting agricultural, industrial, transport and manpower development42 in 
Nigeria. The aim was to see a 4% increase in the GDP of the Nigerian economy, 
but the plan was interrupted by the Thirty-month Civil War which ended in 
1970.43 However, before the War, , Nigeria saw the development of two schemes 
under this plan in 1962 and 1964. The first was the Industrial Development 
Centres (IDCs), which were established to provide extension services to SMEs in 
such areas such as project appraisal for loan application, training of 
entrepreneurs, managerial assistance, product development, production planning 
 
41 Under the First National Development Plan which occurred between 1962 and 1968, the Government planned to 
put the Nigerian economy on the path of accelerated growth by prioritizing agricultural and industrial development 
as well as training of high-level and intermediate manpower. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, ‘Central Bank of Nigeria: 
Nigeria’s Economic Development Aspirations and The Leadership Question: Is There a Nexus?’ (2012) < 
http://www.cenbank.org/out/2012/ccd/Nigeria%27s%20Economic%20Development%20Aspirations%20and%20the
%20Leadership%20Question%20-%20Is%20there%20a%20Nexus.pdf > Accessed 1st February 2016, 3. 
42 Jide Ibietan and Oghator Ekhosuehi ‘Trends in Development Planning in Nigeria: 1962 to 2012’ (2013) 15 Journal 
of Sustainable Development in Africa 297, 300. 
43 Ibid 
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and control.44 It was noted that the first IDC was established in Owerri by the 
former Eastern Nigeria Government and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.45 
“Through the IDCs, entrepreneurs were expected to learn about new production 
techniques, new types of machinery and their usage, how to develop a feasibility 
plan as well as establishing small scale businesses”.46 It was, however, stated 
that during this period, the IDCs were poorly implemented as they were 
inadequately equipped and funded.47 
After the creation of IDCs, “the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) 
was created in 1964 to address the problem of long term financing to large scale 
manufacturing and service industries in Nigeria”.48 While the NIDB focused on 
large scale industries, its small and medium-scale dealings were conducted 
through the intermediation of the various regional development corporations and 
other expanded credit institutions, including the World Bank.49 It has been stated 
that the argument for the involvement of the World Bank in the development 
 
44 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘Overview of Government’s Effort in the Development of SMEs and the Emergence of Small 
and Medium Industries Equity Investment Schemes (SMIEIS)’  (2003) < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/OUT/SPEECHES/2003/GOVADD-10BJUNE.PDF  > Accessed 25th January 2016, 4. 
45 It would seem that this was initially a state initiative because in 1970 it was appropriated by the Federal 
Government, and after the takeover more IDCs were established in other states. 
46 Hassan, M. Ayinde and Olaniran, S. Olawale ‘Developing Small Business Entrepreneurs through Assistance 
Institutions: The Role of Industrial Development Centre, Osogbo, Nigeria’ (2011) 2 International Journal of Business 
and Management 213, 216. 
47 Sanusi (n 45). We must, however, note that after the civil war some studies have claimed that the IDCs have now 
contributed immensely to the development of SMEs, in particular, the Osogbo IDC which was established in 1976. 
Ayinde (n 47). In 2009 these IDCs were turned over to the Small Medium Enterprise Development Agency 
(SMEDAN) for management, an agency which we small examine in great detail in chapter six. 
48 Sama’ila I. Ningi and Tahir, H. Mairiga ‘The Role of Bank of Industry (BOI) in the development of Small and 
Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in Bauchi Metropolis’ (2015) 2 Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 118, 
120. It was noted that it was created through a reconstruction of the Investment Company of Nigeria. These banks 
were chartered to provide medium and long-term credit to existing industrial and mining firms in Nigeria. Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank. Available at < http://nigerianwiki.com/wiki/Nigerian_Industrial_Development_Bank> 
Accessed on 17th January 2019. 
49 Eme O. Essien, ‘The Role of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) in the Financing of Small-Scale Industries’ 
(2001) Central Bank Bulletin No.25 3, 3. 
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bank initiative was that such an institution would serve as a bridge for 
successfully extending the NIDB’s credit facilities to local industrial operators.50  
It has been argued that operational constraints and environmental peculiarities 
helped to undermine the achievement of the bank’s goals, thus in 2001 it was 
merged with NERFUND (National Economic Reconstruction Fund) and the NBCI 
(Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry to form the Bank of Industry 
(hereafter BOI).51 
2.1.2. Schemes of the Second National Development Plan 
 
The second National Development Plan52 lasted for a period of four years, this 
was from 1970 -1974. Under this plan, it can be said that the first fully formed 
interest in SMEs in Nigeria began, this is based on the initiatives that were 
created. During this period several small-scale industry financing schemes were 
initiated by the Government. It was stated that “selective credit allocation became 
imperative in the early 1970s when investment capital was scarce and access to 
bank credit was limited”.53  Between 1970 and 1974, several initiatives were 
developed, in 1971 the Small Scale Industries Credit Scheme (SSICS) was set up 
by the Federal Military Government to provide technical and financial support for 
the SMEs.54 It was stated that the scheme operated as a matching grant between 
the Federal and State Governments and was designed to make credit available 
 
50 Green O. Nwankwo, The Nigerian Financial System (Macmillan Publishers 1980) 95. 
51 Ezeoha, E. Abel ‘Industrial Development Banking in Nigeria: A Forty Year Failed Experiment’ (2007) 3 Journal of 
Economic Policy Reform 193, 194. 
52 Also referred to as the Oil-Boom development plan because it coincided with the period Nigeria started making 
high earnings from oil. Ibietan (n 43) 301. 
53 Essien, S.N. and Akpan, N.I ‘Credit Policies and Private Sector Investment in Nigeria’ (2007) 1 Bullion Publication of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria 1, 1. 
54 Sanusi (n 42).  
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on liberal terms to the SMEs, this led to the creation of the Small Industries Credit 
Fund (SICF).55 Management was left in the hands of the States’ Ministries of 
Industry, Trade and Co-operatives but the scheme was unsuccessful because it 
lacked executive manpower to supervise and monitor projects. Thus, many 
unviable projects were funded leading to massive repayment default.56 
The next scheme under this plan was set up a year later in 1972, this was the 
Nigeria Agriculture and Co-operative Bank (NACB).57 Their mandate was to 
provide affordable credit facilities to micro, small and medium scale farmers. The 
scheme utilised cooperative societies as a channel of loan disbursement and 
repayment.58 Records available on NACB’s financial services indicate that the 
number of agricultural projects that were granted loans by NACB increased from 
2,446 in 1990 to 6,286 in 1994, which accounted for 157% growth in the number 
of loans approved by the bank in five years.59 However, the scheme is now 
defunct because it was merged with the Family Economic Advancement 
Programme in 2000 to create Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative and Rural 
Development Bank (NACRDB).60 
After this, in 1973, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) was 
created.61 Again, like the other schemes in this period, it was set up to provide 
long-term investment financing and equity funds to small and medium 
industries.62 They engaged in “share underwriting, project identification and 
 
55 Sanusi (n 42). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Onyinyechi Josephine Nwanyanwu ‘Micro Finance in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects’ (2011) 19 African Research 
Review 87, 91. 
58 Ibid  
59 Ibid 
60 This shall be discussed in the year 2000 section. 
61 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 27. 
62 Ibid  
31 
 
feasibility studies for SMEs and operated as an apex financial institution for the 
SMEs, thus would later go on to administer the SME I World Bank loan scheme 
of 1985”.63 Their main sources of funds included subventions from the Federal 
Government and the CBN through penalties imposed on commercial and 
merchant banks for credit shortfalls on loans to small and medium scale 
enterprises.64 During its existence, they approved a total of 797 projects 
amounting to N965.5 million between 1973 and 1989, and disbursed N 141.82 
million between 1987 and 1988.65 Under the SME I scheme initiated by the World 
Bank, they financed a total of 126 projects.66 The scheme, however, suffered 
from operational problems, culminating in a state of insolvency from 1989.67 
2.1.3. Schemes of the Third National Development Plan 
 
During the third National Development Plan in Nigeria which occurred between 
1975 -1980, one of the main objectives of the government was to create diverse 
economic activity.68 An evaluation of the schemes during this period reveals that 
the diversification mostly focused on agricultural schemes. The development plan 
emphasised as part of its objectives; research into both food and cash crops for 
domestic and export purposes and research into and development of, livestock 
and veterinary practices and rural development.69 Under this, the Rural Banking 
 
63  Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 27. 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid  
66 Some of which were cancelled due to the failure of the project sponsors to contribute their counterpart funding. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 27. 
67 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 27. 
68 Lewis A. Olufemi, ‘Nigeria’s Third National Development Plan 1975-1980: An Appraisal of Objectives and Policy 
Frame’ Available at < http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1977.tb00370.x/epdf> Accessed on 
2nd February, 60.  
69  Ibietan (n 43) 302. 
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Scheme (RBS) was created in 1977.70 The scheme mandated that commercial 
banks were required to open specified numbers of rural branches in different 
parts of the country with the objective of bringing the network of bank branches 
to rural areas, thereby drawing banking services nearer the rural populace.71 It 
was stated that under this scheme at least 50% of the total deposit in these rural 
banks were to be lent to borrowers within those rural areas, but in spite of the 
scheme, the informal sector in the rural areas remained largely underbanked.72  
About a year later, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) was 
set up in 1978, with an authorised capital of N100 million subscribed to by the 
Federal Government (60 %) and by the Central Bank of Nigeria (40%).73 The 
main objective of the Scheme was to reduce the risks attached to bank lending 
by guaranteeing a very significant proportion of loans against default by the 
beneficiaries.74 It was asserted that the scheme was shown to be biased in favour 
of small scale farmers.75 By 1984, 97% of the borrowers were small-scale farmers 
and in 1983 and 1982, 95.3% and 95% of the borrowers, respectively, were of 
the small-scale variety.76 However, Ike notes that in terms of value of the loans 
given out, this position is reversed; for instance, the 3 % large-scale borrowers 
in 1984 accounted for N13.2 million or 53.4% of the amount loaned out in the 
year.77 It was noted that because of the high default rate the scheme was a 
failure. It was recorded that the loans guarantee repayment ratio was about 18: 
 
70 Onyebinama, U.A.U & Onyebinama I.C, ‘Microfinance Banks and Economic Opportunities in the Informal Sector of 
the Nigerian Economy’ (2010) 2 Pakistan Journal of Social Science 70, 70. 
71 Ibid  
72 Ibid 
73 Don N. Ike, ‘Financing Agricultural Development in Nigeria: An Appraisal’ (1986) 1 International Journal of 
Development Banking 13, 14. 
74 Ibid. Loans and advances granted by commercial and merchant banks for agricultural production are guaranteed 
up to 75% with concessionary rates of interest of 8% for cooperatives and 9% for individuals. 
75 Ike (n 74). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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1 for 1981, the figures show that about 111.5 loans were guaranteed and only 
6.3 were repaid with an outstanding 105.2 remaining.78 In 1982, the repayment 
ratio was 14.3:1, 143.2 loans were guaranteed, 10.0 were repaid and 133.2 were 
left outstanding.79 
 
2.1.4. The Fourth National Development Plan 
 
Under the Fourth National Development Plan the main goal was designed around 
the need to reduce the dependence of the economy on a narrow range of 
activities and broaden the economic base as well as develop the technological 
base of the country.80 This occurred between 1981 and 1985. In pursuit of this 
plan, in 1984, the Federal Government signed an agreement with the World Bank 
for 41 million USD “SME II” loan which was administered by the NBCI.81  A total 
of 275 projects were approved under the scheme, out of which 149 were 
cancelled. This was due to the failure of project sponsors to contribute their 
counterpart funding, time and cost-overrun, and a harsh economic 
environment.82 After the cancellation, 126 projects were financed under the 
scheme with a total disbursement which amounted to 21 million USD (about 52 
per cent of the total projects fund).83 In order to simplify the stringent listing 
requirements for sourcing funds in the capital market, the Second Tier Securities 
Market (SSM) was established in 1985 to assist small and medium sized 
 
78 Ike (n 74). 
79 Ike (n 74) 19. 
80 Sanusi (n 42) 3. 
81 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39).  The projects covered a wide range of industries with agro-allied and 
manufacturing sectors. 
82 Ibid  
83 Ibid  
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indigenous enterprises to access funds from the capital market for expansion and 
modernization.84  
After the fourth national development plan, a new era was supposedly ushered 
in,85 but by the mid 1980’s Nigeria experienced a fall in oil prices which interfered 
with the administration’s economic plan. Thus, in 1986, a Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) was put in place. This programme, which was financed largely 
by the World Bank, combined policy reform measures with other policies designed 
to reduce the dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil.86 The goal was not 
only to reduce the dependence on oil but also  to expand economic activities as 
had been touted under the third national development plan (1975 – 1980).87 
Three years after the inception of SAP, the People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN) was 
created in 1989 to extend banking facilities to the poor who did not have access 
to credit facilities available at commercial banks.88 The PBN made use of group 
lending to ensure high recovery of the loans granted. Prospective borrowers were 
required to organise themselves in groups of similar trades.89 Each group, 
consisting of 13 members with a Chairman and a Secretary had to be duly 
registered with a neighbourhood centre operating under a branch of the bank.90 
 
84 Sanusi (n 42) 8. 
85 It was realised that the five (5) year modelling structure did not provide a realistic long-term view of the problems 
of the economy, thus the modelling structure was dropped. Kelly B.O. Ejumudo, ‘The Problematic of Development 
Planning in Nigeria: A critical Discourse’ (2013) 4 Developing Country Studies 67, 75. 
86 ‘African Development Bank (2013) Available at < 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/opev/Documents/Pper_Project_P-NG-B00-
001_EXPORT_STIMULATION_LOAN_II%20-%20EN.pdf > Accessed 2nd February 2016. It is important to note that as 
in 1986, Nigeria had already begun the rhetoric of reducing her dependence on oil, something that has still not been 
achieved to date.  
87 Under SAP, Nigeria experienced devaluation of its currency –the Naira; deregulation of interest rates which 
before the inception of SAP was below 10%. Ibietan (n 43) 304. 
88 John C. Anyanwu, and Uwatt, B. Uwatt ‘Banking for the Poor: The Case of The People’s Bank of Nigeria’ (1993) 1 
African Review of Money Finance and Banking 87, 88. 
89 Ibid 
90 Loan requests were sent to the field officers at the various centres who then forwarded them to the respective 
branch managers. The branch managers evaluated the requests and made recommendations to the respective 
zonal managers for approval. Anyanwu (n 89). 
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It was stated that the funds came from subventions from the Federal 
Government, donations from state governments and individuals’ savings deposits 
and interest earned on fixed deposits with some commercial and merchant banks 
in the country.91 Nevertheless, despite the array of funding sources, it was noted 
that it was still not enough to sustain the scheme. Final reports concluded that 
the bank was underfunded, this coupled with fraud, greed, ethnic rivalries (the 
north-south syndrome)92 led to inefficiency, and maladministration.93 
2.1.5 Rolling Plans and Vision 2010 (1989 to 2010) 
 
Under this era the government introduced two types of national plans, the rolling 
plan-which was to last for 3 years and the perspective plan which was to last for 
15 years. In 1989, in order to further expand the credit allocation to SMEs, the 
Federal Government negotiated a programme of financial assistance with the 
World Bank to complement other sources of funding, this became the World Bank 
Assisted SME II scheme which started in 1990.94 Together, this facility involved 
a total of 270 million USD for lending to the SMEs through participating banks 
and administered by the CBN.95 Between 1990 and 1994, 211 projects valued at 
132.8 million USD between 1990 and 1994 were approved, and a total 
disbursement of 107.1 million USD for 102 projects were recorded as at June 
 
91Anyanwu (n 89). 
92 Since colonial times, there has always been a divide between the predominately Christian south and the 
predominantly Muslim north in Nigeria, a divide which has often led to clashes even within present day Nigeria. This 
divide not only stems from religious differences but also a wealth and literacy gap between the two regions. With 
the South being perceived as more developed than the North. 
93 Anyanwu (n 89). 
94 Zainab Dabo ‘The Impact of Economic Reforms on Entrepreneur`s Performance: A Study of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Kaduna (Northern Nigeria)’ Available at < 
https://www.essex.ac.uk/conferences/ief/10th/documents/10IEFpapers/The%20Impact%20of%20Economic%20Ref
orms_23_Zainab%20Dabo.pdf> Accessed on 1st February 2016, 7. 
95 Ibid. The CBN also established an SME Apex unit for its efficient implementation. 
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1996.96 However, final reports from the CBN, stated that the scheme struggled 
to make a noticeable impact; low awareness of it coupled with a tedious and 
confusing application process resulted in a painfully slow distribution of funds.97 
Also, in 1990, the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) was set 
up by the Federal Government, with the CBN as one of the facilitating 
institutions.98 The scheme was aimed at providing medium to long-term loans (5-
10 years) to SMEs at concessionary interest rates.99 It was reported that between 
1990 and 1998 NERFUND disbursed 144.9 million USD (foreign exchange 
component) and N681.5 million (Naira component) to support 218 projects.100 
Further reports, however, state that NERFUND’s lending activities were seriously 
constrained by the impact of Naira devaluation which worsened the burden of 
debt servicing under the programme in 2001. Therefore, that same year, 
NERFUND was merged with two other Development Finance Institutions (DFI) to 
form the Bank of Industry (BOI).101 
In 1997, the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) was set up, it 
was designed specifically for local based producers of goods and services and 
potential entrepreneurs in the establishment of cottage industries.102 The scheme 
provided basic working capital to low income families; co-operative societies; 
members of the armed forces, the Nigeria Police Force and the para-military 
 
96 Dabo (n 95). 
97 Nikhil Gehani, ‘The Central Bank of Nigeria’s Small and Medium Enterprise Equity Investment Scheme: A Critical 
Analysis’ Available at < 
https://www.academia.edu/7839439/The_Central_Bank_of_Nigerias_Small_and_Medium_Enterprises_Equity_Inve
stment_Scheme_A_Critical_Analysis> Accessed 1st February 2016, 5. 
98 Sanusi (n 42) 6. 
99 Ibid  
100 Ibid  
101 Ibid 
102 Family Economic Advancement Programme (Establishment) Act Available at < 
http://www.placng.org/new/print.php?sn=178> Accessed on 1st February 2016.  
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services. It was, however, merged in 2000 to create the Nigerian Agricultural Co-
operative and Rural Development Bank.103 The Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative 
and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB) formally came into being 2001.104 As 
with NACB, it was set up for the provision of affordable credit facilities to micro, 
small and medium scale farmers and provided direct financing investment in the 
form of equity capital.105 The loans were aimed at rural dwellers and co-operative 
ventures. It has been reported that the performance of NACRDB was very low, 
mainly due to high default rate by beneficiaries.106 
2.1.5.i.  Schemes from 2001 to 2010 (The Failure of the Vision 
for 2010) 
 
The idea behind ‘Vision’ was to improve the country economically by 2010, 
eradication of poverty was a top priority under this scheme. It has been asserted 
that ‘Vision 2010’ was a failure.107 As with the previous years, they approached 
the Vision through the creation of schemes.  
2001 -2005: 
In 2001, the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was created by 
the Federal Government with the prime aim of eradicating core (extreme) poverty 
 
103 Family Economic Advancement Programme (n 103) 
104 Odi Nwankwo, ‘Agricultural Financing in Nigeria: An Empirical Study of Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative and 
Rural Development Bank (NACRDB): 1990-2010’ (2013) 2 Journal of Management Research 28, 31. 
105 Ibid 
106 Nwankwo (n 103). Also, a study carried out in 2018 on the Agricultural credit facilities schemes enacted in 
Nigeria stated that the NACRDB has not significantly impacted agricultural productivity in Nigeria. See Ezema, 
Clifford Anene and Onah. Clement Ejike ‘Impact of Agricultural Financing to Agricultural Productivity in Nigeria; 1995 
– 2016. ENGEL - GRANGER Residual Based Approach’ (2018) 5 International Journal of Research in Economics and 
Social Sciences 18, 2 
107 Sanusi (n 45) 305. 
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in the country by the year 2010.108 Structurally, NAPEP had five main divisions 
and the General Micro Credit and Grants division dealt with providing loans for 
SMEs.109 Its projects were primarily funded or supported by the Government’s 
annual budgetary allocations and Public Private Partnership.110 In 2015, it was 
stated that NAPEP had not been able to fully realize its objectives 10 years after 
the introduction of the programme.111 
Likewise, in August 2001, the Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment 
Scheme (SMIEIS) was launched. The scheme required that all banks in Nigeria 
set aside 10% of their profit (before tax) for equity investment in SMEs.112 The 
main aims were to assist the establishment of new viable SMEs projects in the 
real sectors such as, agro-allied, information technology and telecommunications, 
manufacturing, educational establishments, services, tourism, solid minerals and 
construction.113  
In October of the same year, through a merger of the then Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank (NIDB) Limited, Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry 
(NBCI) and NERFUND, the Bank of Industry (BOI) was created.114 The BOI115 
devotes 85% of the bank’s resources to SMEs and 15% to large enterprises who 
have links with small or medium enterprises.116 Since its inception in 2001 and 
2010, the total cumulative value of loans and investments stood at N114.3 billion. 
 
108 Sunday O. Onwe and Michael C. Nwakamma, ‘Assessment of National Poverty Reduction Programmes in Nigeria: 
A Study of National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) Ebonyi State’ (2015) 2 International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science 227, 229 and 230. 
109 Ibid 
110Commercial banks and other financial intermediaries, Business firms, including multinationals; Foundations, 
individuals and families; foreign Government assistance and support; religious bodies. Note 104 above 
111 Onwe (n 109). 
112 Babafemi D. Ilori and Adesheye M. Ilori ‘Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Financing and Development in 
Nigeria: A Critical Assessment’ (2015) 1 Journal of Finance and Bank Management 190, 195 
113 Ibid 
114 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 25. 
115 This Bank shall form part of our analysis in chapter six. 
116 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 25. 
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Of this amount, 96 per cent went to SMEs, while the balance went to large 
enterprises.117  
By December 2010, the BOI had managed some specialised development funds 
which included: the Central Bank of Nigeria's N500 billion Intervention fund for 
the Power and Aviation Sectors and the Refinancing/Restructuring fund to the 
Manufacturing Sector, introduced in September 2010;118 the Federal 
Government's $500 Credit Delivery to Small and Medium Enterprises; N100 billion 
Cotton, Textile and Garment Industry Reviving Scheme introduced in 2009; N10 
billion Rice processing Special Intervention Fund in 2010; and the N18 billion 
National Automotive Development Fund, among others. According to the last 
accessible annual report, which is that of 2016, it was stated that of the 
disbursements made non-performing loans stood at 3.72% which seems 
respectable, but this was 3 years ago, so the current state cannot be assessed.119 
In 2003, the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria 
(SMEDAN) 2003120 was established by the SMEDAN Act to promote the 
development of micro, small and medium Enterprises. The Act121 states its main 
functions as being the stimulation, monitoring and co-ordinating the development 
of the SME sector. The policy idea behind SMEDAN was to promote and facilitate 
 
117 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 25. 
118 The facility was instituted to provide liquidity to banks in support of their financing productive sectors of the 
economy (i.e. agricultural production, information technology manufacturing etc.). The RRF was designed to provide 
temporal relief to banks that faced liquidity problems because of having committed their resources to long-term 
financing to the specified productive sectors. Under the facility, banks could access up to 60 per cent of qualifying 
loans which must have been held for not less than one year. Central Bank of Nigeria (n 39) 29. 
119 Bank of Industry Annual Report and Accounts (2016) Available at < 
http://www.boi.ng/downloads/2016ANNUALREPORT.pdf > Accesses 27th March 2019, 36. 
120 Nwanyanwu (n 58) 93. 
121 Section 8 (I) of the SMEDAN Act of 2003 sets out its functions 
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development programmes, implement support services to accelerate the 
development and modernization of SME operations.122 
After 2003, the next development was the creation of Micro-Finance Banks (MFB) 
in 2005.123 The banks were set up with the main objective of supporting the 
delivery of very small, un-collateralized, or less than normal collateralized loans 
or other financial services, such as savings or insurance for low income clients.124 
Two categories of MFBs were licensed to operate, the unit or community banks 
and the Microfinance Banks licensed to operate in states.125 The CBN has 
supervisory and regulatory authority over MFBs. It was noted that in December 
2011, there were 821 MFBs operating in the country.126 It was observed that the 
impact of the MFBs on credit delivery to SMEs is still marginal given the many 
challenges faced by them, principally, a lack of credible information on borrowers 
given the absence of a functional and robust credit registry on customers.127 It 
was further noted that there have been cases of corrupt public officials diverting 
credit meant for small scale farmers. Sometimes loans were being disbursed to 
friends and relatives in a manner that did not suggest that it was meant for 
business.128 It was also stated that the banks suffered inadequate financing, and 
loan losses, especially in rural areas where about 70% of micro credits given were 
not recovered.129 A study revealed that most of the staff recruited in the 
 
122 Nwanyanwu (n 58) 93. 
123 CBN ‘Microfinance Policy, Regulatory and Supervisory Framework for Nigeria’  Available at < 
http://www.cenbank.org/out/publications/guidelines/dfd/2006/microfinance%20policy.pdf> Accessed on 2nd 
February 2016.  
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Charles N.O. Mordi and others, ‘Central Bank of Nigeria Credit Delivery to Small and Medium Enterprises: Post 
Bank Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2014) < 
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127 Ibid. 
128 Nwanyanwu (n 58) 96. 
129 Ibid. 
41 
 
microfinance institutions, particularly at management level, have little or no 
experience in microfinance banking and practice.130  
2009 – 2010: 
The Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme (CACS) was established by the CBN 
in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture in 2009.131 The objective 
of the scheme is to promote commercial agricultural enterprises in Nigeria. 
Federal bonds fund the scheme, and all deposit money banks were expected to 
participate in the administration.132 The cumulative disbursement from the 
scheme since its inception to March 2013 amounted to N1, 199.3 (one billion, 
one hundred and ninety million) disbursed through 19 Deposit Money Banks to 
271 projects including 30 state governments who lend to their farmers using 
cooperative societies.133 While the overall outlook of the scheme looks positive134 
it has been recorded that most states could not provide the list of beneficiaries 
of the funds given to them.135 
As part of its efforts towards unlocking the credit market, and to ensuring that 
credit flows to the SMEs, the CBN embarked on the quantitative easing of bank 
burden through its roles as a “lender-of-last-resort”. The CBN provided a N200 
billion for refinancing/re-structuring of banks' existing loan portfolios to the 
manufacturing sector and SMEs in 2010.136 The major objective of the fund was 
 
130 Nwanyanwu (n 58) 96. 
131 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 53) 34. 
132 Ibid 
133 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 53) 34. 
134 A 2018 statistics report on the CACS states that through impact assessment, it has been demonstrated that there 
is substantial positive growth difference between firms with access to CACS facility and overall national growth. See 
CBN ‘ Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme Evaluation and Impact Assessment Report’ (2018) Available at < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2018/STD/CACS%20Evaluation%20and%20Impact%20Assessment%20Report_compre
ssed.pdf > Accessed 28th March 2019. 
135 Ibid, 38. 
136 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 53) 33. 
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to fast-track the development of the manufacturing sector by improving access 
to credit, as well as improving the financial position of Deposit Money Banks. The 
loan limit for a single obligor was fixed at a maximum of N1billion in respect of 
re-financing/re-structuring with an interest rate of 7 per cent payable on quarterly 
basis. All banks in the country, as well as development finance institutions (DFIs), 
excluding the BOI, were to participate in the fund. As of March 2013, a total sum 
of N235 billion had been disbursed to 535 projects. 
Also, in 2010 the Small and Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme 
(SMECGS) was established.137 The CBN is the managing agent and is responsible 
for the day-to-day administration of the scheme. The scheme has a fund of N200 
billion wholly financed by the CBN. Some objectives of the scheme include 
providing guarantee for credit from banks to SMEs and manufacturers; and 
increasing the access to credit by promoters of SMEs and manufacturers138. The 
guarantee cover shall be 80% of principal and interest and shall be valid up to 
the maturity date of the loan with a maximum tenure of 7 years, inclusive of a 2-
year moratorium.139 A 2012 report notes that this scheme has been underutilized 
because commercial banks are required to lend at prime rate which is unlikely to 
cover all costs.140 In addition, rather than provide full coverage the scheme 
 
137 CBN Guideline for the administration of the N200 Billion Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Credit Guarantee 
Scheme (SMECGS) Available at < 
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2010/publications/guidelines/dfd/GUIDELINES%20ON%20N200%20BILLION%20SME
%20CREDIT%20GUARANTEE.pdf> Accessed on 31st January, 2016. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Gunhild Berg and Michael Fuchs ‘Bank Financing of SMEs in Five Sub-Saharan African Countries: The Role of 
Competition, Innovation and the Government’ (2012) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Available at < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/734811468048848246/text/WPS6563.txt > Accessed 2nd April 2019. It 
should also be stated that it is the author’s view that the unreliability of the government may also have influenced 
the underutilization of the scheme. First when administrations change, there is usually no continuity of government, 
i.e. the new administration would usually not complete or continue funding projects of the previous one. Also, the 
administrations themselves are unreliable due to corruption, while money may be set out to fund a project, along 
the way, it may be looted and become unavailable. 
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requires that all loans are collateralized, and banks have to confirm that the 
collateral is adequate and realizable before the loan can be guaranteed. 
Furthermore, where creditors fail to repay, banks have to exhaust recovery 
efforts before being compensated by the guarantee scheme. This considerably 
reduces the banks’ incentive to utilize the scheme, given the weaknesses in the 
judicial system and contract enforcement.141 
It was noted by Jide142 in his article that the Vision 2010 became stillborn due to 
budgetary constraints.143 Observing the schemes under this period, we note that 
NAPEP never realised its objectives, the MFBs were overwhelmed by 
mismanagement, and CACs, as it stands, cannot identify the beneficiaries of their 
loans. It would be easy to agree with Jide’s assertion. 
2.1.6. After 2010 to Date 
 
The CBN, in collaboration with various stakeholders aimed at expanding 
agricultural lending in Nigeria, created the Nigerian Incentive-Based Risk Sharing 
System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) in 2011.144 The scheme was aimed at 
simultaneously addressing the risk, and capacity bottlenecks along the 
agricultural and financial value chains.145 It has been stated that the introduction 
of the scheme has helped to stimulate a new form of strategic partnership and 
alliances among banks to expand their volume of lending.146 So far, it has been 
 
141 Berg (n 141) 12-13 
142 See Note 41 above. 
143 Ibietan (n 43) 305. 
144 Central Bank of Nigeria (n 53) 35. 
145 Ibid 
146 Ibid 
44 
 
recorded that NIRSAL has guaranteed 631 projects up to ₦65.53 Billion in loans 
and has a total interest drawback paid to date of ₦849,185,339.66.147 
Summarily, it should be noted that a vast majority of these programmes and 
institutions have disappeared without leaving traces, while some have been 
merged to create new financing initiatives.148 An evaluation of the financing 
schemes would reveal that most of them were underfunded, mismanaged or 
suffered from a combination of both. There have been reports of corrupt 
practices, in which funds meant for investment have been diverted, sometimes 
loans even disbursed to friends and relatives in a manner that does not suggest 
it was meant for business.149  
If this weren’t enough, among the challenges faced by these schemes, there is 
also, especially with regards to MFBs, a lack of credible information on borrowers 
given the absence of a functional and robust credit registry on customers.150 
Furthermore, there have been loan losses especially in rural areas where about 
70% of micro credits given to micro enterprises via government microfinance 
scheme were not recovered.151 In light of this, perhaps it is not improbable to 
conclude that banks will be less likely to lend given these circumstances. It is 
suggested that a combination of all these factors have led to the failure of most 
of these SME financing initiatives. 
 
 
 
147 NIRSAL Statistics Available at < https://www.nirsal.com/statistics / Accessed 28th March 2019. 
148 As we noted with NERFUND and the NBCI which merged to form the Bank of Industry; NACB which merged with 
FEAP to form (NACRDB) etc. and with others which continue to function. 
149 Ibietan (n 43). 
150 Olufemi (n 69) 
151 Onyebinama (n 71). 
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2.2. The Role of the Banking Sector and Private Interventions 
 
Generally, banks as part of their organisational structure, provide credit facilities 
to businesses. This role will be considered further when we conduct our analysis 
in chapter six, however, here it is worth considering some of the great initiatives 
created by some prominent banks in Nigeria to create access to finance. The first 
is the Access Bank ‘W’ Community Initiative.152 Access Bank is one of the top five 
banks in Nigeria and has been operating since 1988.153 The ‘W’ Community was 
set up to provide credit facilities to women. According to the bank, some of the 
privileges for women and their families under the initiative include access to a 
comprehensive range of loan products and credit facilities, and access to ‘W’ 
community with helpful advice on family and finance matters, home and family 
articles.154  
It was stated that their decision to finance women, was because 30% of SMEs in 
the country were controlled by women. It was also noted that from the banks 
experience and research that women had a far lower default ratio than men on 
loans repayment.155 The programme ‘W’ community programme initially started 
in 2006 but was re-launched again in 2014. In 2006, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) partnered with Access Bank to open the first credit line for 
Women Entrepreneurs.  
 
152 Access Bank Plc Available at <https://www.accessbankplc.com/media-centre/press-releases/83-news/561-
financial-services-access-bank-offers-succour-to-women > Accessed 15th January 2017. 
153 Access Bank Plc Available at < https://www.accessbankplc.com/pages/About-Us/our-history.aspx > Accessed 27th 
March 2019. 
154Access Bank Plc (n 153). 
155 Ibid 
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The IFC, as part of the partnership, provided funds and training for women 
borrowers and worked with Access Bank staff to address challenges commonly 
faced by women borrowers such as a lack of traditional collateral and a lack of 
credit history.156 Access Bank for its part provided a mentoring programme where 
women could help each other grow their businesses in a structured manner.157 
Successful women would mentor and guide younger women identified by the 
bank.  
While investigating this scheme, only the initial report on the program from 2006-
2009 could be sourced. It was stated by the IFC that over a period of three years 
more than $35m158 in loans was disbursed to women entrepreneurs with a non-
performing loan ratio of less than 1% maintained, 650 women had been trained 
and several new products and services developed.159 Women-friendly and more 
flexible collateral options developed, such as the pledging of equipment, and cash 
flow-based lending. The success of the program in Nigeria led to Access Bank 
replicating this in Gambia, and in Rwanda in 2011. 
2.3. Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) SME Market Hub 
 
GTB was established in 1990, the bank has offices across West Africa, East Africa 
and Europe, and has an asset base of over N3.11trillion.160 GTB introduced the 
SME Market Hub, which seeks to accelerate business growth by encouraging 
 
156 Access Bank Plc (n 153). 
157 Ibid 
158 No other documentation which I have seen indicates more money has been put into the program, this sum is in 
excess of the $15m given by the IFC and the $400k advisory sum. It may be loans which the bank disbursed from its 
own funds but there is no evidence to support this. 
159 International Finance Corporation “Banking on Women Pays Off: Creating Opportunities for 
Women Entrepreneurs” Available at < 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/About_ITC/Where_are_we_working/Multi-
country_programmes/Women_and_trade/Banking%20on%20Women%20pays%20off.pdf > Accessed on 29th 
January 2017. 
160 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc Available at < https://www.gtbank.com/about> Accessed 27th March 2019. 
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entrepreneurs in Nigeria to connect, buy and sell on its free service portal.161 The 
SME Market Hub is a website, where small businesses can create a fully hosted 
online store for their businesses, add products and receive payment online with 
any debit card in the country. 
The SME Market Hub offers the resources SMEs need to grow their businesses 
and provides the tools they need to trade online and gain visibility. To gain access 
to the bank’s Market Hub, the business owner is required to be a customer of the 
bank.162 In addition to the online market, the bank also hosts a fashion weekend 
every year, which exhibits talents from the fashion industry and allows consumers 
to purchase products. The event seeks to not only create visibility and trade 
opportunities for indigenous businesses, but also facilitates learning workshops 
and encourages e-commerce as a sustainable avenue for driving growth.163  
 
2.4. Tony Elumelu Foundation 
 
The Tony Elumelu Foundation Entrepreneurship Programme (TEEP) is a 
programme founded by entrepreneur, and investor Tony O. Elumelu.164 The 
vision of TEEP is to establish a Pan-African entrepreneurship programme and 
create 10,000 start-ups across Africa within the next 10 years to generate 
significant employment and wealth.165 One of the main functions of the 
foundation is to grow businesses through business skills training, mentoring, 
 
161 Guaranty Trust Bank Available at <http://gtbank.com/media-centre/press-releases/49-media/gtbank-in-the-
news/527-a-better-understanding-of-gtbank-s-sme-markethub-2 > Accessed 15th January 2017. 
162 Ibid 
163 Guaranty Trust Bank (n 162) 
164 Tony Elumelu Foundation <http://tonyelumelufoundation.org/programme/about-us/ > Accessed 20th January, 
2017 
165 Ibid. 
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access to seed capital funding, information and membership in its Africa-wide 
alumni network.166 
The TEEP process, involves several stages carried out within a 12-week 
programme. The programme is done with the belief that entrepreneurship and 
business skills are teachable and learnable. The entrepreneurs are taught the 
basic skills required to run their businesses at the early stage of their growth.  
Mentoring is also part of the TEEP process, the foundation assembles mentors 
from across Africa and internationally, who faced similar challenges whilst 
running their business. From the outset, TEEP start-ups are assigned a mentor 
who dedicates time and shares their business experiences, listens to their 
mentee’s goals and expectations and provides guidance and support throughout 
the programme. They keep the start-ups on track to complete their business 
plans and to help them build a business with a solid foundation.167 
The foundation hosts an annual showcase to engage, network and learn. At the 
closing ceremony, the graduates are presented a non-returnable seed capital 
funding and invited to join the alumni network.168  The start-ups are continuously 
monitored on both a portfolio and individual basis. The qualifying start-ups that 
have progressed their business plans sufficiently will each qualify for a second 
stage seed capital investment of 5,000 USD that will be provided as returnable 
 
166 Selection into the programme is through a process with no quotas of any kind, it simply identifies the game 
changers in the continent. The programme supports selected Tony Elumelu Foundation Entrepreneurs through the 
7 Pillars of TEEP, a framework that includes mentorship, online and live learning, as well as access to information, 
networking and seed capital. See note 159 above. 
167 Tony Elumelu Foundation (n 165). Start-ups, alumni and mentors’ access curated online resource library of case 
studies, sample business plans, research documents, video presentations, industry articles and podcasts. All course 
content and training materials used at the boot camp are also cross-linked with the training modules, accessible in 
the online resource library.  
168 Tony Elumelu Foundation (n 165). 
49 
 
capital.169 This seems to be the only project that shows records of successful 
participants, tracking how many employees the SME has been able to hire, and 
the progress of the business. This information is available on its online page.170 
2.5. Lagos State Government Interventions 
 
Beyond the schemes mentioned above which because of their federal nature 
apply in all states, there is a Lagos specific intervention aimed at developing the 
state’s SME sector. The Lagos State Employment Trust Fund (LSETF) was 
established by the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund Law in 2016. The aim of 
the scheme was to provide financial support to residents of Lagos and tackle 
unemployment. The Fund operates with an initial capital of N25 Billion 
contributed over four years by the Lagos State Government, and through 
additional funding from other sources like donor partners, development agencies, 
corporate organizations and individuals.171  
As stated on its mandate, “LSETF will focus on promoting entrepreneurship by 
improving access to finance, strengthening the institutional capacity of MSMEs 
and formulating policies designed to improve the business environment in Lagos 
State”.172 Through the scheme, registered small and medium sized businesses 
can get a loan of up to N5, 000,000, all at 5% interest rate per annum.173 Findings 
from the social impact report released in January 2019, states that the scheme 
 
169 Tony Elumelu Foundation (n 165). 
170 A source which has worked with the foundation stated that the foundation also works closely with the United 
Bank of Africa (UBA). Tony Elumelu worked in UBA and was CEO until he retired in 2010. Because of this relationship 
with the bank, start-ups that have passed through his programme are looked on favourably by the bank when it 
comes to loan application. This information is not available publicly but was just confirmed orally. 
171 LSETF Available at < https://lsetf.ng/ > Accessed 28th March 2019. 
172 LSETF Available at < https://lsetf.ng/content/overview> Accessed 28th March 2019. 
173 LSETF ‘Social Impact Report 2018’ Available at < https://lsetf.ng/downloads > Accessed 28th March 2019, 6 
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had funded 7,817 MSMEs as against the expected 18,705 by 2018,representing 
a 41.7% effectiveness of the scheme.174 Specifically, according to the report, 
during its two year operation, 6,439 SMEs applied for loans and 1,005 have been 
approved.175  
The report further states that beneficiaries affirmed that the fund had improved 
their finances and personal life.176 This improvement was recorded in their 
capacity to meet business and financial obligations. The report however noted 
that about 3.9% of the sample size surveyed177 said their businesses were worse 
off, while about 24% said the business remained the same.178 
In terms of repayment, the report records that only 11% have had to use both 
business proceeds and other sources to pay off their loans.179 The report further 
asserts that repayment is easy because of the loan interest rate of 5%. It 
suggests that this is one of the best features of LSETF because other loans in the 
financial market are granted with 35-37% and the loan repayment terms were 
said to be onerous, with borrowers and their guarantors enduring much 
harassment from the lenders in the event of a default.180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174LSETF (n 174) 8. 
175 Ibid at page 20. As will become apparent when we examine LSTF in more detail in the final chapter of this work, 
the major problems of the scheme were documented as the experience of the people when they tried to access this 
service, complaints of rudeness and the fact that people quickly became aware that they were more likely to get 
abused than the loan required, the fact that they were asked to pay for forms that were supposedly free and a poor 
awareness of the scheme. 
176 LSETF (n 174) 9. 
177 The details of this survey will be examined further in chapter eight. 
178 LSETF (n 174) 9. 
179 LSETF (n 174) 24. 
180Ibid. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlines the various schemes undertaken by the government to 
support the SME sector. As we can see from this fairly succinct history, which 
although not fully capturing every venture undertaken both privately and publicly, 
does highlight a fair and impressive attempt to finance small businesses. The 
chapter first takes the reader from 1960 to present day through different Federal 
initiatives, it then reports on some bank and private interventions, culminating in 
the discussion of LSETF in Lagos. 
The narrative begins to highlight the fact that there is a problem faced by the 
SME sector, and it is not solely capital based. It begins to highlight that there is 
also a loan recovery issue at play. From a report carried out by the Oxford 
business group in 2017,181 according to the Central Bank, there had been an 
increase in non-performing loans from 11.7% in June 2016 to 14% by the end 
of 2016. Thus, this overview has spurred the need for further investigation into 
the area. Having stated this, it now becomes relevant to discuss the method to 
be used in carrying out this investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 Oxford Business Group ‘The Report: Nigeria 2017’ Available at < https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/nigeria-2017> 
Accessed 23rd January 2018. 
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Chapter Three: Identifying Theories; Finding a Method of 
Analysis 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter gave us an overview of the different schemes (private and 
Government funded, previous and on-going) aimed at developing a viable SME 
sector. From an observation of the schemes, it can be seen that a lot of financial 
resources have been invested in the sector, but despite this, a successful SME 
sector is still far from being reached. From the failures of the schemes observed, 
we could also begin to identify reasons such as mismanagement, corruption, and 
a poor debt recovery record as the reason why the schemes failed, and 
sustainability has not been achieved within the sector. However, a more 
conclusive investigation into these perceived reasons is needed to fully grasp the 
rationale as to the successive failures of most of the schemes and lack of growth 
in the sector. Could poor management, corruption, inefficient debt recovery 
system etc. truly be that counterproductive to the success of the sector or are 
there other underlying reasons beyond these factors that could possibly hinder 
the growth of the Lagos SME sector? 
Thus, with this in mind, it became necessary to decide on a method of inquiry. 
As stated in chapter one, the preliminary evaluation was to be elaborated on 
through doctrinal methods. We studied regulations which guided the creation of 
different business forms and other relevant regulations which influence the 
survival of the SME; we looked at the Central Bank of Nigeria policy documents; 
reports from the World Bank; information from OECD and UNIDO; and various 
articles and text. In essence, we looked at all internal and external sources.  
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Given what was evaluated  we can surmise that institutional structures have a 
key role to play in our analysis, and by institutional structure we mean those 
restrictions we create that influence how decisions are made.182 It is averred that 
the perception of the inadequacy of the SME sector rests essentially in the law, 
social and economic sphere. Thus, a need arose to consider theories that allowed 
for the interplay between these three parts, to determine the most appropriate 
method to fully evaluate the sector. In the subsequent subheading an attempt 
will be made to walk the reader through the thought process as to how a final 
method of analysis was decided on. 
3.2. The Free Market and the Invisible Hand 
 
 
The first thing that became apparent was the need to consider the ‘market’ 
structure in which the Lagos SME sector operated. At this point, the thesis 
seemed to lean more towards pure economics and a consideration of the role of 
the invisible hand.183 Adopting the assumption that the market should 
automatically correct the problem of supplying finance i.e. if there were a demand 
for finance then there would be lenders willing to lend, and that competition 
within the market should automatically promote better options, for example 
better lending rates for borrowers or better investment options for lenders. 
However, this idea did not sit well within the established framing done in chapter 
two which already showed that access to finance was still a problem. It was 
 
182 Note that before coming across this definition of institutions and the ones discussed subsequently, the writer 
had a narrow idea that it was strictly synonymous with law. But as the thesis developed and wider reading was 
done, it was realised that the word institution was far broader than originally envisioned. As we shall see Douglass 
North views them as “human constructed constraints” See Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional Change, and 
Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990) 2. 
183 A theory put forward by Adam Smith in his book The Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
(Strahan and Cadell, 1776); Reprint: (Bantam Classic, 2003). 
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established there, from the various schemes highlighted, that there is a credit 
market within Lagos, which should be efficiently funding these SMEs, but the 
policy consensus deems it inadequate for the purpose. Therefore, just saying that 
the market should solve the problem will not take us very far in answering the 
question of how to get more finance to SMEs. Aside from that, there was also a 
strong assumption that an ‘invisible hand’ did not operate in the market, this idea 
is rooted in neoclassical economics. Hayek in his text, discusses this concept as 
‘Catallaxy’,184 that is the notion of endogenous or self-generating markets,185 and 
how they arise naturally if they are not prevented from doing so. He believes that 
the market is created as a result of individuals voluntarily organising themselves, 
to Hayek, the idea of catallaxy is the order brought about by the mutual 
adjustment of many individual economies in a market.186 Thus, a”catallaxy” is a 
special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market”.187  
However, rather than catallaxy, it is believed that a combination of other factors 
working together, influence how the market is created and how it operates. It is 
suggested that for a market to function in the first place, some sort of 
intervention is needed from the government. Establishing a functioning market 
would naturally take a long time and this is often achieved through the 
government policies in place, that create a conducive environment to doing 
business in. So indeed, some form of ‘visible hand’ is present.188  
 
184 Friedrich A. Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political 
Economy (Routledge 1993) 37 
185 This is what he calls spontaneous order. Ibid. 
186 Hayek (n 185) 108. 
187 Ibid, 109. 
188 The Office of Fair Trading explores this need of having some form of intervention. 
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The Office of Fair Trading in 2009 released a policy document which examined 
the role of government in markets. In that document, it was established that the 
government can be market makers, often playing the role of designers, 
supervisors and enforcers.189 The policy stated, that left to their own devices, 
markets will not necessarily deliver best outcomes, and in order to address this, 
the government sets legal and institutional frameworks for the market to operate 
in.190 We can somewhat see that the Nigerian Government is taking this approach 
through the government schemes they set up, trying to influence better lending 
to SMEs. But it is clear that there is still a problem with these interventions. 
Mismanagement problems, corruption, and enforcement problems in the form of 
debt recovery, etc have already been identified. At this point, it behoves us to 
consider more fully not only the legal polices in place but also how the cultural 
environment affects their effectiveness. This eventually led to the exploration of 
other possible methods to investigate the problem and given the need for 
interventions from the government in establishing the market, a more 
institutional approach was required. 
3.3. Exploring New Institutional Economics 
 
To fully evaluate the Lagos SME sector, it was decided that recourse must be 
made to an economic model of institutional structure. It has been asserted that 
“Douglass North, along with Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, transformed 
the early intuitions of new institutional economics into powerful conceptual and 
 
189  Office of Fair Trading ‘Government in Markets: Why Competition Matters-A Guide for Policy Makers’ (2009) 
Available at < 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284451/OFT1
113.pdf > Accessed 29th July 2019, 34. 
190 Ibid, 1. 
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analytical tools”.191 North, in an address delivered at the Washington University 
in St. Louis, stated that the key distinguishing feature of the new institutional 
economics (NIE) from neo-classical economics is that “the new institutional 
economics is an attempt to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics”.192 
This feature identified by North resonated with the intentions of the thesis, in 
that the thesis by identifying legal, market and cultural impediments to financing 
SMEs in Lagos sought to examine the role institutions193 could play in the 
development of the sector, thus NIE as a theory warranted further exploration. 
3.3.1. From Douglass North to Geoffrey Hodgson 
 
Douglass North acted as the first gateway into this field. From North, preliminary 
ideas began to develop on how the institutions (the rules in place) mattered in 
economic development.194 Further understanding of his work was needed, thus 
the need arose to explore and consult not only his work, but others who had a 
firmer understanding of his approach. Julio Faundez,195 while asserting that 
North’s work undoubtedly poses serious challenges to the non-specialist 
reader,196 writes that North’s work should be of interest to lawyers because it not 
only addresses the questions of the role the law plays in sustaining institutional 
change; why countries find it difficult to establish stable institutions to protect 
 
191 Claude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley, ‘The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics’ (2011) 
HAL< https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624297/document> Accessed 29th July 2019, 1. 
192 Douglass C. North “The New Institutional Economics and Development” Available at < 
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf > Accessed 22nd July, 2019, 1. North further notes that 
NIE extends neo-classical economics by adding institutions as a critical constrain. He also asserts that it is necessary 
to analyse the role of transaction costs as the connection between institutions and costs of production. 
193 At this point, law. (n 183). 
194According to North, these are “Institutions are the rules of the game in society or more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction……….” (n183). 
195 Julio Faundez ‘Douglass North’s Theory of Institutions: Lessons for Law and Development’ (2016) 8 Hague J Rule 
Law 373. 
196 Ibid, 375 
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property rights and enforce contracts etc., but also offers points for reflection 
when it comes to law and development.197 From the expositions on North’s works 
and a study of his development of NIE, it became more apparent that having 
strong property rights198 was important for economic development. Thus, this 
highlighted a real need to consider property rights in Lagos within this work. 
Beyond property rights, another important point of reflection raised through 
exploring North’s work, was the role of transaction costs and how it influences 
decisions.199 Again, at this point, the scope of reasoning began to broaden and 
take a more defined outline. It became established that peripheral issues beyond 
the simple fact of whether loans were available, and whether there were 
borrowers available needed to be considered. While the history of SMEs in 
chapter two somewhat establishes this fact i.e. it was not really a question of 
availability of finance or a market question. Literature supported this assertion 
and established furthermore a need to consider the costs associated with getting 
the loans, and from the lender’s perspective, offering the loans was a significant 
point raised through North’s work. 
These points of reflection began to shape the direction of the thesis, obviously 
the question of “what role the law plays” raised by North was still paramount, 
but law was only a part of what the thesis originally envisioned as institutions. 
So, more questions that needed answers were being raised. A need to further 
understand what was meant by institutions emerged, before exploring more fully, 
its role in economic development, specifically the development of the Lagos SME 
 
197 Faundez (n 196) 374 
198 We shall see the impact of a weak property rights system in chapters six and chapter seven where we look more 
closely at the SME sector in Lagos. 
199 When we elaborate in chapters six through seven with the modelling selected, we shall see how transaction 
costs influence the decisions to borrow and lend. 
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sector. Initial research produced an article written by Geoffrey Hodgson simply 
titled ‘What are Institutions’.200 His statement in the second paragraph reflected 
the current dilemma, “it is not possible to carry out any empirical or theoretical 
analysis of how institutions or organizations work without having some adequate 
conception of what an institution or an organization is”.201 In this work, Hodgson 
offers general critique of the different definitions of institution, considering 
different interpretations provided by authors such as Alan Wells and John Searle. 
But what was of particular interest, was his focus on some of North’s ideas as to 
what institutions are, thus, considering his work to further develop the idea of 
institutions raised by North seemed a natural progression. 
Hodgson does suggest that North’s exposition of institution presents some 
problems of ambiguity, which left it open to misinterpretation by others.202 In this 
piece of writing, he proceeds to explain why. He states that the way North 
characterises institutions203 and organisations204 leads to a misinterpretation of 
North’s characterisation by others who perhaps do not understand what North 
was trying to say. This misinterpretation has led to the belief that organisations 
are not institutions. Hodgson, however, believes that they are. His justification 
for this belief is based on the fact organisations involve structures or networks, 
which cannot function without rules of communication, membership, or 
sovereignty. Because of the existence of these rules within organisations, it 
means that organisations must be regarded as a type of institution.205 
 
200 Geoffrey M. Hodgson ‘What are Institutions’ (2006) 40 Journal of Economic Issues 4 
201 Ibid 1 
202 The definition Hodgson works with is taken from North’s book – Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990) 2-3 
203 From Hodgson’s account, North sees this as the rules of the game in society. Hodgson (n 201) 8. 
204 These are the players within the game. 
205 Hodgson (n 201) 10. 
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It is suggested that the unpacking of North’s characterisation of institutions as 
rules of the game and organisations as players within the game is not a distinction 
between exclusive types of things but is a functional or analytical one. That is, 
whether some “things” are institutions or organisations depends on the activity 
being analysed. For example, in terms trying to influence government policy, the 
CBN is an organisation, a player subject to rules it must accept or try to change. 
When operating as lender of last resort, it is an institution. The question being 
asked, and the perspective of the questioner determines the classification for that 
analysis. 
Again, Hodgson suggests that North does not make a clear distinction between 
formal rules and informal constraints and submits that some distinction between 
formal and informal needs to be made.206 Hodgson suggests that the distinction 
between formal rules and informal rules are important because if all rules are 
seen as formal, and institutions are essentially rules, then all institutions are 
formal.207 He further reasons that without this distinction, it becomes open to 
different interpretations, and he suggests three possible interpretations. The first 
is the possibility of identifying the formal with the legal and seeing informal rules 
as non-legal, even if they are written down.208 The second possibility is that they 
could be interpreted to mean explicit (formal) versus tacit (informal) rules.209 
Alternatively, in literature, formal could be interpreted as designed, while informal 
could be seen as spontaneous institutions.210 
 
206 Ibid 11. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Hodgson (n 201) 11. 
210 Ibid. 
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It seems that Hodgson’s main contention is the choice of words used by North in 
his definition. He recommends that because they are ambiguous, that they either 
be used with extreme care, or be abandoned completely.211 Ultimately, Hodgson 
adopts a broader conception of institutions that accommodates the informal basis 
of all structured and durable behaviour. Thus, he defines them as durable 
systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions, rather than rules as such, in short, institutions are social rule-
systems, not simply rules.212 
It is relevant to note that North does revisit his definition of institutions. He later 
defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws and property rights).213 We can observe here that he is more 
elaborate with his explanation of what formal and informal is, and also adopts a 
broader definition of what institutions could be. It is important to note that his 
definition was revisited before Hodgson’s article, but it is assumed that Hodgson 
still maintains his aversion to the words formal and informal.  
Now that a moderate understanding of what institutions are has been developed, 
the next stage of the journey was to look at these institutions within my specific 
context, that is, the Lagos SME sector. 
 
 
 
211 Hodgson (n 201) 13. 
212 Ibid 
213 Douglass C. North ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspective 97, 97. 
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3.4. Beyond Theory – Looking Towards Empirical 
Confirmation. 
 
Aside from the theoretical discussions arguing that institutions play an important 
role in economic development, empirical studies have been conducted to test the 
merits of this theoretical assertion. It was averred in a study conducted in 2014, 
that there is a gap in the literature on how institutions are important to economic 
development, and this gap could derail the conversation.214 It was stated that 
there was a need for empirical data linking the theory of institution and economic 
development, measuring institutions and identifying their precise roles in shaping 
economic behaviour and outcomes, without which, it can neither be completely 
confirmed or denied that these institutions are actually important to economic 
development.215 
The merits of the above assertion, that there is need for more empirical evidence 
can be appreciated. The nature of empirical evidence is that it corroborates truth 
and establishes that theory does correspond with reality. A salient point that was 
uncovered from the analysis conducted in the previous study was that there are 
“various methodological innovations that are making it possible to test some of 
the claims made by institutional theory concerning the co-evolution of legal 
systems and economic forms, including the business enterprise”.216 The article 
states that such methods could involve a Lexi-metric approach, which provides 
comparative data on legal systems and facilitating statistical analysis.217 There is 
 
214 John Buchanan, Dominic Hissang Chai, and Simon Deakin ‘Empirical analysis of legal institutions and institutional 
change: multiple-methods approaches and their application to corporate governance research’ (2014) 10 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 1, 2. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Buchanan (n 215) 7. 
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also an econometric approach, this method, involves a study of the interaction of 
legal rules with financial variables over extended time periods, and enables the 
distinction between short-term and long-term effects of legal change.218 
Summarily, it was asserted that with improved empirical methods being adopted 
to test institutional theory, we would become better informed on the role 
institutions play in supporting economic development and growth.219 
To test the impact of an empirical analysis, it was worth reflecting on works which 
sought to apply an empirical approach to test if law did matter in economic 
development. One such work was a study done in China, on whether the absence 
of the type of autonomous legal institutions found in the West threatened 
institutional economic theory which placed emphasis on the importance of law 
for economic development.220 At the heart of the study was how China seemed 
to ignore key points such as securing property rights and enforcement of 
contracts which are central to NIE but it was nevertheless developing as an 
economy.221 It was initially asserted that China relied on their guanxi system of 
interpersonal trust, as a basis of contractual relationships and this was the reason 
for their development. Key findings of the study, which was conducted through 
interviews, stated that there was no evidence to support the claim that China’s 
economic growth was achieved through the absence of law.222 The study itself 
actually confirmed the suggestion that the Chinese version of the rule of law, will 
in future, involve less reliance on guanxi, and a greater emphasis on judicial 
 
218 Buchanan (n 215) 7. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ding Chena, and others, ‘Law, trust and institutional change in China: evidence from qualitative fieldwork’ 17 
(2017) Journal of Corporate Studies 257. 
221 Ibid, 1  
222 According to the article this may have been true when the economy initially began developing, but same cannot 
be said in present times. There has now been a move from this guanxi system. 
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independence and objectivity. The idea of guanxi, (that interpersonal trust) again 
raised another point to reflect on within the Lagos SME sector. While this will be 
dealt with more fully in chapter five when we explore the idea of calculative trust, 
it is relevant to point out here that it will be averred that Nigeria is a low trust 
society. There is low trust between individuals223 and low trust in the government, 
and because of this, some way of establishing trust needs to be considered, along 
with securing property rights and enforcing contracts.  
3.5. Encountering Elinor Ostrom 
 
 
From the framing done above, it was understood how the various parts and 
concepts, for example, the market, property rights, transactions costs, both 
formal and informal institutions etc., were going to be important in the 
development of the Lagos SME sector. However, a clear picture of how to conduct 
an analysis of the sector, examining these individual components within the 
sector, could not yet be seen.  At this point, they stood as words on paper, ideas 
understood individually, concepts that were important but not allowing for the 
diagnosis and identification of the exact impediments within the Lagos sector. 
Perhaps this was due to a failing to become more familiar with North and 
Hodgson’s work, or as already asserted above, some form of empirical analysis 
was needed to support the theory.  
 
223 Speaking as a Nigerian, there is a strong likelihood of personal trust if individuals share the same tribal origins 
(i.e. trust between two ‘Yoruba’ people, even if they may not have met previously).This reflects the shared 
communal need to be one’s brother’s keeper, especially if working in an area different from their origins. You often 
find market associations based on tribes, where they share information and market secrets and sometimes may 
stand as guarantors for each other. 
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As it seemed likely that the analysis required an empirical approach if NIE theory 
was to be applied to the Lagos SME sector, it became relevant to consider the 
best way to implement this. Given the limitations of the thesis, it was decided 
that an actual empirical study could not be undertaken. Therefore, other method 
akin to an empirical approach, which allowed for the same rigour, was required. 
Something that allowed for conducting the analysis of the sector but would also 
give an accurate, or as close to an accurate analysis of the Lagos SME sector and 
the problems within it, that an empirical study would reveal. 
It was at this point the work of renowned Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom was 
discovered. Ostrom herself was an economist associated with NIE, thus was a 
perfect fit within the established framing. What was observed from a study of 
Ostrom’s work, was that it allowed for two possible applications: an actual 
empirical study; or a theoretical one where a conceptual community would be 
observed and assumptions about their behaviour and interactions would be made 
using behavioural theory. It is the latter application that this thesis adopts.224 
In using Ostrom’s framework, the goal was to uncover problems which had not 
been obvious to generations of reformers within the sector. What was observed 
from the history in chapter two was an identification of these failures. We noted 
that definitely efforts were being made, resources being expended, and 
institutions set up to solve a presumed problem. It is asserted from the history 
that the “presumed problem” was a question of finance, getting more money to 
these SMEs, either through focusing on funding the agricultural sector or based 
on geographical location. We did observe a few schemes which tried to focus on 
 
224 Chapter six provides a fuller explanation of this, particularly the second application. This is what the thesis uses 
to diagnose the SME problem. 
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giving these SMEs the skills to manage their business225 but largely, the focus 
was on financing them, thus different credit schemes were created. 
But these schemes, policies and regulations did not work for various reasons, one 
of which was an enforcement problem especially in regard to debt recovery,226 
another was because of corruption. This raised the question of whether these 
policies could ever be effective, were they being created in a vacuum without 
consideration of the realities in the country? But whatever problem they were 
trying to solve, their solution definitely seemed to be inadequate, and their 
remedies have not been suited to solve the problems. We can assert this based 
on the fact that even now, it is still a high on the current administrations’ agenda. 
This suggests that there has actually been a misdiagnosis. The reason that 
government interventions have not been working, is that either the problems that 
exist are not the problem the authorities think they are, or the remedies being 
deployed are being enacted in a system that will not allow them to have the 
effect expected. Without actually knowing what the problem is, a solution that 
fits will not be possible.  
Thus, the need for Ostrom’s IAD framework to diagnose these problems before 
policy is created, taking into consideration property rights, the role of formal and 
informal institutions, enforcement of contracts etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
225 When we conduct the analysis of the sector, we shall focus on one in particular, the Small Medium Enterprise 
Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN). 
226 In chapter five, this will be discussed in more detail, especially the failures of the Asset Management Company of 
Nigeria (AMCON) which was a government institution charged with the recovery of bad banking debts within the 
country. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter was a reflecting process of how the chosen method of analysis was 
discovered. In this chapter, a few theories were examined, specifically, the free 
market theory and new institutional economics. It was asserted that markets 
were not created by some invisible hand, rather through institutions and because 
of this assertion it became relevant to explore more deeply what the theory of 
NIE was about. Through this exploration of NIE, several points of reflection or 
themes were identified. It is believed that; trust; transaction costs; securing 
property rights; enforcing contracts; formal institutions; and informal institutions, 
are all concepts that would impact the subsequent analysis to be conducted. 
As stated in the first paragraph of the section above which discussed NIE, North 
acted as the first gateway into this field, and influenced the new direction of the 
thesis. While North did provide some valuable insights, ultimately, it was felt that 
Douglass North was too high a level of abstraction to be used effectively. While 
it is possible to reduce it down in scale to examine financing SMEs in Lagos, it 
was believed that this presented more of a hindrance to the work. As another 
institutional economist, Hodgson’s perspective on what institutions are, and their 
role in markets227 provided more insight into the field. But as the understanding 
of the theory began to develop, and more writers consulted, it was realised that 
a more rigorous approach would be best suited to address the research question. 
Thus, Hodgson became like North, more of a gateway to the understanding NIE, 
 
227 That belief that the market is not seen as automatically constructed or naturally occurring, but rather a product 
of institutions. 
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and another author, Ostrom and her analytical tool would be used to address the 
research question. 
Now that a somewhat firmer grasp of the theory and how it related to the Lagos 
SME sector has been developed, it was determined that there was a need for an 
empirical approach to the problem. Due to limitations, it was determined that 
Ostrom’s IAD framework suited the needs of the thesis, and still presented a 
rigorous way of analysing the sector. While not ultimately concluding that it is 
the best approach, it serves its purpose within the limitations of this work, thus 
worth further exploration. A more detailed discussion of Elinor Ostrom and her 
framework will be carried out in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Elinor Ostrom and her Development of the 
Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) Framework 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter gave us an overview of the thought process behind 
concluding on a method of investigation. It explored Free Market theory and the 
role of the ‘invisible hand’, and how New Institutional Economics acted as the 
foundation of the analysis to be conducted. Eventually the chapter concluded by 
determining that Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework best suited the needs of the 
thesis. It was suggested that this was the preferred option to conduct the 
investigation because the IAD framework acts as a lens to view different policy 
elements,228 and presents a rigorous way of analysing the SME sector without 
adopting an empirical approach. 
To understand Ostrom, the most appropriate place to begin would be her book 
‘Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action.’229Succinctly as possible, the main inquiry of the study was to illustrate 
how a group of people who are all dependent on a resource but are in competition 
for its exploitation can organize and govern themselves to maintain and extend 
the long-term economic viability of the resource.230  Ostrom sets her stage with 
the use of common-pool resources (CPRs) and how degradation will occur 
through use, but it can nevertheless be efficiently maintained by self-organised 
groups. Ostrom’s objectives were to illustrate that the community which 
 
228 Michael D. McGinnis ‘An introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A simple guide to a 
complex framework’ (2011) 39 The Policy Studies Journal 169, 170. 
229 (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
230 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions (Cambridge University 
Press 1990) 1. 
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benefited from the use of the CPRs, were the most appropriate body to devise 
mechanisms to efficiently manage the resource. Below, we shall now expound on 
the principles identified by Ostrom. 
4.2. What are Common -Pool Resources and how are they 
maintained? 
 
To begin an analysis of Ostrom’s work, it becomes pertinent to give a definition 
of what is meant by a ‘common-pool resource’. A CPR is “a resource made 
available to all by consumption and to which access can be limited only at high 
costs. Some classic examples of common-pool resources are fisheries, forests, 
underwater basins, and irrigation systems”.231 As mentioned above, degradation 
of CPRs will naturally occur through its use. This degradation is reflected in the 
economic theory which states that deterioration of a natural resource or 
environment will occur whenever people come in contact with the resource, this 
has been coined “the tragedy of the commons”.232 A distinction must be made 
between pure public goods and CPRs. It must be noted that public goods are 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, that is the consumption of the good does not 
deplete the amount available to others, and it is available to all, and its availability 
cannot be withheld. This is in contrast to CPRs, where outsiders can be excluded 
from the use of the common pool if protective norms are practices are put in 
place. Ostrom notes that when compared with public goods, “crowding effects" 
and "overuse" problems are chronic in CPR situations but absent in regard to 
pure public goods, that is, one's use of public security (which is a pure public 
 
231 Encyclopaedia Britannica ‘Common-pool Resource’, Available at < 
https://www.britannica.com/science/common-pool-resource > Accessed on 22nd October 2016. 
232 Garett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science, New Series 1243. 
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good) does not subtract from the availability or reduce the general level of 
security available in a community.233 
Ostrom suggests that this tragedy occurs as a result of the paradox that 
“individual rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes”.234  This 
simply means that a resource can be used rationally235 by one individual to obtain 
maximum benefit. However, when a group of individuals use it in the same 
rational manner to obtain the same maximum benefit, deterioration occurs much 
more quickly. This proposition is reflected in the ‘Prisoners Dilemma game’ 
model,236 this model asserts that persons working for their own benefit when 
pursuing a course of action, do not create optimal results. The typical prisoner's 
dilemma is arranged in such a way that both parties choose to benefit even if it 
is at the expense of the other participants.237 It has been stated that a distinctive 
feature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that short term, neither side can benefit with 
a selfish choice enough to make up for the harm done to it from a selfish choice 
by the other, thus, if both cooperate, both do fairly well.238  
However, in playing the game, there is a dominant strategy, and that is to defect. 
A rational player in the game believes that defection gives them the highest 
payoff. That is, if one defects while the other cooperates, the defecting side gets 
its highest payoff, and the cooperating side gets its lowest payoff. Naturally, the 
 
233 Ostrom (n230) at 32 She further notes that propositions derived from a theory of public goods that are based on 
the non-subtractive attributes of those goods are not applicable to an analysis of CPRs and the use of subtractable 
resources. CPRs and subtractable resources are more closely related to the theory of private goods than to the 
theory of public goods. 
234 Ostrom (n 230) 5. 
235 It is suggested that the term ‘rational’ in this context means to maximise one’s personal return without regard 
for anyone else. In this context it would be irrational to care how anyone fares. 
236Ostrom (n 230) 4. 
237 In the Hardin herders’ game, the ‘defect strategy’ is for each herder to graze as many animals as he thinks he can 
sell at a profit. Ostrom (n 230) 4. 
238 Robert Axelrod ‘Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma’ (1980) 1 Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, 4. 
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consequence of this is that it gives both sides an incentive to defect. However, 
the catch is that if both do defect, both do poorly.239 Thus, as a result of following 
a purely rational thought process, both participants find themselves in a worse 
state than if they had cooperated with each other in the decision-making 
process.240 
The meaning of ‘rational strategy’241 within the context of the game has been 
examined, and it has been asserted that rather than the idea that a player will 
only use rational strategies, which creates the strategy to defect, it is more of a 
common knowledge of rationality, that is used.242 By common knowledge of 
rationality, it is meant that if all players are rational, and they know all players 
will be rational, then the common knowledge. Based on this assumed common 
understanding and belief that the other player is also rational, this forces 
defection because defection is the rational choice of the other player. 
This paradox, as represented in the prisoners’ dilemma, presented difficulties 
when it came to the management of CPRs, hence Ostrom’s commitment to 
investigate and find ways in which ‘these rational strategies’ could be manipulated 
and redirected to prolonging the economic-life of the CPR. Ostrom sets out in 
‘Governing the Commons’ to illustrate how the community in which the CPR is 
used can sufficiently manage the resource within the community itself with little 
 
239 Ibid 
240 Axelrod notes that the interactions being repeated is important to the game. He states that “If the two sides 
knew that there would be only a single choice, there would be every incentive to defect, since no matter what the 
other player chooses, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. But actors often have ongoing relationships 
with both an informative history and an important future. Making effective choices in such an ongoing relationship 
requires insight into the structural implications of strategic interaction”.  – Axelrod (n238) 
241 Aumann makes the argument that “simple rationality on the part of each player - each player being a utility 
maximiser is certainly not enough” Robert J. Aumann ‘Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality’ 
(1995) 8 Games and Economic Behavior) 6, 7 
242 Herbert Gintis The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) 87; Aumann states this as “in some sense, the players must also ascribe rationality to each 
other…….all players know that all are rational, all know this and so on ad infinitum….” Aumann (n241) 
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or no input from an external source.243 She takes a bottom-up approach to this,244 
in that she identifies through an analysis of different CPRs and the collective 
governing mechanisms developed to manage them, how rules were generated 
between users on how to manage and share the resource, and these rules even 
transcended the community itself to become laws.245 
It is worthy to note that Ostrom concludes that neither market nor state 
regulations have consistently nor reliably been able to govern the commons 
efficiently, each has underperformed when compared with some collective action 
governance schemes.246 This underperformance, provoked Ostrom’s need to 
explore an alternative to managing CPRs. This by no way means that Ostrom’s 
alternative is the only way to manage CPRs, but rather she proposes that it is the 
optimal way to do it. 
Ostrom’s contention with state and market forces rests in the fact that neither 
theories resolve the question of supplying a new set of institutions;247 making 
credible commitments; and mutual monitoring within self-organised groups. As 
we know, the theory of the firm centres around economic theories that explains 
how the structure and behaviour of firms, companies and corporations interact 
with the market and influence outcomes within the market (for example, pricing 
of goods and services).248 The theory of the state on the other hand, as depicted 
by Ostrom, states that rather than an entrepreneur (firms, corporations etc.), it 
 
243 By external source, we refer to government institutions or market forces. 
244 Starting at the lowest level and moving up through the system. 
245 This scenario will be explored later in greater detail as this work progresses. 
246 An interesting point to consider within our own SME sector. We have noted the failures of government 
interventions as a defect in the market, as we continue forward in successive chapters we shall also consider policy 
interventions, but at this point it is not presumptuous to state that the policy interventions may not have had the 
desired effect, considering that it is still on the government agenda to revitalise the sector. 
247 That is formal or informal rules that govern human behaviour, or systems for changing those rules. They define 
the benefits that will be attached to different actions. 
248Ostrom (n 230) 40; Also, Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica, New Series 386. 
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becomes a ruler who recognises that considerable benefits can be gained by 
organising some activities.249 Ostrom submits that both theories require the 
interference of an outsider250 supplying the institutional changes to organise 
activities, the entrepreneur or the ruler makes the commitments to punish rule 
breakers and monitor activities.251 
Ostrom’s rejection of these theories’ rests on the fact that it requires outside 
influences to aid self-organised groups, when within the community, the 
individuals can successfully govern themselves and monitor their activities. By 
presenting the above analysis, Ostrom seeks to affirm that successful self-
governance is possible, thus rejecting the need for external coercion. It should 
be noted that while Ostrom maintains that the key situation is self-governing 
without external influence, she nevertheless concedes that there will be situations 
where external influences will have a use. By this, we mean that the state can 
confer legitimacy on self-organised groups by recognising the rules created by 
the groups, or even taking it a step further by helping to enforce rules (through 
the court system) on erring individuals within the group.252 
From the above, we can clearly note that Ostrom favours a self-governing system 
within communities when it comes to managing and maintaining a CPR. Ostrom 
nevertheless submits that it would be erroneous to conclude that individuals with 
common interest would voluntarily act together to further that interest.253 She 
rests this submission on the work done by Mancur Olson in 1965, in his book The 
 
249Ostrom (n 230) 41. 
250 As (n 210) above suggests, external forces (outsiders) refer to government institutions or market forces. 
251 Ostrom (n 23) 40 
252 Ideally within Ostrom’s theory, the self-organised group should be able to carry out both monitoring and 
sanctioning functions, but realistically that is not always the case, Ostrom accepts that in a situation such as this, the 
use of external influence will be unavoidable. 
253 Reaffirming the paradox in the prisoners’ dilemma game. 
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Logic of Collective Action.254 She cites Olson’s assertion that unless there is some 
form of persuasion to make individuals act in their shared interest, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve common interest.255 Ostrom further extends the 
spectrum of Olson’s assertion and restates it. She infers that “one who cannot be 
excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective-good, once the good is 
produced has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of the 
good”. She terms this as the ‘free rider’ problem.256 The free rider is simply that 
person in every group or collection of individuals who wants something for doing 
nothing, that individual who will act opportunistically when given a chance, 
defying the collectives’ rules and not making efforts to achieve the shared 
interest. 
4.3. The Problem of the Free-rider and the Common-pool 
Resource 
 
Above we highlighted briefly who a free-rider is, but now it becomes apt to 
explore how the concept of free-riding informs our analysis of the tragedy of the 
commons. The problem of the free rider is tied to the economic nature of public 
goods. By public goods, it means goods that can be enjoyed jointly by many 
people who are hard to exclude from its use, for example, peace.257 CPRs are 
public goods, but they must be distinguished from goods such as peace, as free-
riding affects each differently. This distinction lies in the sub-tractability of the 
goods. “Enjoyment of peace as a public good does not subtract from the 
enjoyment of others, but with CPRs, each person’s enjoyment of the resource 
 
254 Ostrom (n 230) 5. 
255Ostrom (n 230) 6. 
256 Ibid 
257 Elinor Ostrom Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press 2005) 23. 
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subtracts units from that resource”.258 This is why exclusion becomes necessary, 
if everyone tries to free-ride, the resulting effect is that the common resource will 
be destroyed because no one is contributing to maintaining it. 
Exclusion mechanisms are fundamental to overcoming the free-rider problem. If 
exclusion is a direct consequence for individuals not participating in maintaining 
the resources, it is possible to conclude that the fear of exclusion will coerce 
individuals within the community to engage in maintaining the resource. Ostrom 
submits that the community is best placed at deciding what these ‘exclusion 
terms’ should be. They are the ones affected, they possess more information 
about the resources and how it is accessed, and this puts them in the best 
position to design effective rules which have greater impact on the individuals 
within the community. 
Given the issues of over-exploitation of resources and those of the free rider 
concept highlighted above, Ostrom explores ways in which the resources could 
be maintained within a community without the aid of external influences. She 
embarks on this study through a comprehensive scrutiny of several long-standing 
and viable common property systems. Ostrom attempts to develop a series of 
reasoned conjectures about how it is possible that some individuals organise 
themselves to govern and manage common pool resources and others do not. 
An instructive example of how individuals can organise themselves to maintain a 
resource by self-governance is the California water basin study, a part of this 
study will be discussed below. 
 
258 Ibid. 
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The Raymond water basin negotiations259 which shall be analysed, presents a 
market type system in which extractors had property rights, and there was no 
co-ordination between those property holders. Thus, on the face of it, a market 
solution was failing. The market was not complete, external costs imposed 
required internalising, and to avoid the free-rider or over-exploitative property 
owners maximising personal returns at the expense of other users and the 
resource, a solution needed to be found. 
A summary of the Raymond Basin negotiation is presented thus: 
Water rights in California had been defined on the basis of 
whether a producer owned the overlying land and used the 
water on that land (overlying landowner) or used the water to 
serve areas other than the land owned by the water producer 
(appropriator). Under the common law, an overlying landowner 
held a riparian right to the ‘full flow’ of the water supply 
underlying his or her land. Where there existed a dispute 
between rights of overlying land owners, by virtue of the 
doctrine of ‘correlative rights’ developed in the case of Katz v. 
Walkinshaw,260 it was held that in times of shortage the court 
will treat all owners as coequal owners, and gain proportionate 
share of the water, rather than absolute share.  In the San 
Bernardino v. Riverside261 case of 1921, the overlying 
 
259 Ostrom (n 230) 111. 
260 (1903) 141 Cal. 116 
261 (1921) 186 Cal. 7 
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landowner’s rights over water was further limited to only taking 
what could be put to beneficial use. 
Apart from the competition between overlying landowners, there 
also existed appropriators. The appropriators pumped ground 
water to be used on land not owned by those withdrawing water. 
The doctrine of appropriative rights allowed appropriators to 
withdraw surplus water or water that was not being put to 
beneficial use. Appropriator’s rights were defined by the doctrine 
of first in time, i.e. depending on their history of use. Among 
appropriators, a court resolved conflict over scarcity of water 
would usually exclude junior appropriators. However, 
appropriators were potentially subordinate to overlying 
landowners. 
The simultaneous existence of correlative rights and the doctrine 
of appropriative rights created uncertainty about the relative 
rights of the ground water basin. This was compounded by a 
third common-law doctrine which allowed ground water 
producers to gain rights through adverse use. That is, if a person 
occupies a land, in an open, notorious and continuous manner 
for a set period of five years, and the owner does not eject him, 
the original owner loses the rights to the land. Due to all these 
uncertainties, over extraction was the logical outcome.  
The Raymond water basin negotiation: 
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Los Angeles (LA) is a semiarid region, and thus relies heavily on 
ground water basins for its water supply. Ground water basins 
are delicate resources of nature and can thus be destroyed by 
over extraction and/or pollution. If more water is taken per year 
than the regular level eventually the resource will be ruined. In 
LA, over extraction threatened all of the groundwater basins 
until institutional changes were initiated by those affected. In 
the Raymond Basin negotiations, the city of Pasadena bore the 
responsibility and the costs of replenishing and maintaining the 
ground water basin, thus their individual action was benefitting 
all others using the basin but not contributing to the cost (it is 
suggested that all others thus be adjudged free riders).  
At a certain point the city of Pasadena declared that it would no 
longer bear the costs of replenishing and maintaining the basin. 
The city tried unsuccessfully to negotiate voluntary settlement 
with the other users, whereby all users will reduce the amount 
of water being withdrawn by them. With the failure of the 
negotiations, Pasadena initiated legal action, the case was 
referred to the Division of Water Resources of California to 
determine the safe yield of the basin and whether there was 
surplus.  The process was lengthy and costly, and it was 
reported that pumping needed to cease to curtail their pumping 
to the safe yield. Not sure what judge would decide, and because 
of how rights were assigned (meaning that some would get 
more, while others will be left out), it dawned on the participants 
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that failure to agree would result in a pumping race. At 
Pasadena’s instigation they all sat down to negotiate between 
themselves in the shadow of the court, and within six months 
they had drafted stipulations and signed the agreement except 
for two holdouts. The parties agreed that the safe yield had been 
exceeded and they needed to cut back to the safe yield of the 
basin, and the cut back was to be shared proportionately. The 
parties further guaranteed each other’s proportional share of the 
safe yield. After another 6 months one of the holdouts agreed 
with the stipulations. The last holdout on took them to court, but 
rather than impose its own solution the court upheld the 
stipulations agreed by the parties, and imposed it upon the 
holdout, who was thus forced by law to “agree”.  
The parties went one step further and obtained legislation to 
permit taxation to be raised for the purposes of monitoring the 
agreement, and repair of the water basins that had been 
damaged.262 It might be worth noting that in this example both 
market and State (law) forces are used by the users of the 
common resource. 
This above scenario reaffirms Ostrom’s arguments that self-organisation is 
possible without the need for external influence, and this is just one of the many 
cases portrayed throughout her work. Despite the above, Ostrom nevertheless 
presents a balanced argument. She concedes that self-governance will not work 
 
262 Ostrom (n 230) 111-135. 
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in every situation and illustrates this point with the scenario of Bodrum Fishery263 
among others.  In the Bodrum situation, the local fishing cooperative struggled 
unsuccessfully to mediate in conflicts among small-boat fishers, the new entrants 
and trawlers. 
From her study of successes and failures of self-governing systems, Ostrom was 
able to develop eight factors that when present, permitted the development and 
successful government of common property. These principles are: a clearly 
defined boundary of both individuals or households who have rights to withdraw 
from a particular resource, and also of the resource itself; congruence between 
rules governing the use of common goods to local needs and conditions; those 
affected by the rules should participate in modifying the rules; ensure that those 
monitoring behaviours are accountable to the appropriators or are the 
appropriators; the use of graduated sanctions for rule violators; provision of 
accessible and low-cost means for dispute resolution; the rights of community 
members to make rules should be respected by outside authorities; and the 
responsibility for governing the common resource lies in nested tiers from the 
lowest level up to the highest. Another important point raised, was the ability to 
effectively exclude those who violate the rules as a form of sanction, this was to 
serve as a reinforcement of the importance of following the rules within the 
community. Without an effective way of exclusion and enforcing sanctions by 
those who use the resource, then, the CPR would suffer degradation. 
 
 
 
 
 
263 Ostrom (n 230) 144. 
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4.4. Review of Governing the Commons 
 
 
In the section above a concise version of Ostrom’s work was presented. While 
not every aspect was explored in detail, it touched on some key aspects. It was 
noted that common-pool resources will always be subject to degradation where 
there are no limitations placed on its use. Ostrom’s work undertook a thought-
provoking exercise to determine who was best suited to put into place those 
limitations. She opposed the use of external influences such as the state, but 
rather promoted the use of self-governing mechanisms. Despite this opposition, 
she does accept that some situations will benefit from the legitimacy which state 
forces can confer. She further affirms that self-organised groups can work 
together to decide the best possible way to use a resource and attain maximum 
benefits for each participant. She cautions that it would be erroneous to conclude 
that individuals with common interest would voluntarily act together to further 
that interest without some form of persuasion. She also notes that there will 
always be opportunistic free riders taking advantage. But sanctions will keep the 
free riders in check and self-monitoring by those who have a vested interest to 
maintain the resource will always be more efficient than external coercions. 
While exploring her work, it became apparent that concepts which she adopts 
would prove relevant to this thesis. The bottom up approach Ostrom takes in 
Governing the Commons seemed on the face of it crucial to creating a viable SME 
sector. Given that she recognises that the people who use the resource – in our 
case finance - are best placed to make the laws and set up institutions that govern 
its use, it was worth considering if between the SME and lender264 who transact 
 
264 Again, this could be a Government lender or a private lender. 
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on a day-to-day basis, if they should be the ones who develop the rules 
(institutions) as to how they transact,265 mostly likely supported by in Ostrom’s 
words “external influences” to give it legitimacy. But a question left unanswered 
was how to clearly develop these institutions, therefore it became apparent we 
would need to move beyond Ostrom’s contextual examination of CPRs to her 
more generalised model, so as to analyse the subject matter of the thesis. Hence, 
it became relevant to consider her next book in other to get a deeper 
understanding. 
 
4.5. Understanding Institutional Diversity. 
 
Following the publication of ‘Governing the Commons,’ Ostrom came to the 
realisation that the factors and processes she was analysing in that context could 
be potentially usable in broader contexts beyond CPRs. Thus, she endeavoured 
in a final major work to produce a universal account of an institutional structure 
in which users of economic markets were able to self-govern and self-transform 
the market in the face of problems and dysfunctions within the market. In 
‘Understanding Institutional Diversity’, Ostrom tries to extend and apply the 
comprehension of the principles of governing CPRs identified above in a broader 
context. She does this by analysing the heterogeneity of rules and norms, and 
how they are established and in what situations they will be obeyed. Ostrom’s 
 
265 For example, when we move on to the chapters in which we conduct our analysis of the Lagos SME sector, we 
would note that identification of persons was a barrier within the sector. In terms of identification, one common 
means was the use of the Nigerian National Identity Card., Rather than get national ID which is a difficult thing to 
achieve, it becomes relevant to consider whether between lending institutions and borrowers they can develop 
some other means of identification between themselves. These banks and schemes operate in the same community 
through branches and can thus generate their own forms of identification. Banks have ‘know your customer’ 
requirements in which they generate information, thus it is relevant to consider what other alternatives could be. 
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discussion is supported by an extensive array of empirical work. She presents 
hypothetical scenarios which depicts human behaviour to certain external 
influences and draws patterns within institutions. In governing the commons, she 
started with concrete and real-life situations (i.e. CPRs in individual case studies) 
and created a theory of CPR management based on common linkages from her 
study. However, in Understanding Institutional Diversity she works from high 
generality and abstraction to create an analysis theory that can be used across 
different situations. It is this abstraction that is of particular interest to this work. 
Ostrom’s later analysis is potentially applicable to any market which is 
dysfunctional, and as the SME capital market in Lagos Nigeria is seen to be 
dysfunctional, this broader approach can be applied. 
It is suggested that Ostrom seeks to understand interactions within institutions266 
i.e. what an institution is, and how the institution functions. However, her work 
is not only a conceptual analysis of institutions, but rather she gives a modelling 
of how institutions can be changed. She understands and recognises that 
institutions are diverse, and that this diversity extends to how interactions occur 
within the institution. Nevertheless, she maps out a framework for analysing 
these diversities and interactions and concludes that the framework can be 
transposed across institutions to effect change. In short, she created a dynamic 
meta-framework of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
266 We have previously defined institution to mean the formal or informal rules that govern human behaviour, or 
systems for changing those rules. They define what benefits that will be attached to different actions, see note 247 
above.   
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4.5.1 The Action Arena as a Framework for Institutional 
Analysis  
 
Ostrom in developing her meta-framework focuses on what she calls ‘action 
arenas’ and how external variables affect the structure of the action arena, 
provoking interactions that create outcomes. Ostrom defines action arenas to 
include situations in the home; neighbourhood; local, regional and international 
councils; firms and markets etc.267 It is suggested that these arenas are the 
lowest levels of analysis within the institutional structure, and it is at this level 
she seeks to effect change.268  Within Ostrom’s arena, there are components that 
must interact to produce outcomes; the action situation and the participants. 
  
                                Action Arena 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Taken from Ostrom’s text, representing the action arena, where variables interact with components of the arena 
i.e. the action situation and the participant, thereby producing outcomes. Evaluation occurs through an observance of 
these interactions and outcomes by an analyst or by the participants of the arena. (Permission to reproduce has been 
granted by Princeton University Press). 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to distinguish between what the action arena is, 
and what an action situation means. Simply put, the action arena is the place in 
 
267 Ostrom (n 257) 13. 
268 This draws to mind the bottom-up approach she adopted in her management of CPRs. Starting from the lowest 
level to influence change. 
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which things happen, the action situation is what happens within the place. Thus, 
an action situation is the “social space where participants with diverse 
preferences interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate 
one another, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in action 
arenas)”.269 Ostrom further characterizes her action situations by using seven 
clusters of variables.270 They are the participants; positions; potential outcomes; 
action-outcome linkages; the control that a participant exercises; type of 
information generated and; the costs and benefits assigned to actions and 
outcomes. All this combine to create the internal structure of Ostrom’s the action 
situation. 
Exogenous Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 The internal structure of Ostrom’s action situation, depicting the seven variables that create the action situation. 
(Permission to reproduce has been granted by Princeton University Press) 
 
269 Ostrom (n 257) 14. 
270 Ibid. 
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But what do all these variables mean? If we recall, there are seven of them. 
Firstly, the participants, this refers to the decision-making entities assigned to 
positions and are capable of selecting actions from different alternatives and 
generating new alternatives. The second variable is the position, this is the 
connecting link between participants and actions, and it distinguishes the levels 
different participants can occupy. The position is an anonymous slot which 
participants can move into and out of, for example, players, voters, legislators, 
buyers, sellers etc.271 The third is the potential outcomes, this refers to the 
possible results from the actions taken by participants. The fourth variable is the 
action-outcome linkages; this simply means the resulting effect of a decision 
made by a participant in a position, it is a direct action taken by participants to 
produce results. The fifth variable is the control that participant exercises, as we 
noted different participants occupy different positions, some can influence actual 
change (the decision makers) and some cannot, that is, some can exercise more 
control than others - the extent of control can vary from absolute to none.  
The sixth variable is the type of information generated, this is simply the amount 
of knowledge the participants have about the full set of actions available to them 
and resulting outcomes, and how these actions are linked to the outcomes. 
Ostrom notes that participants in the action arena can have access to complete 
or incomplete information.272 She nevertheless notes that complete information 
rests in the realm of assumption about things within the arena. The information 
might be complete, but a distinction needs to be drawn between perfect complete 
 
271 Ostrom (n 257) 40. Depending on the structure of the situation, a participant may simultaneously occupy more 
than one position. 
272 Ostrom (n 257) 50. 
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information and imperfect complete information.273 To understand this 
distinction, the general examples used are games of chess or card games. It has 
been suggested that a chess game is a game of perfect information because the 
state of the game is described by the positions of the pieces and whose turn it 
is, and this information is available to both players.274 But with imperfect 
information, while they may have some information, other strategies are revealed 
gradually. For example in the card game bridge, the first move of the game is to 
deal the cards at random, each player knows the contents of their own hand, but 
the contents of the other players’ hands are revealed only gradually, as cards are 
played one by one.275 
The final variable is the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes. 
Ostrom submits that rewards and/or sanctions maybe be distributed to 
participants in positions depending on the path taken to achieve a particular 
outcome.276 All these variables will interact in the action situation, to produce 
outcomes in an action arena. 
While Ostrom’s illustrations serves the purpose of depicting her explanation of 
the arena, it became pertinent to translate her depiction into a relatable image 
for the writer’s own understanding. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the arena 
was reimaged as a house, with the exogenous variables being the foundation on 
which the house was built, provoking interactions within the house and producing 
 
273 It is worthy to note that Ostrom believes analysts are more likely to assume that participants have access to 
incomplete information. 
274 Jean R. S. Blair, David Mutchler, and Cheng Liu ‘Games with Imperfect Information’ (1993) AAAI Technical Report 
Available at <https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Fall/1993/FS-93-02/FS93-02-009.pdf> Accessed 20th August 
2019, 62. 
275 Blair (n 274). 
276 Ostrom (n 257) 52. 
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outcomes, all subject to evaluative criteria.277 The re-imagination is depicted 
thus:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.1.3: The re-imagined structure of the action situation makes some of the abstracting metaphors used by Ostrom more 
concrete. It also makes the foundational nature of exogenous factors clearer. Finally, process is given two directions of 
change: side to side for interaction; from bottom to top for significant consequences of the interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
277 These criteria will be discussed subsequently in chapter four, however note that they are: efficiency; 
accountability; equity; adaptability, resilience and robustness; and conformance to general morality. 
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4.6. How does the Action Arena Effect Change? 
 
Before attempting to answer the question posed above, it is relevant to 
independently consider other concepts ingrained in Ostrom’s work which will 
influence the answer to the proposed question. These aspects are the importance 
of rules, and what sanctions are appropriate. Above we have hinted at the impact 
rules and sanctions will have on the action arena, below we shall now endeavour 
to consider more fully what these impacts might be.  
4.6.1. The importance of rules and norms. 
 
It should be noted that rules are particularly important in Ostrom’s action 
situation because rules are used by participants in an action arena to order their 
relationships.278 Ostrom suggests that rules are only important in that they allow 
the outcomes resulting from the participants’ choices. For Ostrom, these rules 
are also used to rule out certain actions, or rule in some actions. Given the 
important role that rules play within the action arena, it becomes necessary to 
answer the self-posed question ‘what are rules?’ In defining rules, Ostrom adopts 
the definition from Black’s law dictionary. This definition embraces four features 
of the meaning of rules, they are: regulations; instructions; precepts; and 
principles.279 Regulations are the laws that come from an authority.280 
Instructions denote a manual used to solve a problem, and precepts reflect 
honest moral behaviours, while principles are codes of conduct. So, when the 
 
278 Ostrom (n 257) 15.  
279 Ostrom (n 257) 16. 
280 Government, Legislature etc. 
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word rule is used, it encompasses law, strategy and moral behaviour, codes of 
conduct. In Ostrom’s modelling they are intertwined.  
It is suggested that the concept of moral behaviour, that is, the precept form of 
rules is hinged on the personal norms of participants. These personal norms can 
either be internalised individual norms or a group norm, but the key thing is that 
both are internalised. By this, it is meant that it can be a belief specific only to 
the individual, or a belief shared by individuals within the same group, which the 
group is aware of and abides by. It should be noted that norms are a reflection 
of the participants’ culture and community. According to Ostrom, “norms are 
prescriptions held by an individual that an action or outcome in a situation must, 
must not, or may be permitted”.281 In other words, they are the accepted 
behaviours which an individual adheres to, they are in a way, an informal 
institution. Ostrom suggests that over time as rules subsist in society, they 
gradually become norms i.e. socially accepted personal behaviours.  
As Ostrom did in her own work to illustrate the importance of rules and norms, 
let us theorise our own snatch game282 regarding SMEs in Lagos. Note that the 
snatch game characterizes situations where the individuals involved do not share 
norms and rules. In this game, participants (lets term them A and B) are required 
to trade with each other. But each participant works with different sets of rules 
and norms. An example of a different set of norms or rules can be, for participant 
B there are no norms which prohibit him from taking participant A’s goods 
forcefully. Ostrom suggests that in this ‘snatch game,’ if given the chance, 
participant B will snatch the goods of A because he stands to gain more this way, 
 
281Ostrom (n 257) 121. 
282 Ostrom (n 257) 36. 
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rather than through an equal trade. In our own snatch game, we have lenders 
and borrowers, and given the well-known corrupt nature of Nigeria as a country, 
we can hypothesize that some norms the participants may have will include 
fraudulent behaviours i.e. not paying back loans with no legitimate reason, not 
using loans for the purpose they were meant, absconding with loans etc. Lest we 
paint all participants with the same brush, it should be stated that not everyone 
will share this trait. Some are genuine and honest. Nevertheless, this does not 
eliminate the bona fide fear that dishonest behaviour is a possibility. 
To play our theorized game, lenders and borrowers are faced with several moves 
which they can play. 
1. They can deal with each other despite the uncertainties. With this move, 
the lenders take a gamble and hope their money is going to a genuine 
borrower. The lender may have conducted personal research, but how 
credible is the information? They run the risk of the borrower making off 
with his money. 
2. The lenders can impose stringent requirements on the borrower in the 
form of collaterals.283 Several things can happen here; the borrower may 
not have the capacity to provide said collateral, so they walk away, or they 
provide false documents which supposedly show ownership of property 
somewhere, which he hands over to the lender. In the event of a default, 
the lender calls in the collateral and realizes that the loan was never 
 
283 Frederick Onyango ‘Banks Demand More Collateral as Loan Defaults Rise’ (2016) Lagos Television Available at < 
http://www.lagostelevision.com/banks-demand-collateral-loan-defaults-rise/ > accessed on 7th December, 2016. 
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secure.284 Or we can have a genuine borrower, who can legitimately meet 
the requirements. 
3. There are no willing lenders, or there are no borrowers capable of meeting 
the requirements set by lenders, so no one plays the game. 
We now begin to see how important rules are, especially their precept form.285 
Societal and cultural influences affect our assumptions of the behaviour of others 
and their assumptions of our behaviour. It may seem like an overused opinion to 
restate that corruption has a negative effect on the business environment of a 
country, but this assertion remains valid even now. It ties back to the issue of 
trust which has been hinted at as forming a basis of our analysis,286 and the 
lender’s bona-fide fear of encountering a dishonest borrower. Corruption sets up 
a system in such a way that taking advantage is seen as the better strategy, over 
that of playing the game legitimately so all participants can benefit. 
The question of how to get individuals to act cooperatively, and maximize 
collective individual returns becomes paramount. Ostrom’s underlying focus rests 
on the premise that given the right set of rules, individual responses i.e. the 
choices the individual will make, can be predicted if the right costs and benefits 
are attached. “The opportunity and constraints individuals face in any particular 
situation, the information they obtain, the benefits they obtain or are excluded 
from, and how they reason about the situation are all affected by the rules that 
structure the situation”.287 The challenge as Ostrom states, lies in knowing 
 
284 Gbenga Bada ‘EFCC arraigns man for forgery over N50m bank loan’ (2016) PulseNG Available at < 
http://pulse.ng/gist/in-lagos-efcc-arraigns-man-for-forgery-over-n50m-bank-loan-id5593357.html > accessed on 7th 
December, 2016. 
285 Ostrom assumes that individuals are fallible learners trying to do the best they can in the long term by using 
norms and heuristics in making their immediate decisions. Ostrom (n 257) 7. 
286 This would be discussed more fully in chapter five. 
287 Ostrom (n 257) 1. 
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enough about the structure of the situation to select the appropriate assumptions 
about human behaviour that fit the type of situation under analysis. This suggests 
that before attempting to apply her modelling, we must identify fully what our 
situation is.288 
Ostrom further states that rules are “a set of instructions for creating an action 
situation in a particular environment”. She uses working rules to illustrate this 
premise. By working rules, Ostrom refers to the set of rules to which participants 
in an action arena would ascribe as the reason they did a particular thing. Ostrom 
suggests that following a particular rule may become a ‘social habit’, and that as 
individuals consciously adopt different rules over time their behaviour changes 
and conforms with the rule.289 This suggests that rules can influence the way an 
individual behaves and in turn become norms. However, Ostrom advises caution 
when working with rules. She states that “all rules are formulated in human 
language and as such share the problem of lack of clarity and 
misunderstanding”.290 The use of the concept of working rules begins to suggest 
that Ostrom’s action situation may adopt a creationist approach to structure the 
action arena. The rationale behind this statement is that, if in creating the action 
situation there already exists a set of instructions or manual which participants 
follow, this suggests that a design of how things can play out has already been 
formulated. This reflects the nature of game theory, where possible strategies 
that can be made by players within a game have been set up, and the game is 
played when players pick one or more strategies to achieve an outcome. 
 
288 Succeeding chapters will establish this more fully, culminating in the synthesis of the information with Ostrom’s 
framework that will be carried out in chapter’s six and seven. 
289 Ostrom (n 257) 19.  
290 Ostrom (n 257) 20. 
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Going back to Ostrom’s definition of rules which she takes from the Black’s law 
dictionary, it suggested that her definition of the concept of rules is too restrictive 
given the broad nature of law. On the face of it, it may look as if she misses other 
relevant concepts such as facilitative rules, co-ordination rules, and the 
channelling effect of rules; these are aspects worth addressing and clarifying 
before moving further. As a form of warning when addressing these above 
concepts, one should be careful of not rewriting Ostrom’s work and turning it into 
what we want her definition of law to be, due to our own understanding of the 
nature of law. Delving into these other concepts of rules brings about a 
jurisprudential quality291 which is not made clear in Ostrom’s work, but it seems 
necessary to highlight them because they may or may not inform our own 
analysis and understanding. 
 It is suggested that while not addressed straight on, Ostrom does highlight the 
importance of facilitative rules. The concept of facilitative rule, while not part of 
her definition is implicit in her work, thus deserves to be elucidated. In her first 
book ‘Governing the Commons’, if we recall the California water basin case 
previously discussed, we noted that the parties changed the way in which they 
governed their commons by sitting down to agree on how to maintain the 
resource and drafting an agreement to that effect. This depicts the facilitative 
aspect of law. By facilitative, we mean the individual’s ability to use rules to order 
or structure their relationships, for example this can be done through the use of 
contracts. Furthermore, in ‘Understanding Institutional Diversity’, Ostrom talks 
about shifting through levels of analysis from one situation to a deeper rule 
 
291 In H.L.A. Harts Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961), Hart provides a descriptive theory of the nature of 
law, its origins and its relationship with morality 
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changing one.292 This change can occur because “all rules are nested in another 
set of rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed…...What can be 
done at a higher level will depend on the capabilities and limits of the rules at 
that level and at a deeper level”.293 The above suggests that the changing of 
rules through level shifting is facilitative in nature, because participants have 
recognised constraints on the current level which they are on, to re-order the 
situation, they move up another level so things can be changed. 
As stated above already, rules also channel294 or coordinate behaviour, even 
though there might not be an enforcement mechanism. The fact that there is a 
rule, allows people to channel their behaviour and act accordingly. The 
channelling behaviour takes over the role of sanctioning. For example, the rule 
of the road, where driving on the left side is the accepted. If you drive on the 
right, you are most likely to crash, so your behaviour is adjusted to drive on the 
left to avoid crashing. It is proposed that this channelling and coordination aspect 
of rules is reflected in the way Ostrom uses “norms”. If we recall, “norms are the 
prescriptions held by an individual that an action or outcome in a situation must, 
must not, or may be permitted”.295 It has been suggested that norms help 
coordinate behaviour. “Norms impose uniformity of behaviour within a given 
social group”.296 Given that norms are synonymous for rules within Ostrom’s 
arena, it can be concluded that norms reflect the coordination and channelling 
aspects of rules. The problem of Ostrom using the definition in Black’s law 
 
292 Ostrom (n 257) 56. 
293 Ostrom (n 257) 56. 
294 Fuller notes that this is a function performed by legal formalities. Lon L. Fuller ‘Consideration and Form’ (1941) 
41 Columbia Law Review 799, 801. 
295 Ostrom (n 257) 121. 
296 Steven N. Durlauf, and Lawrence E. Blume, ‘Social Norms’ Available at < 
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/PalgraveSocialNormsJuly07.pdf > Accessed on 3rd January, 2017. 
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dictionary as the basis for her explanation of rules is that one is left to draw 
conclusions on how these other concepts fit into her action situation. She hints 
at their existence within the action situation but does not expressly add them as 
part of her definition rules. 
Another salient feature of Ostrom’s definition of rules is that it also extends to 
cover legal positivism. This is reflected when she adopts the definition of how law 
comes from an authority. By legal positivism, we refer to John Austin’s command 
theory. “Austin’s particular theory of law is often called the ‘command theory of 
law’ because the concept of command lies at is core: law is the command of the 
sovereign, backed by a threat of sanction in the event of non-compliance”.297 
Now let us take it another step further to review our understanding of Ostrom’s 
use of rule. If we are in agreement that although the words facilitative, 
coordination and channelling are not expressly stated they are nevertheless 
implicit in her work, we can classify Ostrom’s rule into ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ 
rules. This classification or distinction of rules was created by H.L. A Hart, and he 
expressed that “primary rules are rules of conduct; they tell you what you are 
legally obligated to do (or refrain from) and what consequences attach to 
obedience or disobedience. Secondary rules include everything except primary 
rules. The category of secondary rules includes legal rules that allow for the 
creation, extinction, and alteration of primary rules; these secondary rules 
are power-conferring rules”,298 this again suggests the facilitative aspect of rules. 
 
297 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Also ‘John 
Austin’s legal positivism’ Available at < 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/faculty_franke/CLT/Summary%20of%20John%20Austins%20Legal%20Positivism.pd
f > accessed on 9th January, 2017 where he discusses the command theory. 
298 Legal Theory, Available at < http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.html > 
Accessed on 8th January, 2017. Also, Austin (n 297). 
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More importantly, secondary rules permit people to develop their own primary 
rules that regulate their private relationships, and it is how to develop and change 
these rules that Ostrom focuses on in her action situation. 
We started off this section by talking about the importance of rules, we noted 
they were used to order the relationship of participants in an action situation. 
More importantly for Ostrom, her focus on rules rests on two basic reasons. To 
quote her: 
“First, institutional analysts conducting policy analysis are frequently 
asked to analyse the impact of some change in rules-either a change 
that has already occurred or the possible impacts of a proposed 
change. Second, institutional analysts working to craft solutions to 
negative outcomes in an action situation recognize that changes in the 
rules may be easier or more stable than attempts to change the 
situation through changes in the biophysical world or attributes of the 
community”.299 
Throughout her work, Ostrom makes reference to an ‘analyst’ who it seems 
structures and observes the action situation. Again, she states that this analyst 
‘works to craft solutions to negative outcomes in an action situation’. It is 
suggested that her reference to the analyst again creates an assumption of a 
creationist model.300 While this reflects the nature of setting up ‘the game’ in 
game theory, this however conflicts with the bottom up approach which she 
justifies as the reason for her action situation. However, the understanding of the 
 
299Ostrom (n 257) 138. 
300 This will be dealt with more deeply later on in this chapter, when we discuss Mechanism Design, as we consider 
if Ostrom’s modelling is the only approach to analyse the thesis question. 
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role of the analyst is more generally to observe the interactions that occur within 
the action arena, rather than design the situation. It is from this observing of the 
arena playing out naturally in reaction to the exogenous variables that we begin 
to see where changes can occur. 
4.6.2 What are the appropriate sanctions? 
 
The stability of ruled ordered relationships is also dependent upon enforcement, 
breaking rules is always a possibility to individuals in an action arena but 
associated with breaking rules is a risk of being monitored and sanctioned.301 “If 
one person can cheat without being caught, others can also cheat with 
impunity”.302 This suggests that if there are no adequate sanctions attached to 
the rules made, the rules may not be followed and predicting outcomes becomes 
unstable. What should be understood is that sanctions can be either positive or 
negative. Positive in the sense that it comes in form of an incentive to encourage 
better behaviour among participants, and negative in that it excludes rule 
breaking participant from attaining benefits or imposing a direct loss or detriment. 
Here, Ostrom restates her conclusion from her earlier work about self-
governance. She suggests that the enforcers of the rules should come from 
participants within the institution itself, this is because they are more motivated 
to monitor the situation as they have vested interest in the success of the 
institution. 
Using our new understanding of the role of rules and sanctions we shall now 
explore how these concepts influence our arena and the outcomes they produce. 
 
301 Ostrom (n 257) 20. This is John Austin’s command theory that laws must be backed up by sanctions. 
302 Ostrom (n 257) 21. 
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4.7. The Arena and Changing Outcomes 
 
It should be noted that there can be many action situations nested within an 
action arena, but each action situation will be operating at different levels. These 
nested action situations are interconnected, and sometimes participants within 
the situation can occupy institutional functions at different levels.303 By nested, it 
is meant that within that same arena, new levels of interactions and action 
situations can be created based on the initial outcomes produced.304 If we recall 
the diagram in Fig 1.1, we can see that when exogenous variables305 interact 
with components of the arena i.e. the action situation and the participant, 
outcomes are produced. These outcomes feedback into the action situation, and 
back into the variables in a loop-like fashion. This feedback loop will initially occur 
on the same level of analysis, i.e. participants doing the same things, producing 
the same outcomes, and nothing changes. For example, a same level feedback 
loop can be: in a situation where, exogenous variables such as lack of collateral; 
corruption; inadequate debt recovery system exist, a lender gives out a loan, the 
borrower doesn’t pay, the lender is unable to recover the loan due to system 
failure, and it can be assumed that an outcome can be the lender not giving out 
loans again. This loop will look like fig. 1.4 below: 
 
 
 
303 In Nigeria, CBN plays the role of lenders, but are also involved in policy making regarding how financial 
institutions operate. 
304 Ostrom generally has three levels, the operational level, where the day-to-day interactions take place, the 
constitutional level where new laws can be created and the meta-constitutional level. 
305 By exogenous variables we can mean culture, societal norms, rules, the community (which can be corrupt) etc. 
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As we can see, in an unchanging loop all the variables remain the same, and the 
same variables and interactions will produce the same outcomes. Therefore, 
something within the action situation must change to create a different set of 
information that will be looped back to the arena and variables. The moment the 
participants start taking steps to change, a new action situation (new level) will 
be created and new outcomes produced. But how does this change occur? It is 
suggested that a reassessment of the produced outcomes by the participants 
involved in the situation can stimulate this change. Also, an awareness of the 
impact of the exogenous variables, can stimulate the desired change within the 
action arena. With an awareness of the impacts of outcomes on the lending 
system, a change that can occur within the situation can be where the borrower 
doesn’t pay back the loan, the lender/lenders can actively seek new legislation to 
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help recover debts in a more efficient manner. This depicts how an analysis of an 
outcome can change the rules. The outcomes will feedback on the participants 
and the situation and may transform both over time.306 
It is suggested that Ostrom’s action arena can be effectively used to understand 
and influence changes in rules and regulations. As noted above already, Ostrom 
prefers a bottom up approach when it comes to institutional changes. This goes 
to her argument that states and/ or market forces often lack the required 
information to efficiently produce the desired better outcomes. If individuals who 
are crafting and modifying rules do not understand how a particular combination 
of rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular ecological and cultural 
environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and at times disastrous 
outcomes.307 
The action arena offers an opportunity to approach rule changing from the lowest 
level. So how are these rules made?  As we can see from the example presented 
above, if we want to change the rules, we use action arenas, the participants 
occupying different positions in the action situations determine the rules to 
change308 and consequences can be attached to these rules,309 thereby changing 
the interactions and influencing outcomes. Below an attempt will be made to 
construct what this rule changing situation could look like. 
 
 
 
 
306Ostrom (n 257) 13. 
307 Ostrom (n 257) 3 
308 As we noted in the credible lending illustration, the lenders sought to influence the debt recovery laws. 
309 See (n 301) above, which makes reference to Austin’s use of sanctions to strengthen the law. 
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4.8. Rule Changing Action Situation 
 
Ostrom’s modelling is about influencing outcomes and possibly changing 
exogenous variables. The question to ask ourselves is what are these outcomes 
and variables we want to influence? To start, an outcome to change could be 
creating a credible lending system and counteracting the lack of trust embedded 
within the system. A variable to change that can help create the desired credible 
system could be inadequate debt recovery laws. Another variable that can 
influence the outcome of creating a credible lending system could be changing 
the laws concerning acceptable forms of collaterals. In short, we are trying to 
change some rules that affect an SME sector. From the above, we have submitted 
that when these changes start to occur, they can occur on different levels (action 
situations) but all in the same arena. Now let us explore what these nested levels 
will look like. Action situation one (Fig.1.5): 
It must be remembered that all these interactions are occurring within the same 
arena but at different levels, below it has been separated for ease of 
understanding. 
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Action situation two (Fig.1.6): 
Inadequate collateral laws. 
(Exogenous Variable) 
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Analysis: 
The first thing we notice from the two situations is that they share common 
participants. This is because to influence the overall arena we have set up; these 
participants need to communicate on all levels. Their interactions will influence 
the changes that will be made to both the collateral law, and the debt recovery 
law. For example, we may change the laws to extend the criteria of acceptable 
collateral to include “patents”. However, if lenders cannot accept that patents 
offer them real value for money the change in law will not make a difference 
because the lenders will still reject it as a form of collateral. On the other hand, 
if the debt recovery laws are revised and made extremely creditor friendly, this 
might stimulate fear among borrowers, and reduce the amount of people actually 
taking out loans. To create a change in variables that is acceptable to all 
participants, they must interact and exchange information.  
The second things noticed are the positions available. As we know, the positions 
are the connecting link between participants and actions. In our scenario, the 
deposit money banks, will occupy the position of lenders, the borrowers will 
borrow, and the CBN shifts into rule changers. It should be noted that the CBN’s 
position can shift between lender and rule changer. Now that the positions have 
been filled, we can determine their actions. This being lending, borrowing and 
policy making. It should be noted that in both diagrams, rule changing can be 
performed through four types of action: policy making, regulatory change, 
practice reform or legislative influence. 
The third thing to be picked out from the situation are the potential outcomes. 
This refers to the possible results from the actions taken by participants. Looking 
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at the diagram, we note that the word ‘potential outcome’ is used, meaning that 
this is desired change we hope to achieve by changing the variables of the arena. 
Illustrating them within the diagram does not mean they are the outcomes 
produced, a change needs to occur, before they become actual outcomes, rather 
than potential outcomes. 
The fourth element noticed is the action-outcome linkages; this simply means the 
resulting effect of a decision made by a participant in a position; the direct action 
taken by participants to produce results. As already noted, for there to be a 
change that leads to the desired outcomes, the participants in positions need to 
interact with each other, meaning that they must exchange information between 
themselves and this exchange of information will influence what actions should 
be taken. 
This leads us to the fifth item, the type of information generated. This is simply 
the amount of knowledge the participants have about the full set of actions 
available to them and resulting outcomes, and how these actions are linked to 
the outcomes. Some potential information that can be generated within the arena 
can be; a consensus on what can be used as collaterals; finding a middle ground 
that is acceptable to all participants with regards to what the debt recovery laws 
allow; what interest rates are acceptable to both borrowers and lenders etc.310 
Exchanging information like this can help achieve the desired potential outcome. 
The next element is the control that the participant exercises, as we noted, 
different participants occupy different positions. Some can influence actual 
 
310 We should however keep in mind that it is nearly impossible to have complete information in an action arena, 
and even if complete, it might still be imperfect. See (n 273) above. 
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change (the decision makers) and some cannot. In our situation, it is implied that 
the CBN is the only participant with any real control. They change and influence 
policy, if there is to be a change in the variables, the participant occupying the 
position of legislator would be the one to effect it. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the control the CBN has is limited. While they can indeed change 
collateral laws, with regards to debt recovery laws, it is more likely they make 
recommendations to a higher body of legislature, rather than effect actual change 
itself.311 
The final variable is the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes. 
This ties into the need to have sanctions attached, to influence the desired 
behaviour of participants in the arena. As noted already, Ostrom submits that 
rewards and/or sanctions maybe be distributed to participants in positions 
depending on the path taken to achieve a particular outcome.312 If the benefits 
of an easy flow of finance and an adequate loan recovery system is to be created 
these sanctions can either be positive or negative. Positive in the sense that it 
comes in form of an incentive to encourage better behaviour among participants, 
and negative in that it excludes rule breaking participants from attaining benefits 
under the system. 
All these above-mentioned elements will have to interact within the action 
situation, to produce the desired outcomes of a credible lending system, and a 
system where trust exists between participants in the action arena. 
 
 
311 This suggests that perhaps another level of an action situation is needed to effect the necessary changes to the 
debt recovery laws. 
312 Ostrom (n 257) 52. 
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4.9. Is Ostrom’s modelling the only approach? 
 
Before moving forward, we must consider if Ostrom’s modelling is the only way 
to approach creating a viable SME sector in Lagos. At the start of this chapter, 
we began by introducing the reader to Elinor Ostrom. We talked about her work 
with managing common-pool resources, and the eight principles for governing 
the commons which she developed through extensive study. We then proceeded 
to lay foundations to discuss her efforts to understand institutional diversity. At 
this point, before immersing ourselves fully in Ostrom’s theory and applying it, it 
seems prudent to ask if ‘Ostrom’s modelling is the only way to approach financing 
of SMEs in Lagos?’ The direct answer to the preceding question is no. Tackling 
the problem of identifying legal, cultural and market impediments to SMEs in 
Lagos can be approached in numerous ways. A suggested alternative way could 
be through the theory of ‘Mechanism Design’. It should be noted that mechanism 
design is another subset of the game theory. It however plays the game in 
reverse. By this we mean that rather that starting at the lowest level and working 
up through an institution as with Ostrom, in mechanism design theory we imagine 
the outcome we want to achieve, and working backwards, we create mechanisms 
and rules which enable us to achieve the desired outcome. As we know, with 
game theory we have players (individuals) who are working with existing rules 
to play a game and see how it ends, however with mechanism design, we start 
at the end of the game, playing backwards. Thus, with game theory, we have 
the existing set of rules, and players can choose from different strategies and 
attain an outcome. Depending on what rules they play by, we can then predict 
what the outcome will be.  
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In mechanism design however, Maskin313 states that “we begin by identifying our 
desired outcome or social goal. We then ask whether or not an appropriate 
institution (mechanism) could be designed to attain that goal”. Maskin believes 
that mechanism design is directed at answering three questions. These questions 
are: When is it possible to design incentive-compatible mechanisms for attaining 
social goals; what form might these mechanisms take when they exist; when is 
finding such mechanisms ruled out theoretically? It is suggested that mechanism 
design examines the hypothetical space in which our desired outcome can be 
realised, given the right incentives. 
Maskin further identifies constraints that impede the playing of ‘the game’. These 
constraints being the moral hazard problem314 and adverse selection. Adverse 
selection is the problem of getting people to share information honestly. He 
nevertheless states that such constraints can be overcome by designing 
incentive-compatible mechanisms. It has been concluded that individuals will 
naturally not share information, unless there is an incentive to do so, or there is 
a benefit attached to sharing this information. The plan or incentives created, 
must give people a reason to share information honestly. It is suggested that a 
purpose of mechanism design is to add sharing information honestly to the list of 
possible strategies available to a participant in a game. 
Mechanism design operates to find a balance between participants needs, for 
example, it can do this using a mediator. Using this equilibrium, the mediator 
 
313 Maskin, E.S ‘Mechanism Design: How to implement social goals’ (2007) Available at < 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/maskin_lecture.pdf > Accessed on 20th 
November, 2016. 
314 Moral hazard occurs where a person’s incentives do not align with his duty, in an ideal situation a person would 
ordinarily carry out his duty, but the moral hazard occurs when it is in my interest not to do my duty, and because 
there is a possibility that you cannot know everything I do, I take advantage of this fact. 
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finds a match or price which satisfies both participants. This price is found by 
splitting the difference between the participant’s best price, and where no match 
can be found, they are free to walk away. This theory assumes that the mediator 
is not behaving strategically. For example, if we assume the government is the 
mediator wanting to balance the needs of lenders and borrowers. They do this 
by creating policies which help to either assure lenders that they will recover 
loans or assure borrowers that they won’t be taken advantage of by the lenders. 
But is a government ever truly unbiased, we must acknowledge the possibility of 
lobbying occurring, and swaying government policy to the side of the better 
lobbyist. We find that in a situation like this, the difference cannot be split fairly. 
If we take the market to be the mediator, it has been suggested already that the 
market does not work in the circumstances under investigation. If we also factor 
in other transaction costs that come with operating within a market, there is 
always a high likelihood that the best price for each participant will not be met, 
and where it is impossible to generate the outcomes that we want, mechanism 
design theory suggests that we stop trying.315  
It has been stated above that mechanism design operates in a hypothetical 
possibility space. The goal is to design mechanisms or possibility space, where 
the only activities that are possible will be the ones that produce socially 
productive outcomes. This maps quite closely to the challenges of the small-
medium enterprise we are trying to resolve, because we are looking at that social 
space in which lenders and borrowers interact, and we want their interactions to 
produce the outcomes of secured lending and honest borrowing and loan 
 
315 See Maskins third question of ‘When is finding such mechanisms ruled out theoretically?’ 
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repayment. This suggests that there is a natural alignment between mechanism 
design and what we are trying to achieve. However, Ostrom’s model and 
mechanism design are trying to do it at different levels of precision. This precision 
is rooted in the difference in approach taken by both theories. 
Both theories are aligned in so far as they seek to pinpoint what variables will 
determine the strategy chosen by participants, which will produce the outcome 
we desire. They also share the same constraints about information sharing and 
how to get participants to honestly share information, thereby adding ‘honest 
communication’ as part of the possible strategies that can be selected when 
playing the game. If you recall our hypothesized snatch game about SME lending 
in Lagos discussed above, it was questioned under the first possible move that 
participants could play whether or not a lender would be able to get credible 
information about the borrower. 
But the approaches differ thus, Ostrom does not start with an outcome and go 
to a design. She states that we must start with a description of the situation, then 
work out if there are problems.316 After this, we then examine if the problem can 
be remedied. Ostrom’s theory offers a more thorough analysis of the problem of 
financing SMEs in Lagos, she does not start with a blank piece of paper and work 
out if X and Y can be solved by altering D and E variables. Ostrom’s type of 
mapping is useful because it allows us to generate information and truly 
understand the reasons why the successive SMEs schemes have failed.  
It is suggested that from reflecting on the history of SMEs in Nigeria, the different 
administrations have simply pictured an outcome they wanted, created schemes 
 
316 Thus, the approach of this thesis to identifying legal market and cultural impediments 
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in which they assumed would produce the desired outcome. A somewhat 
mechanism design approach, they assumed by introducing different schemes in 
the hopes of creating a certain outcome, the problem would be solved. But as 
history has shown, from 1960 to date, the sector still faces high loan defaults 
rates, mistrust between participants within the sector, and an overall failure. 
Obviously, there have been speculations as to why the schemes failed, and on 
this speculation, counter measures have been proposed.317 However, with these 
new proposed counter measures, things are not where they should be. So, the 
question now is, why? What did the previous research into the area miss? How 
concrete are these speculations? Using Ostrom’s modelling gives us the 
opportunity to perhaps answer these questions, rather than playing a guessing 
game, hope we achieve the desired outcome, and walk away when we cannot. 
Furthermore, as mechanism design postulates its constraints on a blank piece of 
paper, Ostrom develops her constraints through a thorough analysis of the 
situation, taking cognizance of the rules318 currently being followed. Ostrom 
allows us to take into account the role of norms when we alter rules, because her 
game takes cognizance of the role norms play in influencing participant decision 
making and includes it as part of her strategy. Mechanism design predicts 
outcomes from an economic rational standpoint but fails to highlight the role of 
norms in influencing human decision making.  
If we look at laws in real world situations, we see they are not always obeyed 
even with the threat of sanctions. Sometimes sanctions from an above authority 
 
317As we shall note during our analysis, the creation of a collateral registry, Central bank of Nigeria stepping in to 
guarantee loans etc. 
318 Keep in mind by rules, we also include norms, regulation, and instructions. 
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are ineffective. Governments change rules all the time, but they do not always 
have the desired effect. Ostrom allows us to investigate why, she suggests it is 
because of the role our existing norms play. Legislation is drafted to affect 
everyone, but whether or not a person will adhere to it depends on their personal 
norms. For example, the American prohibition of alcohol in 1920.319 This 
prevented the manufacturing, sale, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in 
America. Despite the legislation, millions of American still drank alcohol illegally, 
giving rise to bootlegging and speakeasies (illegal, secretive drinking 
establishments), both of which were capitalized upon by organized crime. As a 
result, the Prohibition era is also remembered as a period of gangsterism, 
characterized by competition and violent turf battles between criminal gangs.320 
What this shows is that sometimes where there is a conflict between norms and 
legislation, people are more likely to adhere to their norms. 
However, this is not always the case. Rules can influence norms, and it is where 
this overlap can happen that Ostrom capitalizes. She suggests that legal and 
other policies can affect normative actions, and therefore shift strategic 
behaviour. But what does it mean to change those norms in the real world? A 
classic example would be the end of segregation in America, and the civil rights 
movement. In Brown v Board of Education Topeka321 the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled unanimously (9–0) that racial segregation in public schools violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits the states from 
 
319 ‘Prohibition, United States History [1920–1933]’ Available at < https://www.britannica.com/event/Prohibition-
United-States-history-1920-1933 > Accessed on 8th December, 2016. 
320 Prohibition, United States History (n 314). 
321 (1954) 347 U.S. 483.  Also available at < https://www.britannica.com/event/Brown-v-Board-of-Education-of-
Topeka#ref135870 > Accessed on 8th December, 2016. 
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denying equal protection of the laws to any person within their jurisdictions.322 
With the end of segregation, racial integration began, and today it is frowned 
upon to be overtly racist, when previously open racism was the norm. It should 
be stated that norms cannot always be changed completely, even in modern 
society racism still does exist. The key thing is reversal in the amount of people 
who regard such behaviour as being the norm. For example, if we have a country 
with a population of one thousand, eight hundred believe that being corrupt is 
the status quo and two hundred do not. We would have a society similar to 
America during the prohibition era, and any anti-corruption laws may prove 
abortive. To remedy this, the target becomes influencing the normative value of 
enough people to flip the numbers, so that being corrupt isn’t the order of the 
day. But the question is, how? 
While mechanism design suggests that we change rules to affect outcomes, it 
does not clearly answer the question of how. Neither does it take into 
consideration, the influence of norms on participants when selecting strategies. 
Mechanism design was rejected as a possible tool for analysing the problem of 
financing SMEs in Lagos, because it does not give us the opportunity to explore 
what will actually be effective in terms of policy making. What policy response 
will be effective in terms of rule changing, lies in the description we generate by 
using Ostrom model.  
Ostrom is a response to what’s happening in the world. Remember above, we 
briefly noted the concept of how rules subsist in society to become norms; this 
happens in the overlap where laws and norms interact. This goes back to 
 
322 Ibid 
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Ostrom’s suggestion that following a particular rule may become a ‘social habit’, 
and that as individuals consciously adopt different rules over time, their behaviour 
changes and conforms to the rule.323 The key thing about Ostrom’s model is that 
it generates her rule from within the system, rather than an above authority 
generating these policies.324 
Norms feed into law, it determines what laws are practical. Laws generated by 
the people who are within the situation are more likely to be effective. I would 
presume that if you can enrich yourself without being corrupt, that would be the 
preferred way of life. The current perception in Nigeria is that everyone is corrupt; 
if I don’t act that way, someone else will swindle me. It’s a relationship of “get 
the other person before they get me”. But corruption undermines economic 
activity and increases transaction costs. It means less deals take place, but if 
business can be done in Lagos without being corrupt, it creates a better, stable 
economic environment. 
4.10. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the model to be used to diagnose the problems of the SME sector 
in Lagos was elaborated on. The chapter began with a discussion of Ostrom’s 
earlier work which formed the basis of her need to understand the diversity of 
institutions. The chapter then proceeded to discuss Ostrom’s IAD framework and 
the different components that must interact to produce outcomes. Following this, 
the chapter drew a distinction between an action arena and the action situation, 
 
323Ostrom (n 257) 19.  
324 See previous discussion on common-pool resources and how when rules are generated internally, they are more 
likely to be obeyed than when it is imposed by an outside body 
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and we noted that different situations can be nested in one arena. The chapter 
noted the important role rules and norms play as part of the institutions and how 
they influence actions and decisions. After this, it became relevant to illustrate 
what the action situation within our SME context would possibly look like. The 
chapter further considered whether Ostrom’s modelling was the only way to 
diagnose the legal, market and cultural impediments to financing business, thus 
another method, mechanism design was considered.  While it was agreed that 
Ostrom’s framework was not the only approach, it was nevertheless asserted that 
the use of Ostrom’s type of mapping is more desirable because it allows us to 
generate our own information and truly understand the reasons why the 
successive SMEs schemes have failed. Having discussed the model to be applied 
in the thesis, it now becomes important to consider some theoretical ideas that 
inform us on how the actors in our arena will select their actions and strategies 
as we simulate the Lagos SME action situation. 
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Chapter Five: Conceptual Underpinnings and the Nigerian 
Debt Recovery Environment 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the work of Elinor Ostrom and her 
development of the IAD framework. An attempt to unpack the complex model 
was done and initial connections between her framework and the subject matter 
of the thesis were made. We noted that IAD framework is viewed as “a way of 
decomposing institutional context into component parts as a prelude to 
understanding how each part affects the other and shapes outcomes, with a view 
of diagnosing, changing or designing the institution”.325 Given that this work will 
focus on investigating the institutional aspects of legal, cultural, market 
impediments to financing SMEs, it is asserted that the framework will allow us to 
conduct an analysis of these institutions with the aim of diagnosing the weakness 
inherent in them. 
From chapter four, we can note that Ostrom as an economist uses several 
economic theoretical concepts within her model, given the more legal background 
of this thesis, it would be prudent to expound on these concepts further as they 
play important foundational roles in our analysis. During our elucidation of 
Ostrom’s work, we could observe that her framing relied on concepts from game 
theory and the behavioural study behind rational actions.326 Even Maskin’s 
mechanism design327 is subject to the rules of game theory. Given that this theory 
 
325 McGinnis (n 229) 170. 
326 An area she has written extensively on. 
327 Which we discussed in the previous chapter as an alternative to investigating legal, market and cultural 
impediments to financing SMEs. 
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forms a foundation of our analysis, it becomes pertinent to explore it further 
below. 
5.2. How does Game Theory Work? 
 
Game theory is a method to study a system of self-interested agents in conditions 
of strategic interaction.328 Alternatively, game theory is the study of cooperative 
and non-cooperative behaviour of individuals within a competitive situation i.e. 
our action arena discussed in the previous chapter. Game theory takes the rules 
of the game as given, and makes predictions about the behaviour of strategic 
players.329 It has been stated that in a cooperative game, players are able to form 
binding commitments.330 However, in non-cooperative games, players cannot 
form agreements without an enforcement mechanism,331 this is because in non-
cooperative games players make choices to achieve their own interest,332 so 
without an inducement, players will follow the rational choice of self-interest.  
Rational choice theory as we have seen, forms the basis of game theory. With 
rational choice, we are looking at why individuals act the way they do. According 
to rational choice, an individual will only act if in their view, the benefits are 
greater than the cost, if it is not then they would not act.333 Yoshimichi in his 
 
328 Classic Mechanism Design, available at < http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/pubs/ch2.pdf > Accessed on 18th 
November, 2016, 25. 
329 Borgers, T ‘An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design’ (2008) available at < 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/521b-08-09/reading/2008-mechanismdesign.pdf > Accessed on 18th 
November, 2016, 2. 
330 Cooperative game theory investigates such coalitional games with respect to the relative amounts of power held 
by various players, or how a successful coalition should divide its proceeds. Theodore L. Turocy, and Bernhard Von 
Stengel, ‘Game Theory’ (2001) Available at < http://www.cdam.lse.ac.uk/Reports/Files/cdam-2001-09.pdf > 
Accessed 22nd November, 2016, 6. 
331 This seems to reflect the Nigerian environment where the players cannot form agreements, and even 
enforcement mechanisms don’t work as we shall see when we populate our action arena with variables from the 
Lagos SME sector. 
332 Turocy (n 330) 
333 Andre Blais., To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (University of Pittsburgh 
Press 2000) 1 
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article states this as follows; “an actor chooses an alternative that he/she believes 
brings about a social outcome that maximizes his/her utility (payoff) under 
subjectively conceived constraints”.334 He further goes on to identify that his 
proposed definition is in five parts: constraints; alternatives; social outcomes; 
utility and belief.335 Sato believes that constraints make some of the possible 
alternatives impossible and constraints change costs and benefits of 
alternatives.336 This view of constraint is based on the belief of the individual, 
thus it is subjective.337 
As noted already, beyond constraints, the set of alternatives available to an 
individual also influences the decisions they make. Consequently, if an individual 
chooses one of the alternatives, a social outcome is realized.338 The basis of 
choosing an alternative is based on the utility that is received. In game theory, 
these alternatives and outcomes are set up by the rules of the game, and the 
game is played according to those rules. The rules define who the players are, 
what actions each player can make are created, possible strategies that a player 
can choose from are designed, and the payoffs of a game produced. To achieve 
this payoff, a player will use one or more strategies, also called the ‘Nash 
equilibrium’. This Nash equilibrium is a list of strategies, one for each player, 
which has the property that no player can unilaterally change his strategy and 
get a better payoff.339  
 
334 Sato Yoshimichi., ‘Rational choice theory’ (2013) Sociopedia.isa. Pages 1, 1. 
335 Ibid 
336 In our action situation which we shall discuss in the next chapter, we shall explore how barriers to accessing 
information i.e. a constraint can exclude certain borrowers and influence the decisions they make. 
337 For Sato, social resources such as money, assets, prestige, privilege, authority and power affect the formation of 
subjective constraints with the help of frames through which the actor views rational choice theory. Yoshimichi (n 
334) 1. As we shall see in the next chapter, the exogenous variable of education (literacy) can influence a 
participant’s decision to remain in the action arena. 
338 Yoshimichi (n 334) 2 
339 Turocy (n 330) 3.  
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There are generally two ways in which game theory is applied, the first being the 
laboratory experiment in which we present people with choices to see how they 
react. The other is the mathematical model based upon the payoffs of the 
different choices, the classic prisoners’ dilemma game developed by Merrill Flood 
and Melvin Dresher.340 The prisoner’s dilemma is simply a hypothetical situation 
where two prisoners are separated and given the chance to cooperate with the 
authorities by confessing.341  The finite strategies available to them are; both can 
confess; both can remain silent; or one can confesses while the other keeps 
quiet.342 If both refuse to talk, then they both go free; if one confesses while the 
other doesn’t, then the co-operator gets off lightly and the non-co-operator gets 
a heavy penalty.343 The worst mutual outcome is if both confess, and both get 
sentenced.344 It has been suggested that if a rational prisoner had full information 
and trusted the other party, they would realize that the obvious choice with the 
best overall outcome is to remain quiet.345  
However in the absence of such information and trust, and with the realization 
that the other prisoner also has choices, the decision moves from maximizing 
benefit to minimizing harm, in which case they should confess quickly.346 Classic 
Prisoners dilemma states as a rational person you should never cooperate, thus 
 
340 We highlight what this game is in chapter four, during our exposition of what common pool resources are on 
page 68, there we note that with this game, people working for their own benefit when pursuing a course of action 
do not create optimal results. Also, Tom De Herdt ‘Cooperation and fairness: the flood–Dresher experiment 
revisited’ (2010) 62 Review of Social Economy 183. 
341 Kevin Gibson ‘Games Students Play: Incorporating the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Teaching Business Ethics’ (2003) 48 
Journal of Business Ethics 53, 53 
342 Ibid 
343 Ibid 
344 Gibson (n 341) 54 
345 Ibid 
346 Ibid  
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Nash equilibrium means that everyone defects at some point, because where you 
don’t defect, you get cheated.  
An attempt to mathematize the decision making process will not be made in this 
thesis, rather game theory and games like the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ are being 
used to develop the thinking process and generate nuanced insights into the 
Lagos SME sector without applying an empirical approach.347 As stated above 
already, the prisoner’s dilemma game is made in such a way that you should 
never cooperate if you are a rational person. Therefore, we can assume that 
many people are irrational because behaviourally, they do not want to be the 
type of person that cheats other people - people would sometimes say why don’t 
we split the gain.348  
It is believed that the prisoner’s dilemma game and reaching the Nash equilibrium 
where defection occurs is closer to the Nigerian state of mind. Again, because of 
corruption, a more rational mind-set (as described by game theory) has been 
adopted, because no one wants to be taken advantage of. Speaking as a 
Nigerian, it is asserted that the Nigerian mind-set has been shaped by corruption 
in such a way that every individual is always on guard because they feel the next 
person is out to cheat them. Thus, exploring game theory has informed this work 
by highlighting the ways in which a corrupt system degrades the quality of 
interaction and degrades the ability of building cooperation.349 The working 
 
347 We are not conducting an empirical approach like that done in the LSEFT survey mention in chapter two and 
discussed more fully in chapter eight. 
348 Peter M. Blau ‘On Limitations of Rational Choice Theory for Sociology’ (1997) 28 The American Sociologist 16 – In 
this article, Blau makes the point that rational theory should be criticised and indeed it has been, he addresses the 
issue of how rational choice theory ignores the fact that human behaviour is also influenced by emotional, moral 
and pathological influences. This criticism addresses the above point, and it can be stated that moral considerations 
may stop a person from cheating another. 
349 We shall see this degraded interaction when we synthesize our information in Ostrom’s action arena in chapter 
six and chapter seven. 
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hypothesis carried forward in this thesis, is that within the Nigerian context, 
people are closer to the rational maximiser, not because Nigeria is a particularly 
rational society, but because in Nigeria this is one of the effects of corruption 
upon society, hence people are more cynical. This explains the importance of 
building normative and structural institutions which support people in the 
absence of trust. Ostrom talks about this, hence again, her relevance to this 
discourse. It is asserted that people’s rationality is not constructed in the same 
way as the mathematical understanding of the prisoner’s dilemma because they 
have norms. Ostrom is important because within our action arena, her framework 
allows us to consider these norms. 
5.3. Establishing Trust in Nigeria, why is it important? 
 
During the introduction to this work, we noted that Nigeria currently has an 
infamous reputation. There are endless reports regarding the difficulty of 
conducting business in Nigeria,350 and allegations of corrupt practices within the 
government have become the norm. It was asserted that Nigeria’s poor 
reputation affects the country economically, especially with regards to 
investments and loans. Thus, there is a need to change this perception, but the 
question of how this can be achieved remains? As we shall see below, it has been 
suggested that the key element that must present in an economy before it 
develops, is the establishment of trust. Trust plays this fundamental role because 
it determines how much people would be willing to risk of their finances. In 
 
350 For example, reports like The World Bank ‘Doing Business Reports’ (2018) Available at < 
ahttps://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-
Report.pdf > and The World Bank ‘Doing Business Report’ (2017) Available at < 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Report.pdf> 
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Chapter Four, we discussed the concept of CPRs and the idea that degradation 
occurs whenever people come in contact with it, we noted that this is known as 
the tragedy of the commons. The idea underpinning this degradation becomes 
useful to think about and keep in mind as we discuss the subsequent topics of 
trust and the rule of law. What we must understand is that trust and the rule of 
law are similar to CPRs in that they must be managed collectively, and if not 
managed and monitored closely, the resource can be depleted by opportunistic 
use since neither trust or the rule of law are pure public goods.351 
 The aim of this section is to analyse Nigeria’s deficiency in establishing trust in 
the financial market, explore how trust can be created and determine the overall 
long-term benefits of establishing trust.  
5.3.1. The Nature of a Lack of Trust. 
 
Finance must be understood as being predicated on risk,352 so it must be stated 
that there is no investment or financial transaction that will be completely risk 
free. Knowing this, how then can we establish enough trust within a society 
where even though an investment is not completely risk free, investors and 
lenders are willing to part with their money? The answer to this lies in mitigation 
of the perceivable risk. If lenders can be reassured that when they give out 
money, there will be an effective system in place to help recover the whole debt 
or at least a significant amount of the debt, then they will be more willing to lend. 
It is pertinent then at this point to ask how this can be achieved. Trust in the 
 
351 In Chapter Four we discussed what public good are and how they differ from CPRs, we said their difference lies in 
that a pure public good is non-rivalrous and their consumption and non-excludable, but with CPRs they are 
subtractable and can be excluded.  See page 69 for fuller discussion. 
352 Alastair Hudson., The Law of Finance (2nd Ed Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 6 
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system in which they operate plays a significant role to achieving this. As part of 
the social construct of society, trust has been a topic discussed by numerous 
authors.353 In their discourse, many have theorised on how the establishment of 
trust in the government and its establishment, and trust between members of 
society can enhance an economy of a country.  
As an illustration, during the course of this work, the example of lending will be 
used as a reference. It is suggested that the issue of trust with regards to lending 
is three-pronged. The first prong deals with the relationship between the formal 
institutions lending the money and the borrower. This proposes that the lender 
must trust that the borrower will pay or will be able to pay if the debt is called in. 
The second, is the relationship between the borrower and the lender (be it the 
government, informal lenders and formal lender). This suggests that the 
borrowers must trust who they obtain the money from.  A current example, in 
Lagos, Nigeria where a microfinance bank was alleged to have fraudulently 
collected money from no fewer than 200 women.354 The agreement was that 
they deposit money ranging from various sums, and at the end of three months, 
they would be granted a loan higher than the sum deposited. At the end of the 
expected time, the women turned up at the bank premises hoping to get their 
loans but discovered that the building had been abandoned and the banking 
premises closed. Finally, there is the relationship that exists when a guarantor 
(third party) is involved. Here, the lender must trust in the ability of the guarantor 
to hold up his end of the deal and pay the borrowers’ debt should it be called in. 
 
353 We shall subsequently examine Francis Fukuyama’s work on trust. 
354 Danielle Ogbeche , ‘Microfinance Bank Defrauds over 200 Market Women in Lagos Daily Post Nigeria’ 
(November 2015) < http://dailypost.ng/2015/11/23/microfinance-bank-defrauds-over-200-market-women-in-
lagos/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter > Accessed 11th December 2015. 
125 
 
The issue of establishing trust becomes problematic when people live in a society 
like Nigeria. As stated above, corruption is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. It 
can be safely assumed that the people rarely trust the government and many of 
its institutions. Given the scenario of the sham microfinance bank above, it can 
be stated that acts such as these, can if unchecked, slowly erode the trust people 
place in financial institutions as well. The implication of a lack of trust in society 
was aptly stated when it was said that; “Trust between citizens and their 
government officials and elected representatives is a vital element of a well 
governed society. In the absence of trust, citizens become cynical about their 
political system and disaffected with the existing order”.355 Applying this to 
investments and lending, it can be stated that a lack of trust will breed cynicism 
with regards to lending, borrowing or investing, hence stifling economic 
development. 
As a reference point to establishing trust in society, Fukuyama’s Trust: The Social 
Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity provides compelling insights. Fukuyama in 
his work breaks down the issue of trust into categories. He talks about low trust 
societies and high trusts societies. To him, in low trust societies the people are 
less inclined to trust people outside their family or clan, and in doing so they 
make it difficult for large industrial growth. He stated that state intervention was 
often the only avenue by which they could build large scale industries,356 
 
355 Larry Diamond, ‘Building Trust in Government by Improving governance’ Available at < 
https://www.hitpages.com/doc/4645543062011904/12/ > Accessed 11th December 2015. 
356  Francis Fukuyama., Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Penguin Books 1996) 17. 
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“If a low-trust, familistic society wants to have large scale businesses, the state 
must step in to help create them through subsidies, guidance or even outright 
ownership”. 
The above reflects the opposite in societies with high degree of trust, it was 
stated that such societies can create large organisations without state support.357 
It must be stated that ethnicity plays a vital role in Nigeria as a whole. This is a 
country with diverse ethnic groups, and with the multiplicity of groups people 
tend to develop closer affinity with members of their own tribe, i.e. more often 
than not, they are more willing to trust or help their own tribesman.   
To Fukuyama, the social problem of lack of trust lies in the fact that: 
“People who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under a system 
of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated 
and enforced, sometimes by coercive means.358” 
A study of Fukuyama, hints that for Nigeria which has a low trust to develop 
economically, state intervention is the logical path. But we must also consider 
that apart from the lack of trust between peoples, the historic corruption of the 
Nigerian government presents the conundrum of whether the people can trust 
their devised intervention. With this in mind, we must then ask ourselves ‘how 
can trust be created?’ 
 
 
 
357 Ibid 
358 Fukuyama (n 356) 27. This is on parallel with Ostrom’s approach. 
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5.3.2 The Concept of Calculative Trust. 
 
As stated above, people who do not trust each other can only cooperate under a 
system of rules and regulation.359 Flowing from this, it would seem a 
straightforward concept that regulation should be able to solve Nigeria’s trust 
issue. However, Nigeria presents a situation where there is not only a low trust 
degree between individuals, but also a low trust degree in the government. This 
indicates that even if regulations and checks are put in place, there will be 
suspicion as to whether they will actually be enforced or be effective. Speaking 
generally, without consideration of the Nigerian predicament, the rule of law 
plays an instrumental role in developing trust. In the financial sector, this rule 
plays its part by the construct of institutional devices. In this regard, 
“in France…., public authorities also participate in the protection of lenders 
through penal punishment of failing borrowers”.360 
In creating penal punishments for failing borrowers, France has created an 
environment where formal institutions are more willing to lend to borrowers, 
because they believe that the rules set in place offers them remedy when a 
borrower fails. It can be stated that trust is embedded in the rule of law, flowing 
from the part which emphasises that no individual or entity be they economically 
or politically or militarily powerful, are able to act outside the reach of legal 
 
359 Ibid 
360 Michel Ferrary., ‘Trust and social capital in the regulation of lending activities’ (2003) 31 Journal of Socio-
Economics, 673, 677 
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remedy.361 Where the rule of law is not undermined, it can be used as an effective 
tool in building trust between the government and its citizens. 
Douglas C. North is convinced that law, rules and processes, are a vital feature 
of the institutional structure of successful economies.362 North also concludes that 
too much uncertainty hinders investment.363 If we are persuaded by this line of 
reasoning, it then becomes incumbent on the Nigerian government to show they 
can be trusted if a viable SME sector is to be established. The current 
administration has recognised that the current institutions within the country are 
in need of repair.364 It is a fact that the rule of law needs to be reinforced. With 
its reinforcement, trust between the people and government can slowly be built. 
Beyond the type of trust created through the rule of law, which is established 
over time, another aspect of trust must be considered because as most financial 
transactions are based on taking, it is this type of trust that influences the 
decision to take risks. This is called ‘Calculative Trust’, it is this type of trust that 
would be particularly relevant in the analysis of our action situation to be 
conducted in subsequent chapters. By calculative trust, we refer to a situation 
where the expected gain from placing oneself at risk to another is positive, but 
not otherwise. 365 This links to our earlier point of financing business being based 
 
361 Graham Ferris ‘The Path-dependent Problem of Exporting the Rule of Law’ (2012) 4 The Round Table 363, 364 
362 Ibid 366 
363 Ferris (n 361) 366 
364 Speaking particularly about the judiciary, President Muhammadu Buhari stated that “our justice system currently 
has a reputation for delays…this situation is a huge disincentive for businesses. It is not surprising therefore that 
Nigeria ranks near the bottom on the ease of doing business index. We are currently ranked 143 out of 189 countries 
by the World Bank Group’s Enforcing Contracts Indicator. According to World Bank, it takes about 510 days on average 
to enforce a contract at the level of a court of first instance in Nigeria. In Singapore, the top ranked country on the 
index, it takes 150 days on average to enforce a similar contract. The ability to enforce contractual obligations and 
resolve disputes is an essential consideration for intending investors, both local and foreign, in deciding where to put 
their money.” See ‘Buhari laments delay in justice delivery ’ (2015) SUN Newspaper Available at 
<http://sunnewsonline.com/new/buhari-laments-delay-in-justice-delivery/> Accessed on 13th December 2015 . 
365 Oliver E. Williamson., ‘Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organisation’ (1993) 36 The Journal of Law & 
Economics 453, 463. This calculative trust shall be examined again in chapter six when we conduct our analysis of 
the Borrower-Lender Action Situation. 
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on risk. While we cannot effectively remove all risks from the system, the 
perceived benefit of agreeing to finance should outweigh the perceived risks. 
Summarily, we observed that trust plays a fundamental role in any economy. We 
observed that a lack of trust will breed cynicism with regards to lending, 
borrowing or investing, hence stifling economic development. We noted that 
Fukuyama provided compelling insights to the nature of trust, and it was 
acknowledged that people who do not trust each other can only cooperate under 
a system of rules and regulation. It was illustrated that France uses public 
authorities to participate in the protection of lenders through penal punishment 
of failing borrowers. However, it was pointed out that due to the flagrant reign 
of corruption in Nigeria,366 even if regulations and checks are put in place, there 
will be suspicion as to whether they will actually be enforced or be effective. 
To tackle this problem, it was suggested that the need to reinforce the rule of 
law in society was of paramount importance. In doing so, only then can trust be 
slowly established in society. It can be argued that within this context, trust and 
law could be substituted for one another as well as the fact that they complement 
each other in the sense that if it is believed that enforcement mechanisms such 
as the courts can be relied upon, and are timely and effective then we begin to 
see more willingness to transact. 
The answer to why this is important has been indicated throughout this piece. 
Succinctly put, the establishment of trust creates an environment where lenders 
 
366 Bernard C. Chine, & Obiajulu, A.U. Nnedum ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A Solution through Application of 
Organisational Development Perspective’ (2018) 4 Social Science Research 31. This article provides an illustrative 
insight on the trend of corruption in Nigeria, tracing it from after Nigeria’s independence during the First Republic in 
Nigeria. The article notes how even the first election in 1961 suffered major rigging by the Northern People’s 
Congress. See page 35 
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and investors are more willing to part with money, because the risk of total loss 
will have been mitigated. 
5.4. Debt Recovery in Nigeria, Some Considerations. 
 
Beyond the issue of trust as part of the way in which loss can be mitigated, we 
must also consider what the legal environment in terms of enforcement of court 
judgements and the debt recovery procedure is like. In chapter two, when 
considering all the various schemes aimed at financing SMEs, we noted that most 
of them failed as a result of the inability to recover debts.367  While these failures 
apply to past schemes, it is relevant to note that a 2016 World Bank study still 
presents this inability to recover debts as a problem. In 2016, a new Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Bill was proposed to help alleviate the debt recovery problems.368 
Research has shown that Nigeria suffers from poor institutional infrastructure, 
thus there is a substantial challenge in enforcing contracts, collateral agreements, 
security registration in the legal and judicial process.369 Even in 2018, the World 
Bank Doing Business Report reaffirms that this is still a problem.370 Based on this, 
it becomes relevant to consider the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in Nigeria. 
In Nigeria, the term bankruptcy is limited to the individual alone while insolvency 
covers corporations. We noted in chapter two that CAMA is currently being 
 
367 For example, the Microfinance Banks  
368 The provisions of this Bill shall be considered subsequently, note that is has not been passed into law. 
369  World Bank Group ‘Nigerian Development Finance Study’ (2016) Available at < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/365141527009626947/pdf/126401-WP-P146319-PUBLIC-Nigeria-
Development-Finance-Study.pdf > Accessed 2nd April 2019, 16. 
370 In the Doing Business Report released in 2018 Nigeria is ranked 145th out of 190 countries in terms of doing 
business. The report also records poor improvement between 2016 -2017 in the strengthening of legal institutions, 
reduction of regulatory complexity and cost with regards to enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency issues. See 
World Bank Group ‘Doing Business 2018 Reforming to Create Jobs’ (2018) Available at < 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-
Report.pdf> Accessed on 2nd April 2019, 38 
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reviewed, but as we stated already, it is not Law yet. Interestingly, this Bill also 
proposes to include a framework on resolving the existing insolvency issues 
incorporating concepts like business rescue.371 Also, being reviewed is the still 
applicable Bankruptcy Act discussed below. The proposed new Act is now called 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill. An example of a 
key highlight from the Bill includes the addition of corporate and unincorporated 
bodies.372 As this is not law yet and there is no indication on when it will be, it 
still remains pertinent to review the position as the law stands under the extant 
Act, even if it may be redundant soon. 
It is the writers’ view that under Nigerian Bankruptcy and Insolvency laws, the 
rights of debtors are given more prominence in the debtor’s indebtedness is 
discharged whether or not the creditor is fully satisfied. A brief summary of 
bankruptcy and insolvency law in Nigeria is given below. The preceding sub-
headings will not offer a comprehensive analysis of the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Laws, but rather highlight some of its important features.  
5.4.1. Bankruptcy in Nigeria 
 
Bankruptcy has been stated to mean an inability to pay debts. It has been 
described as the process to which an individual is subject to when their debt is 
so overwhelming as to be incapable of being paid in full as and when they are 
due.373 The Nigerian Bankruptcy Act of 1992 applies to any person who cannot 
pay his/her debts of a specified amount and serves to disqualify said person from 
 
371 See Companies and Allied Matters Act (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2018 Section 402 
372 See S.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill 2016 
373 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton., Insolvency Law (Jordan Publishing Limited 2012) 45 
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holding certain elective and other public offices or from practising any regulated 
profession (except as an employee).374 This position is reflected in the opening 
preamble of the Bankruptcy Act, and it suggests that Nigerian Bankruptcy law is 
punitive in nature. The preamble also suggests that bankruptcy law in Nigeria is 
only applicable to individuals, however further examination reveals that this is 
not the case. It should be noted that bankruptcy can either be instituted by the 
debtor or by the creditor.375 Furthermore, Section 4 of the Acts states that: 
 (1)     Subject to the provisions of section 7, a creditor shall not be entitled to 
present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor unless - 
(a)     the debt owing by the debtor to the petitioning creditor, or if two or more 
creditors join in the petition, the aggregate amount of debts owing to the several 
petitioning creditors, is not less than N2,000;376 
(b)     the debt is a liquidated sum, payable either immediately or at some certain 
future time; 
(c)     the act of bankruptcy on which the petition is grounded has occurred within 
three months before the presentation of the petition;377 and 
(d)     the debtor is ordinarily resident in Nigeria, or within a year before the date 
of the presentation of the petition, has ordinarily resided or had a dwelling-house 
or place of business in Nigeria, or has carried on business in Nigeria, personally 
or by means of an agent or manager, or is or within the said period has been a 
 
374 Bankruptcy (Amendment) Decree No 109 of 1992, Cap B2, LFN 2004 
375 See Section 1 of the Act 
376 The 2016 Bill under S.5 (a) changed this to N1 Million. 
377 S.5 (b) changes this to 6 months 
133 
 
member of a firm or partnership of persons which has carried on business in 
Nigeria by means of a partner or partners or an agent or manager. 
The Act sets out a series of steps which must be followed in order for a person 
to be officially declared bankrupt. They are: an act of bankruptcy must have been 
committed;378 a petition based on an available act of bankruptcy may then be 
presented by a creditor or group of creditors (or the debtor may present a petition 
against himself to be declared bankrupt); A receiving order making the official 
receiver, the receiver of the debtor’s property will be made, if the petition is 
proved to the satisfaction of the court;379 a statement of affairs will be drawn up 
by the debtor;380 a meeting of creditors shall be held to discuss the statement 
and decide whether to proceed with the bankruptcy or accept any composition 
or scheme of arrangement which the debtor may offer.381 The law states that the 
scheme of arrangement should be structured in such a way that it provides 
reasonable security for the payment of not less than twenty-five (25) per cent on 
all the unsecured debts provable against the debtor's estate, and if it fails to do 
so the court can reject it.382 
 
378 See Section 1 of the Act 
379 Section 3 
380 Section 6 (2) 
381 Section 15 (1) 
382 Section 18(10). Note also that in the distribution of property, the Government and employees have priority 
before other debtors. The government is paid first, followed by employees’ wages accrued during four months 
before the date of the receiving order, not exceeding N300. See Section 36 (b). Under subsection (2) it goes further 
to say that these debts shall be paid in full unless the property is insufficient in which case they shall abate in equal 
portions.  In the proposed new bill, it could be a failure on the part of this writer to understand the intention of the 
draftsman, but the bill under S.24 states that the priorities in distribution of the debtor’s property by the receiver 
shall be done with reference to “Division 3 of Part IV of the Companies Act”. On examination of Part IV of “CAMA”, 
this part provides for the members of a company, the register of members, the power to close register, liability of 
members etc. This raises the question of the accuracy of the bill. Perhaps the draftsman intended to make reference 
to S.494 (Now 496 under the new bill) which is under Part XV of CAMA. Here the preferential payments are listed, 
and like the Bankruptcy Act, ranks the government i.e. payment of taxes and employees first, before other 
creditors. 
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Despite the above preamble suggesting that the Bankruptcy Act applies to 
individuals, Section 5 nevertheless states that the following provisions shall have 
effect in the case of a firm carrying on business in Nigeria: 
(a)     a creditor of the firm shall be entitled to present a bankruptcy petition 
against the firm, and a receiving order may be made against the firm in respect 
of an act of bankruptcy committed in reference to the business of the firm by any 
partner of the firm or by any person having control or management of the 
business of the firm. An act of bankruptcy shall be deemed to be committed in 
reference to the business of the firm in all cases in which the act relates to the 
property or creditors of the firm and would be an act of bankruptcy by such 
partner or person as aforesaid if it related to his property or creditors; 
(b)     it shall be sufficient that a receiving order against the firm be made in the 
firm's name, without mentioning the names of the partners, and such receiving 
order shall affect the joint and separate property of all the partners. 
(c)     the right of a creditor to present a bankruptcy petition against the firm, 
and the jurisdiction of the court to make a receiving order or an adjudication of 
bankruptcy against the firm, shall not be affected by the fact, if it is so, that all 
or any of the partners of the firm are not citizens of Nigeria or are not resident 
in Nigeria. 
This therefore suggests that bankruptcy applications can also be brought against 
firms. A bankrupt individual may, at any time after being adjudged bankrupt apply 
to the court for an order of discharge, and the court shall appoint a day for 
hearing the application.383 It should be noted that the application shall not be 
 
383 See Section 28 
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heard until the public examination of the bankrupt is concluded. The application 
shall, except when the court in accordance with rules under this Act otherwise 
directs, be heard in open court. Section 28 (2) states that where the bankrupt 
does not of their own accord, within such time as the court may deem reasonable, 
apply for their discharge the court may of its own motion or on the application of 
the official Receiver or the trustee or any creditor who has proved, make an order 
calling upon the bankrupt to come up for their discharge on a day to be fixed by 
the court. On due service of the order, if the bankrupt does not appear on the 
day fixed thereby, the court may make such order as it thinks fit, subject to the 
provisions of this section, and the debtor shall, in addition to any other 
punishment to which he may be subject, be guilty of a contempt of court and 
may be punished accordingly. 
 Section 28 (3) provides that on the hearing of the application, or on the day 
on which the bankrupt has been ordered to come up for his discharge or any 
subsequent day, the court shall take into consideration a report of the Official 
Receiver as to the bankrupt's conduct and affairs (including a report as to the 
bankrupt's conduct during the proceedings under his bankruptcy) and may either 
grant or refuse an absolute order of discharge, or suspend the operation of the 
order for a specified time, or grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions 
with respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the 
bankrupt or with respect to his after acquired property. Under the Bankruptcy 
law, an order of discharge effectively releases the bankrupt from all other debts 
provable in bankruptcy.384 While the above does not present a comprehensive 
 
384 Section 29 (2) 
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examination of the Bankruptcy Law in Nigeria, it does however try to highlight 
the fact that the law aims to provide relief to the debtor, even though it comes 
with a punitive measure, and it also provides a means to distribute the debtor’s 
assets. 
5.4.2. The Winding-Up of a Company 
 
The life of a company can be brought to an end through the process of winding 
up.385 As with bankruptcy, this is usually because of the company’s inability to 
pay debts. Winding up is usually accompanied by the process of liquidation, i.e. 
selling all of a company’s assets, paying outstanding debts, and distributing the 
remainder to the shareholders, and then going out of business.386 In Nigeria, the 
process of winding up is set out in CAMA.387 The scope of winding up a company 
is very broad, and cannot be covered fully, nevertheless, Section 408 of CAMA 
provides that a company can be wound up if: the company can by a special 
resolution resolve that the company be wound up by the court; default is made 
in delivering the statutory report to the Commission or in holding the statutory 
meeting; the number of members is reduced below two; the company is unable 
to pay its debt; the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to be wound 
up. For the purpose of this work, we are concerned with the aspect that involves 
the corporations’ inability to pay their debts. 
 
385 Note that the New CAMA Bill now includes a framework for rescuing insolvent companies under S.402. 
386Leonard C. Opara, Livinus I. Okere and Chinwendu O. Opara “The Legal Regime of Bankruptcy and Winding up 
Proceedings as a Tool for Debt Recovery in Nigeria: An Appraisal” Available at < 
http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/4151/pdf_106 > Accessed on 15th March 2016, 66. 
387 Cap C20, LFN 2004 
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Section 409 states that a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its 
debts if: 
(a) a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in 
a sum exceeding N2, 000388, then due, has served on the company, by leaving it 
at its registered office or head office, a demand under his hand requiring the 
company to pay the sum so due, and the company has for three weeks thereafter 
neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable 
satisfaction of the creditor; or 
(b) execution or other process issued on a judgment, Act or order of any court in 
favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or 
(c) the court, after taking into account any contingent or prospective liability of 
the company, is satisfied that the company is unable to pay its debts 
It has been stated that by its very nature, a winding up order in effect is for all 
the creditors of the company, regardless of the amount owed to each creditor, 
and they must be given notice and invited to claim against the company being 
wound up as the assets of the company will be shared amongst them.389 
It has been suggested that from the entire provisions of the Act dealing with 
winding up, it is not intended to be used as a vehicle for debt recovery.390 In the 
case of Oriental Airlines Ltd. vs. Air via Ltd391, it was held per Musdapher, 
JCA (as he then was) that “The machinery of a winding up petition should not be 
 
388 S.11 of the CAMA Bill Changes this to N200,000 
389 Idris, D.B (Justice) “Insolvency and Judicial Capacity: Challenges of the African Courts”. Available at < 
https://www.insol.org/_files/Africa%20Round%20Table/2015/Papers/INSOLVENCY%20AND%20JUDICIAL%20CAPAC
ITY%20PAPER%20BY%20JUSTICE%20M%20B%20%20IDRIS%20NIGERIA.pdf  > Accessed on 14th March, 2016 at page 
8 
390 Opara (n 386) 67. 
391 (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 271 at 230-281. 
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converted to an engine for debt collection in circumvention of the established 
legal procedure for instituting action in appropriate courts for collection of debts.” 
Nevertheless, the process has been used by creditors as a means to recover debts 
owed to them by debtor companies, and many creditors have succeeded in 
having their debts paid using the winding up proceeding.392 Finally, it should be 
noted that the primary function of a Liquidator during the winding up process is 
to administer the assets of the company under liquidation. He sells the assets 
and distributes them amongst various creditors and shareholders before finally 
dissolving the company.393 
5.4.3. The Law of the Books and the Law in Action 
 
When it comes to debt recovery, several options may be available in terms of 
procedure.394 Generally, if the contract or agreement allows for it, an option 
would be Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), either through arbitration or 
mediation. Usually this is initiated by sending a letter of demand. It has been 
stated that the letter must be sent by means which would ensure delivery, and a 
copy of acknowledgement of receipt or such other evidence of the receipt must 
be obtained and kept.395 It should be noted that claimants can apply for ADR at 
the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC) located at the Lagos Division of the 
High Court.396 
 
392 Opara (n 386) 
393 Opara (n 386) 69 
394 As the author has no practical experience with regards to debt recovery, information from Law Firms practicing 
in Lagos will be relied on. Also, on The High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules of 2012 and 2019; The 
Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of 2009; The National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules of 
2017. 
395 Law Salvatores: Advocates, Soliciors and Consultants ‘Procedures available to Creditors for Recovery of Debts in 
Nigeria’ Available at <https://lawsalvatores.com/procedures-available-to-creditors-for-recovery-of-debts-in-
nigeria/> Accessed 21st August 2019. 
396 Ibid 
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In terms of litigation, the Federal High Court rules are applicable where one party 
is the Federal Government or an agency of the Government, while the High Court 
rules apply where there is no affiliation with the Federal Government. When it 
comes to the recovery of liquidated damages, the High Court of Lagos State (Civil 
Procedure) Rules 2012 provides for this. Order 10, Rule 3 states that where the 
claim is a liquidated demand and the defendant or all of several defendants fail 
to appear, a claimant may apply to a Judge for judgment for the claim on the 
originating process or such lesser sum and interest as a Judge may order. Order 
10 Rule 4 further provides that where there are several defendants of whom 
one or more appear to the process and another or others fail to appear, a claim 
may apply to a Judge for judgment against those who have not appeared and 
may execute the judgment without prejudice to his right to proceed with the 
action against those who have appeared. It should be noted that the 2012 civil 
procedure law has now been amended, and an addition has been made regarding 
claims for liquidated damages. Under the new law,397 Order 59(2) stipulates 
that a suit will be automatically qualified (without any application) for a fast track 
procedure where the action is for a liquidated monetary relief of one hundred 
million Naira (N100, 000,000).398 Also, an action that involves a mortgage 
transaction, charge or security will also be automatically qualified for fast 
tracking. 
The Magistrate Courts of Lagos State also make provision for summary 
judgement procedures for quick debt recovery process. Order 3 of the 
Magistrate Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009, provides that a 
 
397 The High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 
398 As at the exchange rate on the 21st of August 2019, that is about £225,000 
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summary summons can be issued for claims for debt or liquidated money 
demand. Also, in 2018, a small claims court was established within the Magistrate 
Court. Article 1 of the Magistrate Court Law of Lagos State Practice Direction of 
2018 sets out when a small claim can be instituted. Article 2 (1) (d) provides 
that the claim for liquidated money demand should not exceed five million Naira 
(N5, 000,000).399 Article 12 (2) further provides that the entire period of 
proceedings from filing to judgement must not exceed sixty (60) days.400 
In the Federal High Court, for liquidated sums, Order 12 of the Federal High 
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides that a claimant may 
apply summarily to recover a liquidated sum and the application will be 
accompanied with an affidavit stating the grounds upon which the claim is based 
and that the defendant has no defence on the merit to the claim. The Court would 
enter the claim in the "undefended list" if it is satisfied that the defendant has no 
defence to the claim. Furthermore, Order 30  provides that where the claimant 
feels that the defendant may obstruct or delay the execution of any order that 
may be passed against them by disposing or removing his property from the 
jurisdiction of the Court, the claimant may apply to the Court at the time of 
instituting the suit, to make the defendant deposit sufficient security to fulfil the 
order or for their moveable or immovable property within jurisdiction to be 
attached until the order of Court is delivered. 
Despite the above developments to ease the debt recovery process, a distinction 
must be made between the laws of the books and the law in action. As a Nigerian, 
 
399 As at the exchange rate on the 21st of August 2019, that is about £11,000 
400 As this is a relatively new court, not much is known about its effectiveness, however communications from 
practicing lawyers in Nigeria say the courts exceed the 60 days limit. 
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it is common knowledge that recovery of debt is not often done through the 
courts. The dysfunctions of the system, i.e. the delay in the court system401 and 
a corruptible police force, enable aggressive creditors, who take advantage of 
this dysfunction. People are often arrested for failure to pay up debts, in order to 
put pressure on the family members to pay debts, and this has proved more 
effective than the courts. In Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
vs. Diamond Bank Plc & Ors. (2018) LPELR 44217 (SC), J.S.C Baje speaking; 
identified and condemned this practice of using police to enforce civil debts 
through misuse of the criminal justice system. In the course of condemning the 
police, he stated that our security agencies particularly the police are not debt 
recovery agents but have allowed themselves to be used as such. He stated that 
the police should focus on their statutory duties of investigation and crime 
prevention rather than being overzealous and unscrupulous characters for debt 
recovery arising from contracts and loan or purely civil transactions. 
This straddles the issues of lack of trust and absence of the rule of law. McMillan 
and Woodruff explain this as private order under a dysfunctional public order. 
They state that where the legal system may not always be available to provide 
contractual assurance and when the law is dysfunctional and machinery for 
enforcing them is inadequate, private order might arise to take its place.402 The 
author’s establish that private order can arise through shared communal norms, 
trade associations, bilateral relationships etc. As we have seen creditors in Nigeria 
 
401 Given the recent strides taking by Lagos State to ease the debt recovery process, this may now be a perceived 
delay. People are generally used to the idea that the Nigerian courts are to slow in dispensing justice, so it may take 
some time before the effectiveness (if any) of the new laws are seen. 
402 John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff ‘Private Order under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 Michigan 
Law Review 2421, 2421 
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have adopted a private order approached to resolving their contractual issues,403 
because there is an inability (perceived or otherwise) of the courts to function 
properly or because the transaction costs associated with going to the courts are 
high. What is novel in the application of this insight to this Nigerian practice is 
that a public institution (police) is being adapted by private actors (creditors) as 
a means of generating private order (debt recovery This idea of private order is 
pertinent to this work, especially the idea that it can arise through norms, as we 
shall see in Chapter Six when we conduct our analysis, we take corruption to be 
a shared norm within Nigeria, it is this corruption that has enabled the use of the 
police force as agents for debt recovery.404 
5.4.4. Asset Managing Company of Nigeria (AMCON) 
 
Another important aspect of the debt recovery process is the role AMCON plays 
in it. AMCON was created in 2010, after the 2009 financial crises in Nigeria. It 
was set up by the AMCON Act of 2010 (amended in 2015), and Section 5 states 
the objectives as being to acquire eligible bank assets from financial institutions, 
purchase or otherwise invest in eligible equities, hold and dispose of eligible bank 
assets including the collection of interest, principal and capital due and the taking 
over of collateral securing such assets. In short, AMCON purchases non-
performing loans from banks and bears the responsibility of debt collection. 
Amongst its powers, under Section 6,405 sub (2) gives it the ability to exercise 
 
403 What is novel in the application of this insight to this Nigerian practice is that a public institution (police) is being 
adapted by private actors (creditors) as a means of generating private order (debt recovery) 
404 Beyond allowing for the use of the police as an enforcement mechanism, we shall also explore the role this norm 
plays in the degradation of interaction between people. 
405 For example, entering into contracts; enforcing any security, guarantee or indemnity; compromising any claim, 
forgiving any debt; selling and disposing any asset 
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its power anywhere inside and out of Nigeria.406 It is interesting to note that since 
its inception in 2010, AMCON has acquired over 12,000 non-performing loans, of 
these over 5, 000 were unsecured and over 2, 000 secured with mortgages.407 
Commencing proceeding is governed by the Federal High Court Asset 
Management (AMCON) Proceedings Rule of 2018. Order 10 (1) of the rules 
provides that where the claimant believes there is no defence to the claim, he 
may sue for recovery of debt or a liquidated money demand or any other claim 
by summary judgement. Order 12 states that the courts may grant interim 
orders with respect to the proceedings. Such interim orders may include; freezing 
accounts; detention or preservation of the relevant property; sale of the property; 
payments of income from the relevant property into a designated account, until 
such time as the case is decided; and restraining the party from moving assets 
outside the jurisdiction of the courts etc. Order 15 covers foreclosure and 
redemption and states that persons entitled to the property whether through a 
legal or equitable charge may claim the following reliefs; payment of moneys 
secured by the mortgage or charge; sale; foreclosure; redemption; re-
conveyance; delivery of possession by the mortgagee etc.408 
In terms of approach and performance, it was said that the enforcement 
approach jettisons restructuring plans and focuses on enforcing the security by 
 
406 Interestingly, Nigeria has no existing legal framework in respect to cross-border insolvency and has not adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 or is a signatory to any insolvency treaties See INSOL 
International ‘Collection of Practical Issues Important to Small Practitioners-Nigeria’ (2017) Small Practice Issues 
Technical Series. Available at < https://www.insol.org/library# > Accessed 3rd April 2019. 
407 AMCON Achievements, Available at < http://amcon.com.ng/achievements.php > Accessed 3rd April 2019. 
Bloomberg notes that the acquisition is worth 1.7 trillion Naira. Emele Onu.,  ‘Bloomberg: Nigeria's AMCON Expects 
to Return to Profit as Losses Narrow (2018) Available at < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
01/nigeria-s-amcon-narrows-loss-by-90-in-2017-as-economy-improves > Accessed 3rd April 2019. This same article 
also reports that in 2016 AMCON suffered a loss of 164.9 billion Naira, but this has been attributed to the recession 
that occurred during that year. 
408 The list is not exhaustive; thus, a full reading of the Order would be necessary. It is interesting to note that Order 
14 covers the possibility of the defendant absconding or selling the property while the suit is ongoing, thus, the 
court may make an order that the defendant provide security if there is a likelihood of this happening. 
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sale of the underlying assets because the majority of debtors may be unable or 
unwilling to repay their debts.409 It has been stated that despite AMCON’s 
enormous powers it has struggled to discharge its duty. “Figures bandied in the 
media suggest that AMCON’s attempts to recover value from non-performing 
loans stands at a paltry 19 to 20 per cent or thereabouts of the NPLs on AMCON’s 
docket”.410 In over eight years, AMCON has only been able to hit an annual 
recovery rate of less than 2.5 per cent.411 Although no official records reflect this, 
personal information reveals within the legal service market within Lagos, firms 
were competing for debt recovery work which was being subcontracted out by 
AMCON which appeared to be due to the difficulty faced in recovering debt. 
Given what has been said above, this somewhat reaffirms the World Bank’s 
stance that debt recovery still presents a problem in Nigeria, and without a strong 
debt recovery system, lending or getting institutions to lend will always be 
problematic.  
5.5. Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter, we explored more fully the theoretical concepts of game theory 
and rational choice theory that would inform our understanding of the analysis 
to be conducted in chapters five and six. The chapter also explored the issue of 
trust in society and how it relates to whether individuals would agree to transact 
with each other. On this concept, we asserted that what was required was not 
 
409 Collins Nweze, ‘AMCON’s debt recovery challenges’ (2018) Available at < http://thenationonlineng.net/amcons-
debt-recovery-challenges/ > Accessed 3rd April 2019. 
410 Ibid 
411 Ibid 
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the ordinary understanding of trust between friends and family, but the 
calculative trust which enabled individuals to take risks. 
The chapter also considered the Nigerian legal environment, examining the laws 
which guided bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. We noted that these laws 
were currently being changed, although there was no effective date as to when 
it would happen. We noted some of the changes the proposed new law sought 
to make. Nevertheless, we concluded, based on the World Bank reports, that 
debt recovery still presented as a problem in Nigeria. When these new laws finally 
come into effect, it will be interesting to review how successful they are in tackling 
the debt recovery problem. 
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Chapter Six: Investigating a Borrower – Intermediary Action 
Situation 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we discussed theoretical concepts that would influence 
our application of Ostrom’s IAD framework. The concepts of game theory, 
rational choice theory and calculative trust were discussed in an attempt to fully 
grasp the complex layers of the model which is about to be utilised. We also 
examined the Nigerian legal environment and noted from the World Bank study 
in 2016, that enforcement of contracts, realisation of securities and insolvency 
was still a problem. With this information in mind, in this chapter we shall attempt 
an application of the IAD framework. The key feature of the IAD framework is 
that it allows for the focused integration of different concepts using the action 
arena, creating the opportunity to carry out a multi-level analysis.  
It is pertinent to note at this point that the use of the model presents several 
possible applications. The first application being to carry out an empirical analysis 
which involves observing the pattern of interactions within a community and 
measuring these interactions against evaluative criteria to note when outcomes 
change or do not change.412 This empirical analysis can be likened to game 
theory413 and conducting a game analysis.414 The second application would be a 
theoretical analysis, that is, a conceptual community is created where 
 
412 This empirical study can be seen in her observations of how common pool resources were managed in her book 
‘Governing the commons’ discussed in chapter four 
413 As we know from chapters four and five, with game theory we have players (individuals) who are working with 
existing rules to play a game and see how it ends. With game theory, we have the existing set of rules, and players 
can choose from different strategies and attain an outcome, depending on what rules they play by, we can then 
presume what the outcome will be. 
414 Again, in chapter four, we discussed the concept of the snatch game, prisoners’ dilemma and mechanism design. 
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assumptions are made about the rational and irrational strategies available to the 
participants, and predicted interactions and outcomes are made. These 
interactions, like an empirical analysis, are measured against the evaluative 
criteria which we assume, in a real world running of the action arena, will inform 
on where a change can occur. This work will adopt the latter of the applications. 
While the ultimate motivation should be policy design, the pertinent problem now 
is diagnosing and identifying questions that needs to be asked and considered 
when attempting to create policy, and where changes within the arena would be 
possible. Therefore, our conceptual focus is on the operational and collective 
action arena,415 rather than the constitutional action arena.416 What follows is a 
population of Ostrom’s framework with our own terms and factors, to observe 
what pattern of interactions will be generated. 
6.2. The IAD Framework and the Lagos SME Sector 
  
To begin our analysis, we must first create the stage, identifying as clearly as 
possible all necessary factors that could impact on the action arena and situation. 
Such factors are according to Ostrom, the biophysical/ material conditions, the 
attributes of the community and the rules in use. Before delving into what these 
attributes are,417 it is necessary to first determine what evaluative criteria the 
arena will be examined with, if change is to occur.418 The relevance of identifying 
these criteria early on, is that it helps streamline and eliminate unnecessary 
 
415 The operational level looks at the decisions by participants and the consequences of those decisions, while the 
collective level is the process through which institutions are constructed by be actors. See chapter four, Ostrom (n 
257) 25 
416 The collective arena looks at the legitimization of the policy generated at the collective level and the actions on 
the operational level.  
417 Because by doing so, it would mean that the analysis of the arena has started. 
418 If you recall, in chapter four, we briefly listed what these criteria will be, but did not go into a full discussion on 
them, Here, we shall now attempt to expatiate on them further 
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factors that have no bearing on our proposed arena.  Ostrom identifies several 
evaluative criteria419 which act as the lens with which the arena is evaluated. 
They are:420 Economic efficiency; Equity; Adaptability, Resilience and 
Robustness; Accountability and Conformance to general morality.421 
6.2.1. The Concept of Efficiency 
 
Ostrom in her work places a lot of emphasis on economic efficiency, however, it 
has been suggested that efficiency can be viewed in many ways.422 With regards 
to allocation and reallocation of resources i.e. the resource being funding, we 
have noted that there are institutional arrangements423 set up by the government 
to fund SMEs. These schemes represent administrative efficiency, but what must 
be examined here is how well they are being managed. Again, administrative 
efficiency can be satisfied by the delivery of the scheme’s mandate. The economic 
efficiency looks at the net benefit to be gained by funding SMEs. 
Economic efficiency within our arena looks at the way in which the system 
functions, examining whether sufficient funding is getting to the SMEs by focusing 
on whether there is an alignment in the demand for finance and the supply to 
meet that demand. Our analysis of economic efficiency does not seek to 
determine what the level of funding to SMEs should be capped at, but rather a 
 
419 McGinnis (n 229) 176, McGinnis in his work analysing Ostrom’s IAD framework further extends these criteria to 
also include Legitimacy and Participation Level. 
420 Ostrom (n 257) 266 
421 Ostrom concludes that the number of potential evaluative criteria is large, but in her book, she focuses on the 
five indicated above. 
422Economic and Administrative efficiency. By economic efficiency it means the degree of difference in the flow of 
net benefits associated in the allocation or reallocation of resources, and administrative efficiency concerns 
government and public interventions. See Kalim U. Shah, and Keron Niles., ‘Energy Policy in the Caribbean green 
economy context and the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) framework as a proposed tool for its development’ 
(2016) 98 Energy Policy 768, 775 
423 The different schemes created by the government to finance SMEs. 
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submission that more money is needed. This in justifiable in that it aligns with 
the perspective of the Nigerian Government, as we have seen in chapter two, 
more recently different funds were being created to fund the SMEs, for example 
the N200 Billion fund provided by the CBN to refinance and restructure the 
different bank’s existing portfolio.424 
It must be noted that this proposed concept of efficiency being used for my 
analysis of my action arena does not align with Ostrom’s use. In other words, a 
proxy view for the concept of efficiency is being used. This view is simply that 
through policy interventions, more funds should be received by SMEs. Whereas 
Ostrom might try to investigate optimum allocative efficiency using her model, 
this is beyond our ambition, we are merely seeking a model which can increase 
the allocation to SMEs.  
6.2.2. The Concept of Equity 
 
Equity here looks at the distribution outcomes and processes.425 With regards to 
processes, in our arena, this would examine the criteria used to assess whether 
or not a loan should be granted, in other words, procedural fairness. With regards 
to outcomes, this would mean that the funding is getting to the most effective 
and successful businesses. It should be noted that predicting successful business 
is a problematic area, and sometimes there are clear indications that a business 
will not be successful. However, the majority of the interactions with SMEs will 
 
424 See chapter two, page 40 (last paragraph). 
425 Ostrom (n 257) 66 
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involve having a risk analysis process, but again even this is not a guarantee. 
What ultimately determines the success of a business is the market. 
6.2.3. The Concept of Accountability 
 
Without accountability, actors can engage in various opportunistic, strategic 
behaviours.426 Ostrom evaluates accountability on the collective-choice or 
constitutional choice level of her action arena.427 Accountability within our arena 
can be approached from two perspectives, the first being systemic accountability 
which has to do with generating publicly viewable justifications as to why specific 
actions were taken and overall monitoring. This suggests that there must be 
checks in place to make sure the loans are granted efficiently and based on merit 
after having done their due diligence.  
The second is individual accountability which deals with whether the loans and 
interest on the loans have been paid back by the SMEs. This also extends to what 
mechanisms are available, how well the SMEs granted loans can be monitored, 
and if they can produce accurate reports on their business to ensure 
accountability. This is obviously hinged on the information system within Lagos 
and enforcement procedures granted by law.428 
Accountability also has an underlying enforcement implication, and what 
resources are available to the officials to carry out their monitoring duties if so 
required, etc.   
 
426  Ostrom (n 257) 67 
427 Ibid 
428 By this we mean the remedies available in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency; how creditors can claim; which 
creditors can claim first etc. 
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6.2.4. Conformance to General Morality and Legitimacy 
 
With conformance to general morality,429 Ostrom seeks to find out whether those 
who can cheat and go undetected are able to obtain very high payoffs. This 
criterion looks at whether those who keep promises are more likely to be 
rewarded and advance in their careers, and how those within the institutional 
arrangement learn to relate with each other over a period of time. 
McGinnis when discussing Ostrom’s work, adds the extra criteria of legitimacy.430 
It is suggested that legitimacy comes into play within our situation where the 
substantive laws are viewed as fair, and there is an alignment between the norms 
and the formal rules as written down.  For example, in our arena when dealing 
with how land is used as collateral. As we shall see when we explore this further 
in chapter six, banks in Nigeria are clear as to what form of title is acceptable 
when it comes to accepting land as collateral. The title (certificate of occupancy) 
issued by the Governor of a state is viewed on paper as the most superior claim 
to land you can hold.431 But despite having a Certificate of Occupancy from the 
Governor, a title which ordinarily should allow for peaceful enjoyment of the 
property, if the community is not in support, then it brings about a host of trouble 
for anyone seeking to claim the land in question.432 
 
429 Ostrom (n 257) 67 
430 McGinnis (n 229) 176 
431 When we look at this in more detail in chapter six, we shall observe that before the Land Use Act of 1978, land 
was seen as communal property and even when alienation occurs this view does not change, and this creates 
problems for the new owners. Banks are always wary of the fact that the community may not be in support of the 
transactions and tend to avoid accepting such forms of collateral or if they do accept, they discount heavily on its 
value. 
432 “The various chiefs or heads of communities still regard themselves as trustees of community land for the 
management and control of the land in total disregard of the rights of occupancy system…. They still allocate, 
partition, and sell land without reference to the appropriate authorities designated under the Act” See Ehi P. Osho, 
‘The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria’ (1990) 10 Boston College Third World Law 
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6.2.5. The Concept of Adaptability, Resilience and 
Robustness 
 
This reflects how the institutions set up can respond to changing environments 
and information.433 For Ostrom, this specifically examines how the system 
changes, and also how the behaviour of the participants changes over time and 
adapts itself to inefficiencies. Whether or not the participants learn from 
experience within the action situation, and if they adapt to new circumstances as 
they arise or become rigid in their responses over time.434  
It is suggested that these concepts are linked to the participation level within the 
arena, because participation level comes into play when examining the 
adaptability of the systems. We have noted that there is a shared common 
interest between the Government lenders, the bankers and the borrowers all 
working together to develop the SME sector, a robust system will be able to 
sustain the participation of all the key players, and where there is a deficiency, 
correct itself in order the maintain the participation level. 
6.3. The Exogenous Variables and Preliminary Observations 
 
Now that our evaluative criteria have been identified and expanded upon, it is 
relevant to examine what our exogenous variables are, and how they play into 
 
Journal 43, 56.  This point is reiterated in more recent studies done in 2012 and 2014. See Butler (n 522) and Ghebru 
(n 533).  
433 Shah (n 420) 775. This goes to the issue of the feedback loop within the action arena i.e. outcomes feedback 
onto the participants and the arena and transform both over time. This has been discussed in our exposition in 
chapter four 
434 Ostrom (n 257) 67 
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our arena. As stated previously, the exogenous variables include the biophysical 
or material conditions435 that affect the arena, for example, the issue of collateral, 
transportation, education,436 power supply, flooding and security are factors 
which can be considered under this heading. For attributes of the community, an 
examination of factors such as: the issues of corruption; issues of security and 
education; access to credit information; problems of trust; inflation affecting 
interest rates; business registration culture,  specifically important in Lagos; 
entrepreneurial spirit; the problem of infrastructure; a working robust property 
registration system; border trading, the ease of accessing business permits; type 
of family or community support available, etc. 
The rules in use, as noted previously, are an incorporation of both formal and 
informal rules. We noted that the formal rules are the existing regulations within 
the country (fully discussed in chapter 2), whilst informal rules are cultural or 
societal norms inherent in a community (for example the registration culture in 
Lagos). It has been observed that sometimes these societal norms may conflict 
with the formal rules. This was observed above when we discussed how land is 
held in Nigeria, and the obvious conflict between the indigenous tenure system 
and the formal system that was established with the introduction of the Land Use 
Act in 1978. 
Some formal rules that would impact our arena include the Small Medium 
Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria Act (SMEDAN), The Asset 
 
435 Chapter four offers a fuller discussion and explanation of this concept. 
436 Which according to Yoshimichi, is a social resource and can influence what individuals see as a perceived 
constraint. This was discussed in chapter five when looking at ‘Rational Choice Theory’ 
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Management Company of Nigeria Act (AMCON), Collateral Registry Regulation,437 
and obtaining business permits and enforcements of contracts. 
Below, we shall now consider some preliminary points on the exogenous variables 
that will be used within our action arena. 
6.3.1. Collateral: 
It was noted that some variables can fit in two or more categories. Thinking about 
the issue of collateral, it can be an attribute of biophysical, attribute of the 
community and the rules in use. Biophysical, depending on the nature of the 
goods produced or if the collateral has a physical life span. For example, cars, 
machinery etc. depreciate over time, while something like land appreciates. 
Under the rules in use, it is relevant to have that classification because of what 
is recognised as collateral under the law. With attributes of the community, it is 
one thing to state under regulation what is legally acceptable as collateral, but 
another for it to be what is commonly used as collateral. In Nigeria, the use of 
land or real property is the most acceptable form of collateral. While the 
biophysical attributes of collateral may not be particularly relevant to the action 
situation438 being analysed, it is however relevant to be aware of their existence. 
The existence of collateral under the attributes of the community and rules in use 
already raises questions within our proposed action situation. It becomes a 
problem because of the lender’s attitude towards the kind of collateral being 
used, and what type of collaterals the borrowers actually hold.  Also, if we have 
 
437 Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA); Companies Tax Act; Personal Income Tax Act; Bank and other 
Financial Institutions Act (BAOFIA), Relevant CBN Guidelines; Bankruptcy Act. 
438 Not relevant because of the level of abstractness being dealt with. The biophysical nature becomes relevant if 
basing the analysis more industry specific areas where perhaps perishable goods can be put up as collateral. 
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progressive legislature which creates a wide variety of legislation on acceptable 
forms of collateral in line with international standards, for example, the use of 
patents to secure debt, but the legislation exists within a community who neither 
understands what patents are or their value. We again have that disparity in what 
is accepted and what the law says. The use of collateral only functions if the 
borrowers hold what the lenders want. If a lender exists within a community 
where the value of patent is not recognized and they have no understanding of 
how attain value for it should they need to exercise their right over it, then they 
would be unwilling to accept it as a form of collateral. 
6.3.2. Corruption and Norms: 
Corruption as an attribute of the community can have both positive and negative 
effects. Positive in that if you are willing to offer kickbacks, you find that business 
can be achieved more quickly. There have been debates around the fact that 
bribes are useful tools within the business environment.439  For example, a few 
thousand naira’s here and there can get you that permit more quickly or make 
your registration of business faster. Such bribes can be calculated as part of the 
transaction costs. But the negative effect of allowing corruption undermines trust 
within that system. If bribes can be taken to falsify documents to acquire a loan, 
then we have lenders no longer willing to participate within that environment.  
Corruption can be viewed from three perspectives; the agent perspective who 
may feel it is better to pay because it expediates achieving their end goal; the 
systemic perspective which has wider negative impact because it raises 
 
439 This was talked about extensively by Adeyeye in his article. See Adefolake Adeyeye., ‘Bribery: cost of doing 
business in Africa’ (2017) 24 Journal of Financial Crime 56 
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uncertainty and transaction costs; and a cultural perspective created because of 
the wide spread acceptance of corruption in every sphere of life in Nigeria, that 
paying of bribes is the normal way of functioning within Nigerian society, and not 
engaging is an aberration. 
It is suggested that corruption in Nigeria lies between reluctant acceptance and 
the need to fight it.440 But while it might be useful from the agent’s perspective, 
the systemic consequences of engaging are more alarming, and it is from this 
systemic perspective that it will be considered in our arena. 
6.3.3. Cultural Norms and Communal Support: 
Again, within the attribute of the community category and the rules in use, we 
can observe another interaction between cultural norms and family or communal 
support. Culturally speaking, it is generally frowned upon within the family unit 
and ethnic group not to assist your “brother/sister”, this is reflected in the NBS 
survey carried out in 2013 in which family loans ranked third when it came to 
sources of finance.441 
6.3.4. Cultural Norms and Rules in Use: 
At this point, it would be relevant to examine that interface between acceptance 
of legislation,442 and accepted cultural norms. There is often a disparity between 
institutional laws and what is culturally acceptable within society. This can be 
examined from two points: a total rejection of the rule because it is at variance 
with the norm as illustrated by the American prohibition of alcohol in 1920 
 
440 This need is reflected in the fact that the selling point of most political platform is the fight against corruption. 
This platform is attractive because political leaders recognise the people’s desire to see change in the system. 
441 SMEDAN and National Bureau of Statistics collaborative survey, (2013) 44 
442 Which would be primarily in line with western policy. 
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discussed in chapter three, or we see a situation where over time the rule can 
change norms as seen in the Brown v Board of Education Topeka case.443 
6.4. Actors, Positions and Outcomes 
 
Under this section we shall begin to fully synthesise our terms and information 
from the Lagos SME sector within Ostrom’s framework. Mainly, our Action Arena 
would be the ‘Financing of SMEs’. Given the functions of SMEDAN, as specified 
by the SMEDAN Act,444 within our first action situation, the participants would be 
the SMEs (borrowers) and SMEDAN.445 Working with this situation, we would 
have an arena like the one set out below: 
• We can take the participants here to be SMEs who are assigned the 
position of borrowers. 
• SMEDAN are assigned the position of linking small scale industries to 
sources of finance, technology, technical skill development and 
management.446 
The aim of SMEDAN as set out in its functions is to bring the borrower and lender 
together in a fruitful enterprise.447 SMEDAN plays an important role to both lender 
and borrower, even if different. The first relationship is between SMEDAN and 
the borrower, while the second is the relationship between SMEDAN and the 
lender. In the interest of the arena, we may assume that the actors within the 
 
443 See chapter four on page 110 where this case was discussed. 
444 Said functions will be discussed subsequently. 
445 Any other situation can include lenders (be it public, private and the Federal Government). 
446 A function of the agency as set out in Section 8 (I) of the SMEDAN Act of 2003 
447 At this stage in our situation, the interactions that will happen occur at the operational level which looks at the 
day-to-day decision-making process. 
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arena are self-interested448 with the aim of maximizing benefits important to 
them. Within our action situation, for SMEDAN, a clear distinction must be made 
between the formally stated functions or motivations of the organisations and 
the actual motivations of the individuals who run the organisation. We must be 
careful not to make false assumptions that SMEDAN as an organisation will be 
filled with people who would naturally be motivated by the functions of SMEDAN 
as set out in the Act. 
So far, we have identified who our actors are within our situation, and what 
position they occupy. The next step would be to determine what possible 
outcomes can arise from the interactions between SMEDAN and the SMEs. In 
setting up the action situation, it is helpful to identify the desired outcome. For 
example, we can decide that in our action situation efficient lending to SMEs is a 
desired outcome, and by efficient lending we mean that lenders can identify and 
ally with genuine borrowers with bona fide businesses.449 Again, we can also say 
our desired outcome can be an efficient debt recovery process,450 or solving an 
information gap problem, giving potential lenders adequate access to information 
on borrowers to make informed choices or vice versa. Broadly, when 
conceptualizing outcomes, these are what will be potentially considered. 
However, this conceptualized outcome should not be confused with the actual 
outcomes generated by the situation; this actual outcome stems from the pattern 
of interactions that occur in the action situation. Here, reference must be made 
to the mechanism design literature, discussed in chapter three, where it was 
 
448 Reflecting the rational choice theory discussed in chapter four. 
449 This implies legitimate businesses with the potential to succeed. The question of if it actually succeeds is a 
market question. 
450 Particularly relevant if we’re looking at a lender focused action situation 
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noted that in the theory, “we begin by identifying our desired outcome or social 
goal”.451 This is not what we are doing here.  
When this theory was compared with Ostrom’s model, it was identified that with 
Ostrom’s framework we have actors who are working with existing rules to select 
strategies and make decisions. It is at this point the outcomes are produced. 
However, with mechanism design we start at the end – determining the outcome 
we want, then running it backwards, designing a situation that will produce the 
outcome and often ignoring the existing social context. Thus, these generalized 
outcomes must be distinguished from the outcomes produced in the arena, 
because the aim is not to create a design to meet our outcomes. Rather, the 
point of the arena is to uncover what outcomes may arise as a result of the 
restricted choices the participants make within the action situation, given all we 
can surmise about the attributes of the community, the rules in use, the 
biophysical and material conditions.452 
6.5. Action, Information and Incentives 
 
Under this section, our knowledge of the biophysical/material conditions, 
attributes of the community and rules-in-use will prove useful. Previously, we 
considered these concepts and drew firm conclusions on what they mean within 
the Lagos SME sector. These factors all influence what actions the participants 
may take, resulting in outcomes. When the constraints presented by these factors 
 
451 Maskin, E.S ‘Mechanism Design: How to implement social goals’ (2007) Available at < 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/maskin_lecture.pdf > Accessed on 1st 
March, 2017. 
452 This would be explored more fully as we discuss the arena in more detail. 
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and the incentive structures are considered, it becomes easier to predict and 
observe the patterns of behaviour. 
Given who the participants are, we can assume that the actions-outcome can be 
broadly categorized into two: the borrower will be linked to a lender or not. The 
question at this juncture now becomes what circumstances will lead to these 
outcomes. To answer this, first we must consider the incentive structures which 
are made up of the costs and benefits to be suffered or gained by the actors. 
The incentives underpin the motivations of the actors and influence what actions 
or strategies will be used. The task of developing an incentive structure that 
aligns with the actor’s interest is fundamental to the situation. If done correctly, 
it may be able to some extent overcome the free-rider problem453 and build an 
internal monitoring system within the situation. 
6.5.1. The Borrower’s Costs and Benefits 
 
If we begin to consider the incentives, we can observe that an obvious benefit of 
a borrower working with the SMEDAN would be to take advantage of their 
connections to lenders.454 Further incentives to work with SMEDAN can be 
identified through its functions under Section 8 (c) of the SMEDAN Act of 
2003.455 It has also been stated that SMEDAN provides training and capacity 
building in areas such as book keeping and accounts management, preparation 
 
453 The ‘free rider’ was considered in chapter four. Within our action situation, from the perspective of SMEDAN a 
properly designed incentive structure will foster competition among employees and encourage monitoring. Thus, 
recalcitrant employees would not benefit but rather only compliant employees. 
454 In March 2017, SMEDAN unveiled a credit information portal which provides information on available credit by 
various institutions. It has been observed that to access these loans a SMEDAN identification number along with 
other requirements are needed. This suggests there is a prerequisite to be a registered SMEDAN member. 
455 Promoting and facilitating development programmes, instruments and support services to accelerate 
development, modernisation, networking and linkage of small and medium scale industries. 
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of business plans, quality control, computer or IT appreciation.456 This  is valuable 
knowledge to any business owner, and acts as a reassurance to creditors that 
the borrower is equipped with the relevant skills to run the business. Again, a 
potential benefit to be considered would be whether the borrower who goes 
through SMEDAN with all the required documents,457 gets priority over a borrower 
who approaches the bank or lending institution directly.  
But we must also examine the costs of working with SMEDAN,458 for example, a 
borrower’s potential cost could be time, expense, the possibility of humiliation, 
expectation that they may have to pay a bribe etc. Now we must consider this 
individually in light of the exogenous variables. If we consider the concept of time 
under the variable of attribute of the community, we can note several 
observations. Time can be viewed from several perspectives, the first is how 
much of it is spent accessing information at the physical offices, and the second 
is how much time is spent accessing information through the online platform. If 
the expectation of the borrower is that they are going to spend an inordinate 
amount of time which could put towards doing other productive things at the 
SMEDAN office, we can assume that some borrowers will be discouraged. 
Experience has shown that Nigerian government offices are time wasting black 
holes unless you have the advantage of knowing a top-level member of staff or 
you have deep pockets.459 This leads us to the second cost of ‘expense’. We can 
 
456 Nigerian Investment Hub “Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)” (2013) 
available at < http://investor.ng/resource/small-and-medium-enterprises-development-agency-of-nigeria-smedan/ 
> Accessed on 25th January, 2018. 
457 A point worth considering would be standardization of what would be required across lending institutions. For 
example, the type of Identification used; some institutions require the Nation Identity card (which is difficult to 
acquire) and others are laxer with the ID needed.  
458 Here we can identify the constraints as defined by Yoshimichi in chapter four which influences the rational 
choice an individual will make.  
459 The problem of government offices is well known and has been discussed in academic literature. See John O. 
Magbadelo, ‘Reforming Nigeria’s Federal Civil Service: Problems and Prospects’ (2016) 72 (1) India Quarterly: A 
Journal of International Affairs 75.  
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view this in light of whether or not there is the expectation to pay bribes.460  If 
this is an added expenditure to be undertaken by the borrower who is seeking 
money, you may find again that some borrowers will be discouraged. 
As stated above already, the second consideration would be how much time is 
spent accessing information through the online portal. Here again, we must 
consider the expense spent in getting the information, and the usefulness of the 
information. Viewing this under the attribute of the community, for expense we 
must consider the money spent on internet data subscription or going to cyber 
cafés for those who do not readily have a mobile phone with internet capabilities. 
Also, we must consider the practicality of accessing the information via the 
internet if you are not literate.461 So, do we then assume that the uneducated 
are excluded from the use of the online platform? This raises questions about its 
accessibility for the older demographic who may not be proficient in using 
computers.  
Additionally, we must consider the usefulness of the information on the platform. 
The SMEDAN platform offers access to a credit information portal where the 
names of various institutions offering loans, their requirements etc. are specified, 
and an SME toolkit website which hosts short videos explaining various concepts, 
like how to apply for loans, what a balance sheet is, how to create business plans 
etc. It must be noted that the concept of usefulness is highly subjective and 
dependent on the individual seeking information. Nevertheless, the videos 
seemed too general and not specific to the Nigerian context.462  
 
460 The concept of corruption has been considered previously. 
461 When considering the attributes of the community, a low level of education was discussed. 
462 A noticeable problem was the continued use of US dollars as the form of currency, rather than the Nigerian 
Naira. This suggests that the video was not designed originally for a Nigerian audience. 
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6.5.2. SMEDAN’s Benefits and Costs 
 
Formally, we can assume that since SMEDAN is a government institution, their 
motivation would be in line with the policies of the administration in power. But 
this official motivation is subject to whether or not the individuals within the 
organisations believe in it and execute it. As noted previously, we must 
distinguish between the incentives of the organisation as a body and the 
personnel within the organisation. While their formal mandate is connecting 
borrowers and lenders together, we may nevertheless assume that some of the 
personnel of SMEDAN may be self-interested actors seeking their own personal 
benefit. Not much is understood as to how benefits accrue to employees of the 
organisation. Section 6 and Section 11 (2)463 of the Act does specify that 
emoluments would be paid, so we can conclude that there is a salary scheme, 
but what is not clear is whether or not salaries are paid, or bonuses offered if a 
specific target464 is met or exceeded. So, we must ask ourselves what type of 
remunerations the employees are paid and is there a difference if they do not 
fulfil their mandate within that year.  
For the individual employee within SMEDAN, there could be the possible added 
benefit of receiving bribes from the borrower in return for services or preferential 
treatment. We may assume that some employees might not be satisfied with the 
salary scheme and won’t diligently carry-out their functions. We can also assume 
that others will be selflessly motivated to carry out the functions as set out by 
 
463 This deals specifically with allowances and remunerations for employees, while Section 12 (1) provides that; ‘……. 
employees of the Agency shall be entitled to pensions, gratuities and other retirement benefits as are' prescribed 
under the Pensions Act’. 
464 By set target we mean how well they did their job, for example, how many workshops or training sessions were 
organised within that year; how many borrowers were successfully linked to lenders 
164 
 
SMEDAN without any other form of compensation, outside their fixed salary paid 
by the organisation. Again, we must also consider the possibility that since the 
organisation receives funds from the government, and aid from agencies to carry 
out their functions, these monies could be diverted by staff for their personal 
use465 rather than using it to fulfil their mandate.466 
As with the borrower, we must also consider SMEDAN’s cost, are there any 
sanctions if their obligations are not fulfilled? Section 16 of the Act provides that 
the Agency shall prepare and submit an annual report to the Federal Executive 
Council, through the Minister, not later than six months after the end of each 
year., However, the last annual report available to be viewed on their website is 
dated 2012. While it is obvious that corruption cases will be prosecuted as with 
the former Director General Alhaji Bature Umar Masari,467 what about the day-
to-day mismanagement? For example, failure to turn up for work, condescending 
attitude towards borrowers resulting in humiliation. It is relevant to note whether 
there are sanctions for these, and whether there are rewards for enthusiastic, 
helpful behaviour. Is there some form of service review mechanism in place 
where borrowers can assess the staff’s performance? if so, how seriously is it 
taken, and is it a ground for termination of employment?468  
 
 
 
 
465 This is considered a benefit for them. 
466 On the 8th of December 2017, the previous Director General of SMEDAN Alhaji Bature Umar Masari was arrested 
by the Independent Corrupt practices and other related offences Commission on charges of corruption, he allegedly 
demanded and received bribes from contractors and awarded contracts on behalf of the agencies to his cronies 
who were neither experienced or qualified to execute them. See The Nation Newspaper ‘ICPC arrests former 
SMEDAN DG for alleged corruption in contract awards’ Available at < http://thenationonlineng.net/icpc-arrests-
former-smedan-dg-alleged-corruption-contract-awards/ > Accessed 16th February 2018. 
467 Ibid 
468 Here we’re looking at the concept of developing rules which with time become part of the Norms of the 
Institution 
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6.6. Analysing Patterns of Interactions  
 
The next step within the action situation would be to proceed towards the 
prediction of likely behaviour. This will be influenced by the rules in use, which 
determine what the actors must, must not and may do.469 We must note that 
individual borrowers may have their own motivation for coming to seek help from 
SMEDAN. As simplistically as possible, if we were to imagine three borrowers X, 
Y, Z who approach SMEDAN with different expectations, X expectation might be 
to receiving training; Y might be finding the right lender to meet a need, and Z 
might have an information need. 
If we begin to elaborate further, given what we know about the structure of the 
situation, we can begin to identify what interactions may occur. Given Z’s need 
for information they are faced with two possibilities, physically going to the 
nearest SMEDAN office to get this information or accessing what is available 
online.470 Z opts to physically go to the SMEDAN office because Z is not computer 
literate, but Z’s physical attendance will require a consideration of the distance 
to the office, time and money to be spent getting there. In Lagos, there is only 
one SMEDAN zonal office471 and there is a high likelihood of being stuck in traffic, 
thus getting there will take time. Two choices are before Z at this juncture: Z 
forgoes going, at which point it can be said Z has exited the action situation; or 
Z decides to undertake the journey despite the possibility of time-wasting traffic. 
On getting to the office, Z is confronted again with several possibilities: Z’s time 
could be wasted further by self-interested SMEDAN employee, but Z receives the 
 
469 Previously, we identified that the rules in use are made up of the authority rules, boundary rules, information 
rules…etc. 
470 This will be considered again as a separate point. 
471 The office is in the Oshodi area of Lagos state, if one is familiar with Lagos, the expectation to get to Oshodi is 
that depending on the start point of the journey there is a very high likelihood of being stuck in traffic for hours. 
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information required; Z could be attended to quickly with no problem; Z could be 
asked to pay a bribe by the employee; Z could receive the information after 
suffering some form of humiliation from condescending staff; Z receives 
information, but it is not useful to Z; Z receives no information at all. 
If, on the other hand, Z decides to access the information online, again Z is 
confronted with several possibilities. Z may find it difficult to navigate through 
the online portal; Z may successfully navigate the portal and get the desired 
information; Z may encounter barriers which limits Z’s access to information. 
Such barriers could include that fact that there is a limit to how much information 
an individual can access from the SMEDAN credit information portal without a 
SMEDAN identification number.472  In the portal there are the basic details of the 
lender, such as who is lending, how much the loan is, interest rates and some 
lenders even specify what documentation is needed. However, to get more 
information you need to use the SMEDAN identification number.473 While one can 
assume a function of this identification number may be to keep track of the 
number of SMEs or act as some form of monitoring tool in proving SMEDAN is 
carrying out its functions, this nevertheless acts as a barrier to the information 
they are supposed to make accessible.474 
 
472 The SME Toolkit portal does not require a SMEDAN identification number, but the information there is too 
general and does not reflect the Nigerian experience. 
473 Online, the process to acquire this number is an initial registration of which there is no cost, after which you fill 
in the required form which requests for information such as your CAC registration number. Registration with the 
CAC incurs cost. This implies that to be part of SMEDAN your business needs to have gone through the formal 
registration at the companies’ house. 
474 Using a friend’s CAC details for her business name to complete a registration on the platform, I was able to start 
the registration process. However, upon completing the form and attempting a submission, an error message kept 
repeating, after several attempts, I stopped trying. However, while filling in the registration form, it was noticed 
from the options provided for the description of business that the range of business SMEDAN is interested in, is 
limited. The CAC details were for a Law Consultancy firm, so the category of “women owned enterprise was 
selected” as opposed to the other options of food processing; arts and crafts; oil and gas related goods and services; 
construction etc. The form requires the business owner to identify their needs, that is, what complaints they had 
with regards to their business. The form also asked for an indication as to whether the business owner required 
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For Z’s interaction, if we begin to make action-outcome linkages we can begin to 
conclude on what the final outcomes will be if the actors decide to participate. 
For example, where the interaction pattern between Z and a SMEDAN employee 
can be Z undertaking to go to the office despite initial constraints, and Z 
encounters an employee who asks for a bribe. Z can either exit the situation; Z 
can refuse to pay the bribe but nevertheless wait to be attended to; or Z can pay 
the bribe for preferential treatment and receive the information in time. While we 
may want Z to get the information needed, we do not want Z to engage in bribing 
within the action situation, as this is not a strategy that we want to encourage. 
The question here now is what incentive structures can be set up to discourage 
the expectation of receiving bribe from the SMEDAN employee or the paying of 
bribes by the borrower.  
6.7. Designing Incentives 
 
According to Ostrom, “perceived rewards and punishments can motivate 
individuals to take actions that are genuinely productive for all involved”.475 
Within our arena, we must now begin to consider what rewards can motivate the 
individual actors. Not much is understood about the incentive structure of 
SMEDAN, while we do know that employees are entitled to remuneration, beyond 
that it is not clear how promotions are made.476 So, in our arena given what we 
understand about the community (Nigeria, specifically Lagos), we can make 
 
entrepreneurship training. Other questions included whether the business owner had accessed any loans, if not, 
why not; the initial start-up capital of the firm; and the current assets of the firm excluding lands and building. 
475 Daniel H. Cole and Michael D. McGinnis Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy: A 
Framework for Policy Analysis, Volume 3 (Lexington Books 2017) 229 
476 Generally, what is known about civil service is that exams are written for promotion. In 2013 there was a move 
to scrap this system, arguing that promotion should be based on customer satisfaction and services rendered, but 
this has not been put into effect. 
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assumptions about the valuations that will be placed on the incentives. The basic 
need for the average Nigerian centres on transportation,477 health care, 
education, food, and power. For our action arena, we shall consider the first 
three. It must be noted that we are working from the premise that an employee 
during the course of the working day will want to do as little work as possible, 
and still earn their pay, thus it is vital that employees are aware of the incentive 
structures in place to encourage them. 
Again, we must note that given that Nigeria is well known for corruption, thus 
we can assume that a high value will be placed on financial rewards. As stated 
previously, not much is known about the salary structure for SMEDAN employees 
other than they are entitled to remuneration. But judging by the salary scale of 
the Federal service commission, which is reputed to be one of the highest paying 
government organisations, but realistically they barely pay a living wage, and 
with SMEDAN being a Federal agency, one cannot expect too much from them. 
The current minimum wage level per month for Federal employees in Nigeria is 
about N18, 000.478 Civil servants in Nigeria, are paid according to their level. For 
example, Level 1 is a staff with no formal education who gets the minimum 
wage.479 Considering other forms of incentive structures is important, but one 
 
477This is very important in Lagos because of the heavy traffic the city experiences. Practice has shown that where 
there is fuel scarcity, flooding (which Lagos is prone to), or any form of hindrance to easy movement beyond what is 
normally expected, fares go up for the regular buses. Thus, getting to and from work becomes a difficult process. 
The alternative to taking the regular buses, will be to use the BRT buses. Which on the average day, the queues to 
get in is not worth the lower fare, and because of frequency problems if you miss the first bus, you have a long wait 
for the one after. 
478 At the current exchange rate on 28th February 2018 that is about £36 a month. Given the current state of the 
economy there has been a lot of agitation for it to be increased. In March 2019 a bill was passed by the Senate to 
increase the minimum wage to N30, 000, but this is not law yet as it requires presidential assent. 
479 This scale is based on the Federal Civil Service commission. See Federal Civil Service Commission Salary Structure 
Available at < https://www.currentschoolnews.com/articles/federal-civil-service-commission-salary-structure/ > 
Accessed 28th February 2018. The level 4 salary – This is the secondary school certificate holder, and the wage for 
this N20, 000 (£40). The level 8 who is a person that has completed their university education earns N81,000 (£161). 
Note that in 2011, SMEDAN applied to the National Salaries, Incomes and Wages Commission (NSIWC) to have a 
special salary structure for its staff, but the application was rejected. See, The Daily Trust, available at < 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201109010764.html > Accessed, 28th February 2018. 
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must first begin by addressing the salary issue. Perhaps revisiting the idea of 
increasing the salary structure should be considered again.  
Aside from the salary, we can also consider other non-monetary incentives, that 
is, performance-based incentives. For example, we can look at promotion and 
job security based on successfully connecting a borrower. At this juncture we 
assume successful connection is not simply putting information on a web page, 
but rather, where possible, supporting and guiding the borrower to meet the 
requirements set by the lender. This will require the employee to be conversant 
with relevant policies. Generally, most government offices in Nigeria provide a 
staff bus for transportation.480 If this is applicable in SMEDAN offices, it can be 
used as a privilege based on performance and can be withdrawn if it can be 
shown that employees are underperforming.  
Also, Nigeria currently has a National Health Insurance Scheme,481 so health 
benefits are also something that can be considered for employees of SMEDAN. 
Access to different benefit packages482 under the scheme can be based on 
hierarchy within the organisation. This can foster competition amongst 
employees to be promoted to attain these benefits. Where an employee 
underperforms, perhaps the responsibility for paying the premium for that month, 
quarter or year can be shifted from the organisation to the employee for that 
 
480 If this is not in use, then it can be something to consider. 
481 Section 16 of the NHIS Act of 1999 makes participation voluntary (Note that the Act was established in 1999, but 
only became functional in 2005). There has been a recent agitation to make participation compulsory. However, if 
employers do decide to participate, both the employer and employee are obliged to make contributions to the 
scheme (See Section 16 (2) of the Act) 
482 Some benefits offered by the NHIS include: Accessing medical care for spouse and four (4) biological children; 
Referral for specialised investigations or care; and more dependants or children above the age of 18 can be added 
to a cover when additional payment is made. 
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period, and should performance pick up again, the organisation shoulders the 
responsibility.  
Another incentive worth considering in addition to revisiting an increase in salary, 
could be extra allowances. Extra remunerations can be paid to deserving 
employees. Also, sponsoring their education based on performance. Generally, 
one of the quickest ways to move up in the civil service is through education. 
Depending on the level which you entered, acquiring the required certificates can 
put you in line for promotion.  Scholarships could be awarded to diligent 
employees to further their education, to further their chances of promotion. 
6.8. Processing information 
 
Above, we have previously considered the benefits the borrower can get483 and 
noted some of the costs attached to engaging with SMEDAN. Putting all this 
information together, we will look at the interaction of our actor ‘Z’ who 
approaches SMEDAN for help. Given the incentive structure,484 we can assume 
now that the individuals will be in competition with each other for the benefits. 
Ostrom states that “as an initial information condition, we can assume that actors 
know the shape of the function linking actions to outcomes”.485 This implies that 
they know what strategies produce which outcome. In our situation, we also 
assume that the SMEDAN operatives may not communicate with each other 
regarding strategies they adopt.486 Ostrom further states that each actor will 
 
483 Where we looked at training possibility etc. 
484 Potential of using the staff bus, attaining scholarships, the possibility of health care. 
485 Ostrom (n 252) 81 
486 Between the borrowing actors, this is a given considering they may likely be in competition for the same source 
of finance. 
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assume that all other actors are rational and will adopt the best response487 to 
their own actions.488 Within our situation, the best response we want to 
encourage would be strategies which allow for the work to be done and also 
attain the benefit. 
6.9. Analysing Outcomes 
 
6.9.1. Efficiency 
As noted, this must be done in line with the evaluative criteria discussed above. 
The first step will be to look at efficiency. For an interaction to be efficient within 
our situation, there must be an alignment between SMEDAN and the borrower, 
by this we mean a borrower is either connected to a potential lender or some 
form of knowledge is gained. What happens beyond this connection falls within 
the purview of a borrower-lender situation which we shall examine in the next 
chapter. The SMEDAN role is to act as facilitator and educator.489 We have noted 
cultural and social factors often hindered the process of connecting these SMEs. 
In our pattern of interaction, we made inferences that this cultural or social factor 
could be the possibility of time wasting, humiliation, demand for bribes etc. Given 
what we know about the Nigeria context, we deduced that this behaviour is often 
overlooked by their co-workers and for the most part encouraged. To do this 
successfully, a form of collusive relationship exists among them, but this collusion 
is the sort we want to discourage rather than reinforce. To resolve this, we 
identified the possibility of using incentives or creating a monitoring structure. 
 
487 This best response should lead all actors to over harvest from the resource. 
488 Ostrom (n 252) 81 
489 Their mandate of equipping SMEs with tools to survive and thrive, e.g. provision of bookkeeping workshops etc. 
Also, this can simply be solving an information gap. 
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With incentives, we are designing tools which ultimately encourage the kind of 
behaviour that will achieve efficient outcomes. 
6.9.2. Equity 
We noted that the question of how the decisions were reached was a question 
of equity. In our situation, it is suggested that equity must look at the fairness of 
the decision-making process. It has been observed that SMEDAN carries out an 
evaluation of SMEs before passing them on to the financial institution who may 
carry out further evaluation.490 One must consider whether this process of 
evaluation is seen as fair. Writing on procedural fairness, Professor Macdonald 
states that this must encompass the two features of any decision-making 
process: the quality of the participation which should be afforded to persons 
affected by a decision; and the kinds of reasons which properly may be offered 
in support of the decision which results.491 While contextually McDonald in his 
article was reviewing legal decision making process, it is submitted that these 
two principles are applicable within our situation. For example, how clearly the 
defined criteria of SMEDAN linked business to potential lenders. Clearly defined 
criteria ensure on the face of it, those who meet the requirements already know 
that they will likely get access to the services provided by SMEDAN. Where they 
are denied access, the reason for the denial must be justified. 
We have also suggested above that there is a possibility of SMEDAN playing an 
active role in streamlining the requirements from lenders, this should be done to 
 
490 Nigerian Investment Hub “https://investor.ng/resource/small-and-medium-enterprises-development-agency-of-
nigeria-smedan/” accessed 22nd October, 2018. SMEDAN indicates that evaluation of the projects takes less than a 
week if all the appropriate details are included. 
491 Roderick A. McDonald., ‘A Theory of Procedural Fairness’ (1981) 1 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 3, 5. 
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aid procedural fairness. From what was observed on the credit information portal, 
the means of identification varied from financial institution to financial institution, 
some required National IDs,492 others passport or any form of valid ID. 
Streamlining the identification requirement can make it easier for SMEs to meet 
the requirements of lenders. 
In terms of fiscal equivalence, we must note what financial burden is shared 
between the SME and SMEDAN. If we use the evaluation conducted, are 
specialists involved in reviewing the business plan of the SME? Do the SMEs pay 
a fee before the evaluation is carried out? From our research, this information is 
not made clear. Again, the training programs hosted by SMEDAN, what is the 
selection criteria of those participating, is there a fee involved? We know that 
most of the programs hosted by SMEDAN are done in collaboration with other 
organisations,493 is there a requirement to pay registration fees? The equity in 
our situation, is that everyone is treated fairly.  In our situation, if rejection occurs 
it will be done on valid grounds. 
6.9.3. Accountability 
Further considerations within the situation, especially in terms of how sustainable 
it is, will include whether the incentive structure within SMEDAN was strong 
enough to allow the individual actors to act in the desired way. This focuses on 
the accountability method within the system. Here we focus on ‘hierarchical 
accountability’ within SMEDAN, where the person in charge (e.g. a director or the 
 
492 Officially it is stated that it takes 12 months after issuance of National Identification number to get the ID. But it 
has been reported in complaints by people that four years later they have still not received their ID. 
493 The CBN sometimes works with SMEDAN to educate SMEs. Community Awareness on Development Network 
(CAWAN) in 2015 collaborating with SMEDAN hosted a two-week training program 
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branch manager) holds other staff members responsible for your actions and 
decisions. Did the SMEDAN actors receive the benefits for engaging in the correct 
behaviour? The granting of benefits must also be examined alongside whether 
those who cheated were caught and sanctioned, or whether it went 
undetected.494 It must be understood that monitoring is expensive especially 
where employee self-interest cannot be aligned. We noted above when 
considering incentive structure, it must address the basic need of transportation, 
health care,495 education,496 and since SMEDAN is a government agency, the 
government could easily take advantage by arranging a collaboration between 
the agencies. 
Alternatively, we must also consider how the use of a complaints system might 
contribute to the sustainability of the situation. Where an SME encounters an 
actor within the situation who requires them to pay bribe, a confidential reporting 
mechanism might prove to be a useful tool, especially where there are assurances 
that complaints will be taken seriously.  
Without the criteria of accountability, actors can engage in the various 
opportunistic behaviours. It must be noted that accountability can be approached 
from two perspectives, the first being systemic accountability which has to do 
with generating publicly viewable justifications as to why specific actions were 
taken. This is linked to legitimacy and whether there is a public perception that 
the evaluation process is fair and transparent, and that the SMEs are not 
 
494 By undetected, it is meant that within the organisation the individual monitoring is not working but outside 
reports show that there is a problem. 
495 We noted above that the government currently has a National Health Insurance Scheme, and health benefits is 
something that can be considered for employees of SMEDAN. Access to different benefit packages under the 
scheme can be based on hierarchy within the organisation, with access being given by performance. 
496 Education or training sponsored by the agency, gives them the opportunity to attain promotions 
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overcharged to attain training from SMEDAN. The second being individual 
accountability, the evaluation here would be whether the bonus mechanism has 
been able to encourage individual accountability. 
6.9.4. Adaptability, Resilience, and Robustness. 
We noted above that this is a reflection of how the institutions set up can respond 
to changing environments, specifically how the system reshapes itself and also 
the behaviour of the participants, changing it over time.497 Whether or not the 
participants learn from experiences within the action situation, and if they adapt 
to new circumstances as they arise or become rigid in their responses over 
time.498 Thus, we must examine again how effective our incentives are in 
moulding the type of behaviour we require in the situation. We must contemplate 
the resilience with which the players can change level i.e. change the way in 
which the game is played and survive that change. Since we have/are designing 
the incentive structure to foster competition for benefits, we must reflect back 
on our study of game theory and determine at what point actors would begin to 
act on their self-interested impulse. 
It must be understood that our action situation is definitely a repeat game, in 
that SMEDAN acts to continually evaluate and provide training for SMEs, and the 
SMEs wishing to gain access to SMEDAN’s services or information base must 
engage with them either physically through their offices or via their online 
platform. Since there is no control over the number of times the game can be 
repeated, what we may have is a potentially infinite number of repeat situations, 
 
497 How rules can shape norms over time. This was explored in chapter four. 
498 Ostrom (n 257) 67 
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and potentially a one-shot game for each set of players.499 The reality is that if 
the situation works well, only then can there be repeated play. To qualify, working 
well does not simply mean a connection to potential lender, but also includes 
where SMEDAN offers an opportunity to develop a skill or correct a deficiency. 
This highlights the concept of adaptability, resilience and robustness currently 
being explored, because what matters is that the system keeps repeating. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that adaptability is specifically linked to the level of 
participation engaged in by the actors. The more actors that are motivated to 
engage in the situation, the more barriers to participation within the arena we 
can identify. A robust system will be able to sustain the participation of all the 
key players, and where there is a deficiency correct itself in order to maintain the 
participation level. 
6.9.5. Conformance to General Morality 
With this criterion, Ostrom seeks to find out whether those “who can cheat and 
go undetected are able to obtain high payoffs, and whether those who keep 
promises are more likely to be rewarded and how those within the institutional 
arrangement learn to relate with each other over a period of time”.500 Again, this 
would be a reflection of how benefits are awarded, and if, despite engaging in 
undesirable behaviour, the SMEDAN actors are still able to obtain these benefits. 
Beyond attaining benefits, it also examines whether evaluations made by 
SMEDAN are done fairly and transparently, and whether SMEs that are 
 
499 One-shot because they may choose to exit the situation where they feel SMEDAN has no useful knowledge to 
offer, or they experience humiliation/ they feel their time has been wasted. For SMEDAN it can be a one-shot game 
where they feel that the SME has no viable business or does not meet the requirements to be linked to a potential 
lender. 
500 Ostrom (n 257) 67. 
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successfully connected to potential lenders are linked honestly. As noted 
previously, the distortive effect of corruption is that most decisions taken by 
government agencies are viewed with suspicion. As we noted with some of the 
government schemes examined in chapter two, decisions on who to grant loans 
to were based on familial relationships. It would not be too farfetched for SME 
actors to assume that they were rejected based on the fact that they could not 
take advantage of such connections. 
Aside from familial relationships, we must also look at bribery. In our discussions 
above, we noted that there may be a possibility of SME actors being asked to pay 
bribes in exchange for preferential treatment, and as a matter of practicality, 
people will compromise and engage to attain their ends. Both practices are 
generally accepted behaviours within Nigerian society, but these are not the 
behaviours we want to encourage, but rather one where merit attracts the 
reward. This criterion enables us to understand the catalyst behind the 
behaviours/actions and generates ways to change the behaviour. Again, a way 
of doing this could be through the incentive structure and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
6.10. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we conducted the first synthesis of our concepts with Ostrom’s 
IAD framework. Before conducting the synthesis, we began the chapter by 
expounding on Ostrom’s evaluative criteria hinted on in chapter three. Following 
this, we made preliminary observations on what exogenous variables will be 
considered throughout our analysis. With the exogenous variables in mind, we 
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then considered who our actors were (SMEDAN and the Borrowers), what 
potential action-outcome linkages would arise from their interactions and how 
they matched against our evaluative criteria. The process undergone in this 
chapter allowed for a firmer understanding of the reasons as to why the SME 
financing sector is not viable.  
The chapter teased out these reasons and also made preliminary suggestions on 
how to potentially begin resolving them. But this chapter is just the beginning, 
and forms only a part of our analysis. Here, some limited empirical investigation 
was undertaken, using publicly available resources. If resources permitted, the 
next stage would be a more structured investigation of the question in the Lagos 
SMEDAN office through data gathering. Using desk-based methods, the most we 
have been able to do is identify salient points, pertinent questions and potential 
means for addressing system failures. In our next chapter, we shall now delve a 
bit further into the legal, market and cultural impediments to financing SMEs in 
Lagos.  
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Chapter Seven: A Borrower-Lender Action Situation 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we began to populate Ostrom’s model with our own terms 
and in doing so we made preliminary observations on what value actors within 
the SMEDAN-Borrower action situation placed on actions. We made some 
preliminary conclusions that if SMEDAN’s intermediary role was to be improved, 
the incentive structure501 needed to be changed, we also mentioned what some 
of these possible changes could look like. Now, having used the SMEDAN-
Borrower action situation as a foundation to begin illustrating the use of the 
model, in this chapter, we must now begin to consider what a borrower-lender 
action situation would be like. This is the heart of this thesis in that we now begin 
the journey of identifying legal, market and cultural impediments to financing 
SMEs in Lagos, thus creating a foundation for a more viable SME sector. 
Note that this action situation will be analogous to the SMEDAN-Borrower action 
situation. Again, from the pattern of interactions we would be using the model to 
identify relevant questions that need to be asked if the sector is to improve and 
thrive. It is important to remember that the framework is acting as a lens to view 
different elements that can affect a situation. Therefore, from the interactions 
within the situation, we can then make valuations on what incentive structures 
would be most relevant to the actors, what actions may occur, what possible 
situations will give rise to lending and borrowing, and when it would not. 
 
 
501 The cost and benefits of doing or not doing a particular action, as explained in chapter four. 
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7.2. Legal, Market and Cultural Impediments to Financing 
SMEs   in Lagos 
 
As noted previously, largely our “Action Arena” is the financing of SMEs in Lagos. 
Within this situation, we must now consider the interactions between the 
borrower and a lender. Here, our exogenous variables502 considered in the 
previous chapter will be utilised more fully. Like the application of the model done 
in the previous chapter, this chapter will be broken down into two sections; 
‘Actions-Information-Incentives’ and; ‘An analysis of the patterns of interactions’. 
But before proceeding, it is relevant to consider the nature of banks and their 
functions. This is necessary because, in our action situation banks will act as the 
embodiment of the various types of lenders.503  
It can be stated that a major feature of a bank in addition to acting for depositors 
is to maximise their profits. They often do this by providing loans to businesses, 
which have interest on top of the principal sum loaned. Shelagh Heffernan in her 
book, notes that banks are strategically placed to offer this service as opposed 
to the individual lender because their core activity is to act as intermediaries 
between depositors504 and borrowers. Also, because of the wealth of information 
available to them through access to privileged information on current and 
potential borrowers with accounts at the bank.505 It was suggested that provided 
 
502 In the previous chapter, we looked at the issues of collateral, education, corruption, issues of security, access to 
credit information, problems of trust, inflation, business registration culture etc. and categorised them under the 
headings of attributes of the community, rules in use and the biophysical and material conditions. Note that the 
confines of this work would not allow for each variable to be treated individually, the key idea of this elaboration is 
to see how the model itself can be used to identify barriers within the sector. 
503 It would be nearly impossible to consider every potential type of lender and conduct an analysis of them within 
this piece of work. 
504 Who are seen in the context of lending as suppliers of capital. Shelagh Heffernan, ‘Modern Banking’ (John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd 2005) 1 
505 Heffernan (n 504) 3 
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a bank can act as intermediary at the lowest possible cost, there will be a demand 
for its services.506 However,  this condition of acting “at the lowest possible cost” 
presents a problem in Nigeria. This is because the interest rates at which the 
loans are taken are often prohibitive. In 2016, the CBN reported that the interest 
rate for different banks ranged from 20% to a maximum of 31% .507 It is asserted 
that high interest rates may be as a result of two possible factors; the perceived 
risks of lending within the current system or due to inflation.508  
Robert Shiller in his book explains that high nominal rates of interests are in part 
a reflection of high rates of inflation, and real interest rates tend to be lower.509 
The real interest is the nominal rate minus inflation, and generally, people will 
likely not borrow when nominal rate is high. In the Nigerian system, many 
relatively unsophisticated small business owners will be subject to a concept 
called money illusion.510 The high nominal rate will be off putting even though 
the real interest rate might be reasonable, thus with interest rates being high, 
despite there being a market demand for loans in Nigeria and by implication, 
Lagos, the demand is often not met. 
 
 
 
 
506 Heffernan (n 504) 3 
507 THISDAY Newspaper ‘CBN Unveils Banks with Lowest, Highest Lending Rates’ (October 2016) THISDAY 
NEWSPAPER Available at < https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/10/20/cbn-unveils-banks-with-lowest-
highest-lending-rates/ > Accessed 23rd March 2018. . It is interesting to note that Agricultural loans were in single 
digits 
508 In chapter one we note that Nigeria just experienced a recession and is now classified as the poverty capital of 
the world. As at February 2019 the National Bureau of Statistics recorded that the inflation rate was at 11.31% see 
NBS ‘Consumer Price Index February 2019 Report’ March 2019 available at < 
file:///C:/Users/N0657569/Downloads/CPI_REPORT_FEB_2019.pdf > Accessed 19th March 2019. 
509 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (3rd. Ed. Princeton University Press 2016) 55-56 
510 Ernst Fehr discusses this concept extensively, and how the money illusion means that people behave differently 
when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. See Ernst Fehr and 
Jean-Robert Tyran, ‘Does Money Illusion Matter?’ (2002) 91 American Economic Review 1239 
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7.2.1. Action, Information and Incentives 
 
In this Borrower-Lender situation, using the format from chapter five, we will 
take the participants here to be SMEs who are designated to the position of 
borrowers and banks511 who will take the position of lenders. Again, we must 
accept that these participants may have incomplete information about each other 
as our default position.512 Given who the participants are, we can assume that 
the action-outcome can be broadly categorized into two: the borrower will receive 
the loan, or the borrower does not receive the loan. The question now becomes 
what circumstances will lead to these outcomes, that is, the action-outcome 
linkage. Here, we must consider what the banks require from borrowers in order 
to grant loans. To answer this question, it was relevant to look at some bank 
profiles in Nigeria and identify what (if any) conditions would be attached to a 
loan request. In First Bank of Nigeria Plc,513 the bank can offer a secured loan of 
N40, 000, 000 (Forty Million Naira)514 with a maximum term of 36 months.515 The 
conditions for receiving this loan includes providing six  months bank statement; 
current utility bills; latest audited accounts; company profile; application letter 
and other ‘know your customer’516 information. The borrower also needs to 
 
511 Again, not that the use of banks represents various lenders, be it individual or government because they will be 
faced with the same problem. 
512 For banks despite there being an awareness of the borrower’s financial information through their role as 
depositors, it is still possible not to have perfect complete information on borrowers. 
513 The banks considered in this section beyond the criteria of popularity were chosen randomly. First Bank itself is 
one of the biggest banks in Nigeria, with International offices in Africa, Europe, Middle East and Asia. It was founded 
in 1894 as The Bank for British West Africa and was one of the first banking institution to be established on the 
African continent. See First Bank < https://www.firstbanknigeria.com/about-us/  > Accessed 7th March 2019 
514 With the exchange rate of today -23rd March 2018, that is about £79, 000 
515 First Bank Nigeria ‘Secured Loans’ Available at < https://www.firstbanknigeria.com/business-
banking/loans/secured-term-loans/#1457947296685-89b04a4b-7441ca15-0bdf > Accessed 23 March, 2018. 
516 The ‘know your customer (KYC)’ information was a policy released by the CBN to gather information on 
customers when opening accounts. It usually includes information such as the customers address, photograph of 
the customer etc. 
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provide as collateral, landed property in a First Bank approved location,517 or 
treasury bills or a fixed term deposit.518 
To receive a loan facility from the Bank of Industry (BOI)519 of about N5, 000,000 
(Five Million Naira),520 aside the usual documentations,521 the collateral 
requirements include the option of landed property with a Certificate of 
Occupancy; debentures522 on assets of the company; bank guarantee; external 
guarantors with notarized statement of net worth for loans below N10 million.523 
From the above, the issue of collateral raises questions within our proposed 
action situation. We must consider the lender’s attitude towards the kind of 
collateral used, and what type of collaterals the borrowers actually hold. We can 
note from the two banks above, there is a range of options to choose from when 
it comes to collateral. Based on the requirement of using land because this is the 
most popularly accepted and used collateral, we must now briefly consider the 
nature of property rights and view them within the Lagos context. 
To expand on this, we note that the BOI requires a Certificate of Occupancy. 
Under the new land tenure system brought in by the Land Use Act of 1977,524 
this vested ownership of Land in the hands of the state government, to hold in 
 
517 This shall be discussed further under the lender’s cost and benefit 
518 First Bank (n 513).  
519 This was discussed in chapter two. The Bank targets businesses that engage in manufacturing and processing 
activities. It only finances enterprises or companies and not an individual person or group of persons. The company 
/ enterprise must register, and you will be required to provide the registration number for a Limited Liability 
Company or business name for an enterprise. 
520 As at the 23rd of March 2018, N5 million is about £10,000 
521 That is, identification documents, application form etc.  
522 By debenture, we take the meaning to be a secured loan document. Section 173. (1) Of CAMA states that a 
debenture may either be secured by a charge over the company's property or may be unsecured by any charge 
(Floating or fixed). 
523 Bank of Industry Loan Centre, Available at < https://www.boi.ng/apply/register > Accessed 23rd March 2018 
524 Previously in the southern region, that Lagos is a part of, land was held under customary laws, which emphasised 
collective community or family ownership with the head of the family or chief of the community vested with the 
authority to part with land. This parting was not a true divestiture of interest, but rather a lease to the individual or 
family to hold at the convenience of the chief so long as tributes were paid. See Stephen Butler, ‘Nigerian Land 
Markets and the Land Use Law of 1978’ 2012 Available at < 
https://landportal.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_land_markets_nov2012.pdf > Accessed on 23rd March 2018.  
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trust for the people. The provisions of the Act require that the Governor’s consent 
must be sought for alienation of land.525 For a sale to be complete, the Governor 
would issue a Certificate of Occupancy526 which represented the title and 
ownership of the land. Generally, getting consent is often an arduous process 
and attracts a fee in every state. It was noted that Lagos was among one of the 
states that had the highest land consent fees.527 Currently, fees528 for mortgage 
transactions range between N2, 500 to N1, 000,000 for consent and a registration 
fee of 0.25% of the value of the land, that is from N 5, 000 to N1, 000,000.529 At 
this point we begin to see that should a borrower be inclined to use their land as 
collateral, they have already begun to incur costs. This is because for most 
people, without the need for alienation or some pressing purpose, they will not 
usually obtain a Certificate of Occupancy. It is relevant at this juncture to consider 
the costs and benefits to the borrower should they decide to use landed property. 
7.2.2. The Borrower’s Cost and Benefits. 
 
It becomes relevant to consider the costs of engaging with a lender and using 
land as collateral. A report from 2012, finds that the main obstacle to accessing 
finance for SMEs is the collateral requirements stipulated by financial 
institutions.530 Using the IAD framework to understand what these ‘requirements’ 
 
525 Whether an outright sale or creating a mortgage. 
526 Section 5 (1) Land Use Act 1977 
527 Note 522 above at page 3 
528 Other fees include capital gains tax at 2% and a stamp duty fee of 2%. 
529 Lagos State Land Government Bureau. Available at < 
https://landsbureau.lagosstate.gov.ng/2017/05/17/governors-consent/ > Accessed 23rd March, 2018. 
530 The report also notes that the absence of a functioning personal identification system, and the high costs of 
realizing collateral in the case of default contributes to the inability to access finance. See Note 141 above. 
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are, we can see that the borrower already has very high transaction fees just to 
mortgage the property. 
Aside from the consent fees, during the term of the loan, since the property is in 
Lagos, the borrower also bears the land use charges. Recently, on the 28th of 
January 2018, the Lagos State House of Assembly repealed the 2001 Land Use 
Law and replaced it with a new Act ‘Land Use Charge Law of Lagos State, 2018 
(LUC)’. Under this new Act, land use charges were greatly increased.531 Section 
10532 provides that the new rate payable on any property will be arrived at by 
multiplying the market value of the house533 by the relief rate534 and annual 
charge. If a borrower wants to take a loan and considers the transactions fees 
too high at this point, they may drop out of the action situation. It must be stated 
that the Land Use Charge may or may not influence the decision to collateralize 
the property. It may not influence the decision because whether or not the 
borrower uses the property to take a loan, they still pay the land use charge. As 
the charge for private and commercial properties are different, with commercial 
being higher.535 However, the borrower must also consider whether, in addition 
to the land use charge, they can afford to pay the extra fees to perfect the 
mortgage.  
 
531 This increment sparked several protests across Lagos state. The Guardian Newspaper ‘Protests, concerns trail 
new Lagos land use charge’ 5th March 2018 Available at < https://guardian.ng/property/protests-concerns-trail-
new-lagos-land-use-charge/ > Accessed on 7th Match 2019. 
532  Land Use Charge Law 2018 
533 The market value is arrived at by adding the value of the land to the value of the building developments. 
534 Some properties are entitled to relief, for example Section 3 provides that the status of the owner will be 
considered, i.e. if they have reached the age of retirement, whether or not they are physically challenged, the 
depreciation rate of the property etc. 
535 With this charge being higher, it is possible that people will fail to declare that their premises is used for 
business, thus a distortive effect is caused when it comes to business surveys. Also, it can keep people in the 
informal markets due to the fraud being perpetuated, they may not want to use the property as collateral. 
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Additionally, we must consider what type of title the borrower has. If they own 
property but do not have a Certificate of Occupancy, then they find themselves 
in the position of having to apply for one.536 After going through the arduous 
time-wasting procedure, they still have to pay the fees to mortgage the property 
as consent fees for this new transaction, as it is different from obtaining the 
Certificate of Occupancy. Contextually, it is possible to own land without having 
the Certificate of Occupancy as prescribed by the Land Use Act. Again, this is a 
reflection of the tenure system before the enactment of the Land Use Act. It has 
been noted that “since various chiefs or heads of communities still regard 
themselves as trustees of community land, they disregard the current right of 
occupancy system. These chiefs are still allocating, partitioning, and selling land 
without reference to the appropriate authorities designated under the Act. Where 
written documents are used for this purpose, they are back-dated to any period 
before the Land Use Act came into force”.537  Furthermore, in a 2012 study it was 
revealed that 35 years after the enactment of the Act, alienation of land still 
occurred through contractual documents without the application for Government 
consent or registration.538  
Further considerations also include the cost of engaging a lawyer: additional fees 
to be added to the transaction. Given the rise in fees, one must consider the 
amount being loaned and how it may affect the borrower’s view of the worth of 
 
536 In a working paper published in 2014, it was identified that the national-average of those who had a Certificate 
of Occupancy was less than 3% See Hosaena H. Ghebru et al “Tenure security and demand for land tenure 
regularization in Nigeria: Empirical evidence from Ondo and Kano states” Nigeria Strategy Support Programme II 
Working Paper (2014) at page 15 Available at < http://www.ifpri.org/publication/tenure-security-and-demand-land-
tenure-regularization-nigeria-empirical-evidence-ondo > Accessed 8th March 2019 
537 Osho (n 422) Also see working paper of 2014 where it was reaffirmed that this still happens “Although the Land 
Use Act” does not allow sales of land without authorization, this practice still continues. In some cases, documents 
confirming transfers are fraudulently backdated to appear legal” Ghebru (n 536) 6. 
538Ghebru (n 536) 2. 
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the final balance. We can safely assume that the borrower requires a loan facility 
because they may not be financially buoyant to shoulder their current 
responsibility. Weighing this lack of finance and how much of the loan they will 
actually end up with, because of the above transaction costs, it may not be worth 
it to engage within the action situation, and they may decide to drop out rather 
than add the extra cost lawyer services. 
Furthermore, we must also consider other variables such as corruption.539 Is 
there an expectation to bribe the loan officer540 for the application to be 
processed and granted? One would assume that granting the loan especially 
when it can be collateralised would be in the best interest of the bank, but like 
the distinction we drew with the SMEDAN action situation on the motives of the 
individuals in the organisation, and the organisation as its own entity, we must 
also do that within this situation. It must be recognised that the ‘loan officer’ may 
not be motivated by the interests of the organisation and in such situations may 
seek to serve their own interests. Additionally, like the SMEDAN situation we must 
also consider what impact the expectation of the borrower’s time being wasted 
may have on their decision to apply for a loan.541 Also, the possibility of 
humiliation,542 the problem of high interest rates,543 the need for registration of 
 
539 At this point we note that this is an attribute of the community.   
540 A report written by Transparency International indicates that SMEs are susceptible to corruption because of the 
red tape imposed by banks to get loans. The report stated that’s the formal requirements and costs on SMEs, may 
create incentives for engaging in corruption in order to enable, facilitate and speed up the process. See 
Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource “Corruption risks and mitigation strategies in Small and 
Medium Size Enterprise lending” Available at 
<https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Corruption_risks_and_mitigation_strategies_in_SME_l
ending_2013.pdf > Accessed 7th March 2019 
541 In the last chapter we explored this concept from the perspective of information sourcing and the actual time 
spent in the offices. 
542 We considered this under the SMEDAN-Borrower action arena, and same line of reasoning would apply here. 
543 From what has been observed on the SMEDAN Credit information portal interest rates could be as high as 24%, 
and up to 31% 
188 
 
the company,544 and the possibility of the land being sold if they are unable to 
pay, are all factors that influence the borrower’s decision. 
But we must also examine the benefits, for example using valuable landed 
property can give the borrower access to a wider range of lenders than other 
forms of collateral. Also working within the formal markets affords the possibility 
of building a strong credit reputation in a situation where the borrower 
successfully repays the loan. 
7.2.3 The Lender’s Costs and Benefits 
 
Despite landed property being a prized collateral,545 the use of it still presents 
some potential costs for the lender. We have noted previously under our 
discussion of legitimacy in chapter six, the banks are always wary of the fact that 
the community may not be in support of a mortgage transaction and tend to be 
wary of accepting such forms of collateral, or if they do, they discount heavily on 
its value. This again is a reflection of the problems within the land tenure system 
of Nigeria. Despite having a Certificate of Occupancy from the Governor, a title 
which ordinarily should allow for peaceful enjoyment of the property, if the 
 
544 It is suggested that this may not be a crucial factor, given the business registration culture in Nigeria, especially 
Lagos. It may be safe to assume that the business had already been registered prior to the quest for getting loans. 
The need for registration is not often synonymous with wanting access to the formal markets, but rather a need to 
show legitimacy in an environment known for fraud and corruption. 
545 Although we note for First Bank treasury bills are acceptable, but this calls into question access. It is more 
probable that a borrower will have landed property, rather than money tied up in treasury bills. Also, it should be 
noted that the security can be redeemed early although with the forfeiture of some of its cash value. This raises the 
question of whether the borrower will simply redeem their bills if the return is still high enough rather than be in 
debt, paying high interest rates. Another consideration is whether the value of the bills will be enough to secure the 
loan in the first place. The Bank of Industry offers more options, as noted above, they allowed for the use of 
debentures on assets of the company, bank guarantee, external guarantors etc, but their lending is targeted to 
manufacturing and processing industries. With regards to the use of assets, this also presents a problem, because 
assets can depreciate, also to use the movable collateral registry there is also a fee that goes with it, that also adds 
to the transaction cost. 
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community is not in support, it brings about a host of trouble for anyone seeking 
to claim the land in question.  
For example, Lagos like any other state, is not free of land grabbers. In Lagos, 
they are called the Omo-Nile which loosely translates to ‘sons and daughters of 
the area/community’. When property is bought without community approval, the 
Omo-Nile usually turn up at the property claiming to represent the community 
interests and demand money before the new owners are allowed to enjoy the 
property. If they are not paid, they usually vandalise the property and prevent 
the new owners from carrying out works on it. The problem became so rampant 
that in 2016, the Lagos State Government enacted the ‘Lagos State Properties 
Protection Law 2016’ which imposes a fine of N 5 million Naira or a term of 
imprisonment of 10 -21 years or both on land grabbers. The government also set 
up a special task force to try and control the problem. 
Due to the problems caused by the Omo-Nile, it can be assumed that First Bank 
through its specification that the ‘land should be from a First Bank approved 
location’ that the bank is aware of these tensions and have tried to limit their risk 
by specifying the location in which the collateral should come from. But then we 
must ask ourselves what happens to borrowers without collateral from these 
areas, most likely they will drop out of the action situation and the same would 
be the case for the lender when the borrower cannot fulfil the requirements. 
Again, the education of the borrower must be considered. The lenders must be 
able to satisfy themselves that the borrower would have sufficient bookkeeping 
and accounting skills to sustain their business. At this point we can begin to see 
how this situation can be linked to that of the SMEDAN-Borrower. If we consider 
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the range of training offered to borrowers in the SMEDAN-Borrower situations,546 
evidencing this with a certificate from SMEDAN along with the past performances 
of the borrower, can be seen as a benefit. 
Further considerations for the lender in terms of costs can be whether the 
mortgage agreement can be enforced. This falls into the exogenous variable of 
the rules in use. In a situation where the borrower has defaulted in their 
payments, factors such as how effective the legal system is,547 the time spent in 
litigation and the cost of litigation, and what procedures are available to the 
lender to recover the assets need to be considered. We noted in chapter four 
that enforcement was still a problem in Nigeria, and in the 2018 Doing Business 
Report conducted by the World Bank, it was noted that in terms of enforcement 
of contracts and resolving insolvency, Nigeria had made no improvements.548 
Also, regarding the benefits to the lender, we must also understand what 
incentive structure the bank has. Aside from salaries and promotions, are 
bonuses given,549 and on what basis will they be given? In deciding how bonuses 
should be awarded it is worth considering the use of teams.550 Each team would 
be assigned a set target551 of granting various loans or processing loan 
applications, and at the end of the determined period,552 a prize is awarded. This 
can be a useful tool to promote competition between the different actors within 
 
546 This reflects Ostrom’s position on having different situations nested in one arena. 
547 We briefly considered the Nigerian Legal environment in chapter four. 
548 World Bank ‘Doing Business Report 2018; Reforming to Create Jobs’ Available at < 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-
Report.pdf > Accessed 18th March 2018, 24. 
549 This could be a monetary reward, or any other form of incentives e.g. paid holiday packages, different types of 
prizes etc. 
550 It is understood that in the banking industry teams may be assigned to work on projects. 
551 The use of set targets is an option employed in the marketing department.  
552 Deciding what this period would be is worth considering. If it is too long, for example when the borrower pays 
off the loan because the business is successful, this might discourage the employee because this is never 
guaranteed. If, however, the determined period is at the end of a financial year, this becomes more feasible.                                            
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the bank. However, one must be careful of employing such strategies as it may 
lead to employees making reckless decisions or trying to game the system by 
lending to family members etc.553 Nevertheless, it is believed that with the 
adoption of competition as a strategy, this brings about the possibility of 
monitoring between teams.554 As noted in the previous chapters, monitoring 
plays an important role in the sustainability of the arena. Again, it becomes useful 
in that it may encourage opposing teams to carry out verification of the other 
team’s loan grants, this plays on their self-interested need to win the competition 
and attain the benefit. In this kind of situation, we must allow for an open access 
policy in which records of each team’s transactions are available.  
For example, if Team A has a potential borrower, the information about the 
borrower is available on the bank’s database, the searches done with regards to 
verifying the borrower’s collateral, and the results of those searches etc. would 
also be available. Obviously, there would need to be a policy in place prohibiting 
stealing another team’s potential borrower but keeping the information open to 
all serves two purposes. The first is that the team who puts up the information 
does so with the perception that the information can be verified, so they are 
inclined to be truthful. The second is that it allows for monitoring. This in its own 
way provides check and balances. 
7.2.4 Possible Patterns of Interactions 
 
The next step within the action situation would be to proceed towards the 
prediction of likely behaviour based on the exposition given above. Again, this 
 
553 A very likely outcome because this was done in the Micro-finance banks which we considered in chapter two. 
554 How well these teams work will always be dependent on effective monitoring and hierarchical structures. 
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like the SMEDAN action situation, this will be influenced by the rules in use, which 
determine what the actors must, must not and may do. Again, we must note that 
individual borrowers may have their own motivation for coming to seek loans. It 
may be a genuine business activity, or it may not. Like the SMEDAN action 
situation, we must also not assume that the interest of the individual actors (e.g. 
loan officer) within the bank would be automatically aligned with the overall 
motives of the bank, thus the nature of the incentive structure remains important. 
Less elaborate than the SMEDAN action situation which had varying borrowers 
with different reasons for approaching SMEDAN,555 here we will simply work with 
two characters X and Y because whatever their underlying intentions, be they 
genuine or fraudulent, their end goal is the same, accessing a loan. If we assume 
X has landed property in the appropriate location,556 we can predict X’s potential 
for staying in the game is stronger and even playing it out to the end a possibility. 
Y, on the other hand, does not have land but other movable chattels with their 
own value,557 and as First Bank and BOI have suggested: treasury bills,558 a fixed 
term deposit, assets of the company,559 bank guarantee etc. The problem with 
these forms is that they are not as reliable as land, which presents the problem 
of giving ‘land collateral’ more priority. At this juncture, there is a huge possibility 
that Y may have to exit the game as their position is not as strong as X. Given 
that these are the possibilities, the potential outcome is either the bank lends, or 
 
555 We recall that some could simply becoming to receive training on bookkeeping, others might have bookkeeping 
knowledge already and were simply there to get information on potential lenders etc. 
556 Based on the criteria for First Bank of Nigeria 
557 Going into this action situation, what must be encouraged is dissuading the bank actors from choosing the easy 
strategy of selecting only those with land within the situation. 
558 In footnote 42 under 6.1.3 we note the possibility of redeeming the bill rather than take a loan 
559 It should be noted that tangible assets can depreciate overtime due to wear and tear from fair use. 
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it does not. The real question here, is what the underlying reasons are as to why 
the decisions were made.  
If we begin to elaborate further, given what we know about the structure of the 
situation, we can begin to identify what interactions may occur.560 X with the land 
already has some form of guarantee of remaining in the action situation. The 
interaction that will occur is the verification of information provided by X; this 
requires an investigation into the title of the land and the type of ownership held. 
Several possibilities come from this investigation, the first being because of the 
prohibitive transaction cost involved. For example, verifying information, even if 
title is established, the interest rates the bank gives might be high.561 The 
investigation might reveal a problem with the title which may need to be rectified 
before moving forward. The outcome of this interaction is either after their 
investigation they choose to lend, or they do not because of the failure to 
establish title. 
It is also relevant to consider this interaction from the borrower’s perspective: 
that is X’s perspective. X may decide to drop out from the situation because of 
the high interest rate or continue despite it. Should X decide to continue with the 
situation, X faces another potential problem. It has been noted above that the 
requirements to be satisfied before a mortgage transaction is complete are 
arduous, and faced with the possibility of incurring such costs, X at this point may 
choose to drop out of the situation. 
 
560 We can assume for the Y actor the considerations would be the same, going through investigations which will 
inform a decision. 
561 We noted above that loans have a high interest rate, going as high as 31%. As at 2018, it was recorded that 
interest rates for all types of loans started from 19%. See Deposits, available at < https://nigeria.deposits.org/ > 
Accessed 23rd March 2018. 
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Other issues that may arise that affect whether or not X will choose to remain in 
the action situation, include the possibility of being asked to pay bribes, how long 
it takes for the bank to process the loan application, the time spent waiting in the 
banking halls, humiliation from the loan assessor, and how quickly X gains 
information for the loan application either through an online platform or in 
person. With regards to information gathering, the potential of linking this 
situation to the SMEDAN-Borrower situation must be considered again. As noted 
previously, the SMEDAN online platform currently does offer some information 
on lenders, but this can be an opportunity to standardize lending requirements. 
While using the online platform we must be careful to address issues of 
navigation and limit potential barriers to accessing the information.562 
Regarding the issue of paying bribes, again several possibilities exist. X may 
choose to exit the situation at this stage. X may choose to pay the bribe in 
exchange for preferential treatment and receive the information on time.  X may 
remain in the situation but refuse to pay the bribe. While we may want X to get 
the information needed, we do not want X to engage in bribing within the action 
situation, as this is not a strategy that we want to encourage. At this juncture, 
we must begin to consider how the incentive structure can discourage asking 
borrowing actors to pay bribes, and even when the borrowers offer to pay, the 
offer would be rejected. We have already discussed the possibility of using 
bonuses as incentives for engaging in good behaviour, but we must also consider 
what sanctions are available for deterring bad behaviour. It is suggested that 
sanctions may include deducting from the salary of the erring actor, suspension 
 
562 In the SMEDAN-Borrower situation, we noted that such barriers included that fact without a SMEDAN 
identification number there is a limit to how much information an individual can access. 
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or a dismissal. Here the monitoring effect of the competition structure discussed 
above becomes a useful tool. Given the incentive structure of attaining bonuses, 
we can assume that since the individuals will be in competition with each other 
for the benefits, they are more likely to be vigilant and guard against such 
practice in the opposing team. 
7.3. Analysing Outcomes 
 
7.3.1. Efficiency 
As noted previously in chapter six, analysing outcomes must be done in line with 
the evaluative criteria.563 With regards to efficiency, what we must determine is 
how well the action situation functioned. Could alignment between the borrower 
and lender be achieved? We note that alignment is a subpart of efficiency, and 
within our context, alignment will mean that participants seek the same 
transaction within the action situation because it is in their interest to do so. An 
efficient lending system is a field of potential interaction between parties, where 
each party can/should derive some benefit from the interactions that occur. This 
benefit can either be receiving a loan/lending to a credible borrower or gaining 
valuable knowledge or experience if a loan is not given. The point of the 
interaction is that it must be viewed as worthwhile.564 For an interaction to be 
efficient (worthwhile) within our situation, a loan is either given or some form of 
knowledge is gained. We note above that banks are often strategically placed to 
acquire information through access to privileged information from current 
 
563 The criteria here would be efficiency, equity, accountability, legitimacy, adaptability, resilience and robustness, 
and conformance to general morality 
564 A rational actor will weigh the value of engaging in a transaction, the primary value of engaging here will be to 
receive a loan facility at reasonable rate, or lending to an assured borrower. If this does not occur, a secondary 
value can include the borrower gaining knowledge as to why the loan application was rejected etc. This opens up 
the possibility of the borrower rectifying the issue and reapplying. 
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account activity when potential borrowers have accounts at the bank.565 
Hypothetically perhaps, this strategic position can be extended and further 
exploited to not only their customers but customers of other banks in order to 
build a comprehensive report on the borrower.566 On the other hand, it would be 
inefficient if a loan were not  given and there were no justifiable reasons for 
this.567  
It is suggested that in our borrower-lender action situation, a misalignment of 
interest can occur because the risk of lending to the borrower outweighs the trust 
the lender may have for the borrower’s ability to pay back. The lender’s first 
concern factoring all risk is to make a profit568 and secure their loan by the best 
possible means in case there is a default. This ‘concern to make a profit’ is 
determined by the risk appetite of the institution, willingness to risk is not uniform 
across institutions, some institutions are more aggressive than others and may 
choose to overlook certain things where most would not. 
Above we discussed the prioritisation of land as the best form of collateral to 
secure a debt, not just land anywhere, but one in a pre-approved location. This 
already begins to suggest that the land is viewed to have a varying value 
depending on its location and the type of title held.569 With the use of land brings 
 
565 This can be considered as a cheap way of getting information and could potentially eliminate some transaction 
costs. 
566 Given that banks tend to be proprietorial with their information, the likelihood of this happening seems 
inconceivable, but I would assert that there is precedence for this. Currently, in attempt to reduce fraud in the 
banking system, the “Bank Verification Number (BVN)” was implemented in 2014. The BVN is an 11-digit number 
and it acts as your universal ID in all deposit money banks in Nigeria and links individuals who have different 
accounts in different banks. See CBN “Regulatory Framework for Bank Verification Number (BVN) Operations and 
Watch-List for the Nigerian Banking Industry” Available at < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2017/bpsd/circular%20on%20the%20regulatory%20framework%20for%20bvn%20%2
0watchlist%20for%20nigerian%20financial%20system.pdf > Accessed on 21st March 2019 
567 The question of how the loan was made, will be dealt with in the subsequent criteria of ‘equity’. 
568 This implies finding a balance between the highest interest rate that can be paid and the lowest rate at which 
they can lend and still make money. 
569 The effects of this was explored above under 7.2.2 the borrower’s costs and benefits. 
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in the possibility of the borrower acquiring high transaction costs because of its 
differentiated nature, or through fees imposed by the state. This high transaction 
cost may serve to push the borrower out of the action situation; thus, inefficiency 
is created.570 
As we stated in chapter four, trust571 within the situation is central to creating a 
sustainable and efficient lending system, thus it becomes necessary to explore 
this concept with relation to lending further. Again, by trust, we refer to the 
calculative aspect of it, and not the ordinary use of the word. By “ordinary use” 
we are referring to that long-standing relationship built over a period of time,572 
where individuals get to know themselves and/or family personally and create a 
bond. Calculative trust on the other hand occurs where “the expected gain from 
placing oneself at risk to another is positive, but not otherwise”.573 Simply put, 
both the lender and borrower are aware of all the potential risks involved in 
engaging in a transaction but decide to take that risk because the gains or 
benefits are more than the risks, and certain precautions have been put in place 
to guard against the rest. This reflects that underlying idea in classical contract 
law that a contract will only arise where both parties benefit from it, thus this is 
where the alignment of their interest becomes relevant again in our action 
situation.574 
 
570 Markets with lower transaction cost leads to efficiency. 
571 In chapter four we already began to suggest that this concept would play an important role within our arena, 
now we must begin to fully appreciate how much. To trust can imply many things. It could be trust in the ability of 
the borrower to keep good books; it could be trust in the borrower’s ability to pay back; it could the trust that the 
system allows the lender to acquire the collateralised asset without any form of hindrance or unnecessary expense. 
The borrower must also trust that the lender will not call in the loan and try to take their assets before it is due; 
they must also trust that the interest rate being given is fair.  
572 Also, in chapter five we discussed the type of trust created by a strong enforcement of the rule of the rule of law. 
This concept was discussed when exploring Fukuyama’s work and that of Douglas North in chapter four 
573 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organisation’ (1993) 36 The Journal of Law & 
Economics 463 
574 This is the Freedom of Contracts on which Patrick S. Atiyah, extensively writes on in his book The Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract (Oxford Publishers 1985). This also reflects McMillan and Woodruffs point on using private 
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When it comes to lending, trust becomes necessary for a lender because if they 
can be reassured that when they give out money, there will be an effective 
system in place to enable enforcement actions575 against the assets of the 
borrower should the need arise, then they will be more willing to lend. When 
dealing with risk and trust, the alignment comes in where the level of calculative 
trust is enough to overcome the risk, so they enter into the voluntary transaction 
which is of benefit to both. If you have a borrower that is unsuitable, they should 
be identified quickly and moved out of the situation, again if the bank is 
exploitive, they should also be identified and kicked out.576  
It is pertinent then at this point to ask how this can be achieved, Douglas C. 
North is convinced that law, rules and processes are vital features of the 
institutional structure of successful economies.577 North also concludes that too 
much uncertainty hinders investment.578 In our situation we assume the 
uncertainty to be that which surrounds the borrower’s ability to pay back, and 
the uncertainty about being able to recover secured assets.579 What has been 
observed from the situation above is that the current policy in place tries to 
compensate for this lack of trust, but rather than resolve the issue, an imbalance 
 
order as a mechanism, contracts can be an effective use of private order and in our situation over time may be used 
to establish trust, but this is still subject to the ability to enforce, which we recognise as a main problem in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, this is where the mechanisms to foster cooperation become useful in establishing new norms with 
the aim of countering the effects of corruption. 
575 Deakin believes that Law/the legal system is an expression of state power and the state is ultimately required to 
ensure enforcement – (see Simon Deakin, et al “Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the constitutive role of law” 
(2017) 45 Journal of Comparative Economics 188, 190). Ostrom believes that enforcement rests in the hand of the 
participants within the arena, and state/outside intervention is only necessary to sometimes give effect to the 
enforcement measures decided within the arena. It is suggested that the former view is more compelling, and while 
within our arena participants should undertake the task of monitoring, ultimately serious enforcement may rest on 
the State. Thus, there is a need to review the legal mechanism. 
576 This ordinarily should be a market function, in that the demand for the services of the banks should decline 
where it is recognised that they are exploitative, but because of the distortive nature of the community (corruption) 
the market does not operate efficiently. 
577 Graham Ferris, ‘The Path-dependent Problem of Exporting the Rule of Law’ (2012) 101 The Round Table 363, 365 
578 Ferris (n 577) 366. 
579 Whether through enforcement in courts (the notion of state intervention), or the community preventing the 
bank from utilizing the property. 
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has been created between the borrower and the lender. The current policies 
seem geared towards protecting the lender from being out of pocket,580 thus 
encouraging more supply of funds. With these policies in place, the Government 
are confounded as to why more lending is not taking place. 
It is suggested that the problem is not only one of supply,581 but of demand as 
well. Borrower’s may want money but may choose not to borrow on the terms 
currently being offered. In our situation, to identify where there can be 
misalignment, we must also draw a distinction between the borrower’s need for 
money and actual demand. Borrower’s may need money but demand for it may 
fall short if the interest rate is not favourable and if this is coupled with the high 
transaction cost that comes with securing the loan imposed by the government, 
then at this point again we see an exit from the situation. It is believed that the 
efficiency problem in this situation must be considered and resolved from a supply 
and demand perspective. 
7.3.2. Accountability 
Further considerations within the action situation, especially in terms of how 
sustainable it is, will include whether the incentive structure within the bank is 
strong enough to allow the individual actors within the bank to act in the desired 
way. This focuses on the accountability method within the system. Here, it is 
 
580 For example, the establishment of the collateral registry which useful is still lender centric. Other examples 
include the credit guarantee scheme like the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF), The Commercial 
Credit Scheme (CACS) set up by the government. These were discussed in chapter two. 
581 It has already been suggested in chapter two that there is currently a block in the flow of money to SMEs. If we 
consider all the money set aside by the CBN and other Government institutions as intervention funds, or credit 
guarantee funds we should ordinarily see positive reports reflecting a marked increase in the flow of finance. But in 
chapter two, what we noted was a failure of the banks to access these funds. We suggested as a reason for this was 
the lack of trust in the government’s ability to actually pay back due to corruption should a default occur. This lack 
of trust has the potential to undermine the growth of the economy. This assertion is supported by Deakin, he 
suggests that an economy can only be viable with state involvement (n 575) 198 and if you cannot trust the state, 
this can potentially undermine the integrity of the economy. 
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suggested that there would be two forms of accountability, the ‘market 
accountability’ where if there is a default in payment, it can be enforced. The 
second form is ‘hierarchical accountability’, this can be found, for example, in the 
government schemes, where the person in charge (e.g. a director) holds staff 
members responsible for their actions and decisions, or in the bank where 
managers hold staff members accountable for their decisions.582 Thus, within the 
situation we must ask if the bank actors are actually rewarded for engaging in 
the correct behaviour. The granting of rewards must also be examined alongside 
whether those who cheated were caught and sanctioned, or whether it went 
undetected. While it is understood that monitoring is expensive, especially where 
employee self-interest cannot be aligned with the interest of the employer, it 
must nevertheless be enforced. Also, individual accountability must be made 
paramount, the evaluation here would be whether the bonus mechanism has 
been able to encourage individual accountability. 
Above, we explored the possibility of using managers to oversee the jobs carried 
out by individual actors and rewarding or sanctioning the manager, based on 
whether the teams are meeting their targets and how well they do it, and  how 
well the managers were able to detect undesirable behaviour. Alternatively, we 
must also consider how the use of a complaints system might contribute to the 
sustainability of the situation. Where a borrower encounters an actor within the 
situation who requires them to pay a bribe, a confidential reporting mechanism 
might prove to be a useful tool, especially where there are assurances that 
complaints will be taken seriously.  
 
582 This idea of hierarchical accountability shares a similar theme to that put forward by Alfred Chandler in his text 
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard University Press 1977) 
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This ties back to our initial discussion of CPR in Chapter Four583 where we discuss 
exclusion mechanisms being fundamental to overcoming the free rider problem 
and our analysis in the chapter of accountability within our action arena. 
However, it is pertinent to consider the role anti-social punishments play in 
societies that are corrupt. Anti-social punishments take the view that non-co-
operators in a group will punish the co-operators within said group as a means 
of revenge. In a study conducted by Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter584 where 
different societies were observed, some of the initial results confirmed that the 
ability to punish free riders who did not contribute to the public good increased 
the cooperative behaviour in most participant pools. Free-riders learned that free-
riding doesn't pay off and started contributing to the common pool585.  This is the 
prosocial behaviour we want to encourage within our action arena. However, the 
study took an interesting turn, when it was observed that in some societies, the 
co-operators were being punished. They note that “the higher antisocial 
punishment was in a participant pool, the lower was the rate of increase in 
cooperation”.586 The study notes that anti-social punishments are more prevalent 
in societies with weak rule of law.587 This is the situation in Nigeria, thus, within 
our arena, we must now be aware of the fact that those who monitor may 
potentially face anti-social punishments, removing the incentive to continue 
monitoring or reporting. The awareness of this further strengthens the argument 
 
583 See page 72 for this discussion 
584 Benedikt Herrmann, Christian Thöni and Simon Gächter ‘Antisocial Punishment across Societies’ (2008) Science, 
New Series, 1362 
585 Note that is some pools it remained the same, the ability to punish did not change the behaviour. 
586 Herrmann (584) 1365 
587 They note that “antisocial punishment is harsher in participant pools from societies with weak norms of civic 
cooperation and a weak rule of law” Herrmann (n584) 1366 
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in this thesis for the development of a stronger rule of law to combat the potential 
of anti-social punishments arising within the action arena. 
7.3.3. Equity588 
Above, we noted that the question of how the decision to lend was reached was 
a question of equity. In our situation, it is suggested that equity must look at the 
fairness of the decision-making process. The fiscal equivalence is our situation 
can only be found in who bears the transaction cost. As it stands, both the lender 
and borrower share the fiscal burden in some form since they both stand to 
benefit from the transaction. The borrower’s fiscal burden is paying the required 
consent fees to mortgage the property,589 the possibility of paying for a certificate 
of occupancy, land use charges etc. For the lender, the fiscal burden can come 
from the money being spent to carry out the required searches at the different 
registries to verify the information on the borrower.590 
For re-distributional equity, this can be reflected with the targeted financing of 
business in particular industries.591 This is echoed in the Government’s renewed 
zeal for developing the agricultural sector, as opposed to the oil industry, which 
Nigeria is largely reliant on, but it is suggested that further diversification is 
needed. Furthermore, it should be stated that for our situation, equity goes 
beyond these two perspectives of fiscal equivalence and re-distributional equity 
 
588 Ostrom views this criterion from the position of fiscal equivalence (which looks at the fact that those who benefit 
should undertake the cost of financing) and re-distributional equity (which suggests that the poorest receive more 
resources to improve their condition over time) Ostrom (n 257) 67.  
589 If a movable property, the required fees for the collateral registry. 
590 Other costs can come in the form of employing a business analyst to go over the borrower’s business plans or a 
risk manager; or hiring someone to interpret data or information they collected; or even developing a specialised 
system or algorithm to calculate risks. 
591 Currently the government is focused on financing business in agriculture, and the banks have reassessed their 
lending focus to reflect this. We noted in chapter four that agricultural loans had lower interest rates compared to 
businesses in other sectors. 
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as used when looking at common-pool resources. The equity in our situation, is 
that everyone is treated fairly. In our situation if rejection occurs it will be done 
on valid grounds. We illustrated above that different banks require different 
information and types of collateral.592 It is clearly stated on the bank’s portal 
information page (for example First Bank which identified what was needed to 
secure a loan from them, equity in this situation would be depicted where 
borrowers who have met these requirements are given the loans, rather than 
close relatives of the lending officers, as was seen under the previous government 
schemes.593 There should be transparency when it comes to the decision-making 
process,594 and borrowers should be aware of why their loan application was 
rejected. If particular sectors have been prioritized by the bank, this information 
should be known from the outset, rather than a blanket statement of lending 
being done by that particular institution. This way borrowers are aware of the 
complete information.  
7.3.4. Adaptability, Resilience, and Robustness. 
We noted that this is a reflection of how the institutions established can respond 
to changing environments. For Ostrom, this specifically examines how the system 
reshapes itself and also the behaviour of the participants, changing it over 
time.595 Also, whether or not the participants learn from experiences within the 
action situation, and if they adapt to new circumstances as they arise or become 
 
592 In chapter six under the SMEDAN-Borrower action situation, we discussed the possibility of standardizing the 
requirement process, especially of the SMEDAN credit information portal. 
593 This was noted in chapter two when discussing the various schemes aimed at financing SMEs. 
594 This transparency is reinforced under the accountability criterion, thus there may be an overlap between 
accountability and equity in the action situation. This transparency should show that no tribal or religious bias were 
at play in the decision-making process, rather it should be a clear indication that you are potentially a bad risk for 
reasons given. 
595 At this point we now begin to see how rules can shape norms over time. This was explored in chapter four. 
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rigid in their responses over time.596 We can see this rigidity reflected within the 
banking system’s acceptance of what form collateral should be in. We have 
understood that land is highly prized as a form, despite innovative policies aimed 
at diversifying these forms, we have observed a strong adherence to land 
because it has a tendency to appreciate, and for various other reasons mentioned 
previously.597 Ostrom further notes, that institutional incentives affect the 
sustainability of an infrastructure. Thus, we must contemplate again how 
effective our incentives are in moulding the type of behaviour we require in the 
situation. 
Adaptability and robustness have to do with change, and while in the strictest 
sense resilience does not necessarily embody the concept of change, it must be 
understood that there is a link between all concepts. Robustness and resilience 
reflect the facility with which the players can change level i.e. change the way in 
which the game is played and survive that change. Resilience and robustness are 
part of the set up that exists for the system to transform itself. By ‘transform 
itself’, it means applying Ostrom’s concept of moving levels within the action 
arena to change a particular situation.598 As we have noted previously, the action 
situation is dynamic, it can switch levels or use the same level it is on, to change 
the situation it is in. Here, the system facilitates change, by facilitating a shift in 
level to respond to a difficulty which causes a problem. It is suggested that within 
our action situation currently being examined this may present a difficult problem 
 
596 Ostrom (n 257) 67 
597 In chapter six when discussing ‘collateral’ under preliminary observations on page 147, we note that broadening 
the scope of what can be classified as collateral in Nigeria would most likely be ineffective as an appreciation for 
these other forms has not been fully developed, neither has the infrastructure to support such claims.  
598 From an operational level to a collective choice level to a constitutional/ meta-constitutional level. See chapter 
three where the California water basin case was discussed. 
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because while the Central Bank of Nigeria has taken a leading role in coordinating 
policy, the study of the history of SME schemes  in chapter two has shown that 
there is still a lot to be achieved in terms of effectiveness. 
Again, the adaptability of the borrower-lender situation is tested depending on 
the type of game being played. Whether it is fixed, or a short run,599 i.e. is it a 
repeat-player game or a one-shot game. It must be understood that our action 
situation is definitely a repeat game, especially for the lenders (in our situation 
the banks). From the borrower’s perspective, if they are hoping to achieve a 
successful business growth, then it is a repeat game for them. Now, because 
there is no control over the number of times the game can be repeated, what we 
may have is a potentially infinite number of repeat situations,600 and potentially 
a one-shot game for each set of players.601 The reality is that if the situation 
works well, only then can there be repeated play. To qualify, working well does 
not simply mean a loan is made or repaid, but also includes where difficulty arises, 
participants are able to find solutions to them (moving up levels). This highlights 
the concept of adaptability, resilience and robustness currently being explored, 
because what matters is that the system keeps functioning. 
Summarily, it is suggested that determining the adaptability is specifically linked 
to the amount of participation engaged in by the actors. The more actors that 
are motivated to engage in the situation, the more barriers to participation within 
the arena we can identify from their experiences. A robust system will be able to 
 
599 Ostrom (n 257) 33 
600 For example, a business takes a loan, it grows and takes another loan. Potentially we may be able to witness the 
growth from a micro business, to a small business to a large one. As time goes on, we expect the business that 
keeps growing to be a repeat player. Banks will be repeat players, because this is one of the ways with which they 
make their money. 
601 One-shot because they may choose to exit the situation where they do not get the first loan.  
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sustain the participation of all the key players, and where there is a deficiency, 
correct itself in order to maintain the participation level. 
7.3.5. Conformance to General Morality 
From our discussion in chapter five we note that McGinnis,602 in his exposition of 
Ostrom terms this evaluative criterion as ‘Legitimacy’. If we recall, with this 
criterion603 Ostrom seeks to find out whether those “who can cheat and go 
undetected are able to obtain high payoffs, and whether those who keep 
promises are more likely to be rewarded and how those within the institutional 
arrangement learn to relate with each other over a period of time”.604 We know 
from our account so far that corruption within Nigeria has had a distortive effect 
on the level of trust within the system. This in effect can lead to a questioning of 
decisions being made, irrespective of whether they have been fairly made, for 
example, because of mistrust, a rejected applicant may begin to speculate about 
the reasons (ignoring their own unsuitability) as to why they were not given the 
loan. At this point you may begin to hear unfounded statements of how the loan 
was given to the less qualified ‘brother/relative’ of the bank’s manager.605 
In determining what this criterion is, we must first understand what the term 
‘general morality’ means. Broadly speaking, morality looks at the values people 
hold, and this value could be based on religion,606  it could be based on education, 
 
602 McGinnis (n 229) 176 
603 Ibid 
604 Ostrom (n 257) 67 
605 This is not to say some claims may not be true, building on the premise of what occurred with the MFBs 
discussed in chapter two. However, it may become difficult to determine this because of set prejudices against the 
government or other institutions. 
606 To Etzioni a fundamentalist way of thinking, given the rise of religious fundamentalism in the world. See Amitai 
Etzioni The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (Basic Books 1996) 3  
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experience607  and it could be shared culture values.608 We have established that 
it is generally accepted conduct in Nigeria to engage in bribing in most daily 
activities, but the question is just because it is a “shared cultural value,” does this 
make it moral? This must be answered negatively, because we must view morality 
from the perspective of what is seen as good and bad behaviour. 
It is suggested that conformance to general morality/legitimacy comes into play 
where both the substantive laws and procedures609 are viewed as fair, and there 
is a consensus between the norms (what is good and what is bad) and the formal 
rules as written down. For example, if we look at bribery again, the formal rules 
view this a wrong, but on some level610 it may be appropriate to pay a bribe, 
because as a matter of practicality people will compromise to attain an end and 
often this is the only way to achieve that end. In this circumstance, we have a 
corrupt behavioural norm which is not regarded as ethically normative. As actions 
stop being normative, they start being behavioural. This suggest that several 
concepts of morality may be at play within Nigeria. In a situation where bribing 
may be seen as appropriate it is suggested that some form of corruption norm611 
is being exercised. On one level people generally see corruption as something 
that is bad, on another level people expect corruption and see it as an entitlement 
of the position/office they may hold. 
 
607 Which Etzioni see as the inner source of the moral voice. Etzioni (n 599) 120 
608 Classified as an external source. Ibid 
609 This indicates an overlap with the criteria of accountability. To McGinnis, he states is as “legitimacy as seen by 
participants in the decision making-process”  
610 Whether it is right or wrong often depends on the position of the individual. An underprivileged individual paying 
may view this as wrong when they must pay, but an affluent person may not take the same view, especially if it gets 
them what they want. The person receiving in Nigeria often views it as their entitlement (especially in public 
offices), and any individual not respecting this right and conforming to the practice is often met with contempt. 
611 For our arena, norms have been grouped into ethical norms with represent good and bad behaviours. Corruption 
norms- which is a reflection of Nigerian society, and how irrespective of corrupt behaviours been seen as bad, it is 
still generally accepted as part of everyday life without which society cannot function. 
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With this criterion, the action arena enables us to understand the catalyst behind 
the behaviours/actions and generates ways to change the behaviour. One way 
of doing this could be through sanctions. We noted above that Ostrom requires 
a consideration of whether those “who cheat and go undetected are able to 
obtain very high payoffs”. Currently, in Nigeria, this would be answered 
affirmatively. Under the other criteria discussed above, we considered how we 
may use incentives to readjust behaviours to a desired standard, but it is also 
suggested that here we must now consider what appropriate sanctions and 
enforcement policies should be in place612. Nigeria is not without its laws and set 
punishments for engaging in corrupt acts. Nevertheless, one of its key problems 
lies in enforcement of those laws. If actors cannot trust that those who break 
rules would be penalised, then they may drop out of the situation or refuse to 
enter at all. 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we explored the role of banks within the action situation and their 
possible interactions with borrowers. We noted the requirements of some banks 
that needed to be met before loans could be granted. In terms of collateral being 
offered, it was observed that landed property (in an approved location613) was 
the most viable form of collateral. Thus, there was a need to examine the 
property rights in Lagos. From our observations, we noted that the transaction 
costs associated with mortgage/selling etc. land was high614. Additionally, it could 
 
612 This takes us back to Ostrom’s original work of Governing CPRs and the role of sanctions and monitoring 
613 We noted that this restriction was because banks were more assured that the title to land would be more 
authentic as opposed to other areas where clear chain of title could not be established, thus the land may be 
subject to disputes. 
614 This was reflected in the carrying out searches in the land registry, paying consent fees and taxes for the 
transactions 
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be a time-consuming process (obtaining the Governor’s consent for every 
transaction is slow), and these were seen as potential costs to the borrower. 
The lender’s cost was also considered, while the loan may be secured with landed 
property it was also necessary to consider what enforcement mechanisms were 
in place for the lender. We noted from a 2018 Doing Business Report from the 
World Bank, that enforcing agreements through the courts was still problematic. 
While analysing the interactions within the arena, it was concluded that 
misalignment of interests between the borrower and lender could occur if the 
system was not efficient, again we considered the potential benefits of holding 
participants accountable and how assigning equal fiscal equivalence between 
participants can sustain the integrity of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
8.1. Introduction 
During the last four years, the focus of this thesis has been driven by the 
underlying need to understand why, despite the evidenced commitment of the 
Nigerian Government to develop the SME sector since the country attained 
independence as a former colony, this development has not fully been attained. 
From our chapter one it has been understood that SMEs can play a vital role in 
economic development, and this development is needed now more than ever as 
it has been seen that the Nigerian economy has been in and out of recession 
over the last few years, and currently the country has been ranked as the poverty 
capital of the world.  
The question of why SMEs are seen as the key to meaningful development has 
already been answered by a plethora of studies, and some of the points of those 
studies have been reiterated here in this work. But this research’s focus was more 
centred on Nigeria’s failures to utilise these SMEs to attain this development. 
Through this research it was anticipated that meaningful and in-depth insights 
into the constraints these SMEs faced beyond the surface infrastructural problems 
would be identified. The thesis proposed a new way of looking at the problems 
these SMEs faced within the Nigerian context, specifically Lagos, culminating in 
the utilisation of an ‘Institutional Analysis Development Framework’ as the lens 
through which we looked. 
Thus, this chapter contains the conclusion of this four-year study. It is divided 
into four sections. The first section provides an introduction to this final part of 
211 
 
the work. The second section provides a narrative of the process of deciding on 
the method to tackle the problem of investigating the legal, market and cultural 
impediments faced by SMEs in Lagos and a reflection from my perspective on the 
limitations of the use of the framework. The third section contains a discussion 
of the findings diagnosed through the use of Ostrom’s framework and remarks 
on the possible directions that could be adopted going forward. The fourth section 
is the final conclusion, and it considers whether the aims and objectives of the 
thesis discussed in chapter one was met. 
8.2. The Narrative 
 
 
Before the overview of schemes conducted in chapter two, there was a general 
awareness that the SME sector faced viability problems. The thesis itself started 
with the belief that to solve this problem, more access to capital was needed to 
enthrone a robust SME sector in Nigeria. With the decision to further understand 
the problems faced by these SMEs and the role they played in the economy, it 
was realised that the world of Law and Development and Development 
Economics needed to be investigated. As an introduction to this world, that is 
development economics, and with an appreciation of its breath and scope, 
William Easterly’s “Tyranny of Experts” became a foundation on which to 
undertake this journey615. While Easterly raised numerous points within his text, 
what resonated the most was the need to learn from your history rather than 
hiring so called experts to create solutions to your problems. Easterly stated that 
“the blank slate mind-set tends to ignore history and to see each poor society as 
 
615 William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (Basic Books 
2013). 
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infinitely malleable for the development expert to apply his technical solutions”.616 
Thus, there was a need to study our own history rather than adopt and transplant 
solutions. An example of the bad effects of transplantation being that of the Land 
Use Act which we have discussed within this work, an Act which mostly ignored 
the pre-existing tenure system of communal ownership of land, thus has 
produced difficulties in using and alienating land. 
With this thought in mind, this became the premise for the work done in chapter 
two, where a study of different schemes aimed at developing the sector was 
conducted. From Easterly it was understood that before there could be full 
engagement with the problem, there was a need to know what had been done 
and what was currently being done, because both formed a vital part in possibly 
addressing the problems of the SME sector. History revealed invaluable points, 
salient among them was the Government’s pattern of funding schemes without 
fully addressing possible incidental issues that would aid in making the scheme a 
success. At this point, a re-evaluation of the initial position of the thesis became 
necessary, moving away from the initial mind set of finding new ways to invest 
more capital into the schemes. It now became necessary to look beyond just 
creating access to capital, but also into recovering loans, creating trust, and 
making the schemes self-sufficient to run on their own without further input from 
the government: a sustainability issue. 
Easterly further warned about the dangers of transplanting solutions. Easterly 
himself is informed by the work of J.B Condliffe who was of the opinion that “it 
is too easy a solution to believe that economic development can be achieved 
 
616 Easterly (n 615) 25 
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simply by transplanting some of the mechanical tricks and tools of the west”.617 
Concurring with this belief, it was recognised that a comparative methodology, 
an approach adopted by most law thesis would not be compatible with the 
intention of this work. As it was important to be wary of borrowing solutions, it 
became necessary to seek out other methods that would aid in the understanding 
of the SME problem. This led down the path of seeking authors who appreciated 
economic and socials problems, and the role the law played in providing solutions 
to them. As seen over the course of this work, prominent authors like Douglas 
North, Richard Coase, Oliver Williamson and their works have influenced the 
writing of this thesis in some way. And it is through a consideration of their work 
which led to Elinor Ostrom who offered within her IAD framework, a way to avoid 
the problem of transplanting solutions.  
In chapter four, we discussed how Ostrom’s framework allowed for a better 
engagement with the reasons why successive schemes have failed and justified 
why we settled on her IAD framework as a model to be utilised in this thesis, so 
it is not necessary to discuss this further here. However, it behoves us to keep 
Condliffe’s point in mind as we move forward through this conclusion. It must be 
remembered that the modelling adopted a bottom up approach to investing the 
issues, necessitating that the work be situated in the environment of study. This 
for the thesis, affirmed the potential limitations of it and of the model itself, 
because as the user needs to know as much of the environment as is possible.  
Being Nigerian and growing up within the environment, it was somewhat easier 
to source information, albeit not every potential source was able to provide 
 
617 Easterly (n 615) 75; Condliffe, J.B, ‘The Industrial Development of China’ speech given at Chinese National 
reconstruction Forum at Berkeley on January 24, 1943 
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credible information or any information at all. But it raises the question of how 
someone outside an environment can engage with it through the model. Articles, 
books and your own research can get you so far, but would never really answer 
why the man from the Bini tribe and the man from the Esan tribe, all grouped as 
the Edo people, who share similar root language so close enough to understand 
each other when speaking, who recognise the same traditional authorities and 
observe the same traditional festivals bore prejudices against each other, which 
often affected trade between them. Again, the problem of being from the 
environment requires a check of preconceived bias which needed to be done 
often, so a balance needed to be struck. Being aware of enough information 
about the environment, but far removed from it as an analyst so that the bias 
does not distort the evaluation. 
Further limitations during the process was finding the need to be immersed in 
economic literature, trying to grasp the concepts of market functions, game 
theory and rational choice theory. Translating an understanding of these concepts 
and how Ostrom views their interplay within the arena. Also, time became a 
constraint. Because of this, it was felt that analysis needed to rest solely at the 
operational level of the action arena where the day-to-day interaction takes place, 
leaving out the constitutional and meta-constitutional levels. In essence, while 
recognising that situations could be nested, the analysis did not fully engage in 
what a nested action arena could look like although it hints at it when references 
were made to SMEDAN and how their function could fit in our Borrower-Lender 
situation. 
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Following this narrative, below a discussion of the findings from the use of the 
model will be presented. As stated in the introductory section of chapter six, while 
policy design should be the ultimate goal, the pertinent problem is identifying 
questions that need to be considered when attempting to create these policies. 
Thus, this thesis advances current approaches to SME policy making in Nigeria 
through the utilisation of NIE analysis. It thereby enriches the policy literature 
and illustrates the potential value of the rather abstract modelling produced by 
NIE theorists in policy discourse. 
8.3. Discussion on Findings  
 
The problems faced by the Lagos SME can be mostly attributed to the exogenous 
variable of the “attribute of the community” and the “rules in use”. This section 
will be considered in two sub-headings. The first part focuses on the questions 
raised from the SMEDAN-Borrower action situation, while the second will discuss 
that of the Borrower-Lender. 
8.3.1. SMEDAN and the Borrower 
 
This situation raised several questions to be addressed. The findings revealed, in 
no particular order, that there was a need to review the identification process of 
the borrowers who approached SMEDAN and standardise these requirements 
along with other lending requirements to make it easier for a borrower to access 
the loans. We noted that some of these requirements from the lending 
institutions were not even specified. From the situation, it was observed that the 
way SMEDAN was designed could possibly set up barriers to entry for the 
borrowers, especially with the online platform that provided information on 
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potential lenders. If it is assumed that the online platform could be used as an 
alternative to the possibility of time wasting at SMEDAN offices (an exogenous 
attribute of the community that is prevalent), then access to it needs to be easier. 
We noted that without the SMEDAN ID this would be impossible. Beyond easier 
access, the information on it also needs to be tailored to Nigerians, for example, 
the use of the US Dollar rather than the Nigerian Naira is a failure to tailor their 
information to Nigeria. The practicality of the information to a largely illiterate 
population is called into question. Usefulness is subjective, and if majority of the 
individuals who the information is supposed to help, do not understand or cannot 
access it, then its usefulness must be questioned. 
The action arena concept proved apposite for reflection on an intermediary 
agency. It permitted the opening of the “black box” of state action by compelling 
a focus on the lowest levels of action, that is, the state employees interacting 
with potential borrowers. Reflection and analysis of the motives and perceptions 
of these agents revealed hidden problems of alignment and collaborative 
purposes. 
8.3.2. The Borrower and Lender 
 
This situation proved more instructive on the usefulness of the application of the 
model, in that the findings could be substantiated by an external source. In this 
we see that our action situation generated concerns, and these concerns were 
confirmed by an empirical source. This solidifies our premise of the IAD 
framework being a practical alternative way of diagnosing problems. In chapter 
two, we discussed the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund (LSETF) which was 
created in 2016 and acted in a similar role as SMEDAN, with the underlying 
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difference between them being that LSETF disburses loans. LSETF have released 
an impact analysis report618 within which they carried out a survey of SMEs in 
Lagos, including those to whom they had disbursed loans. Through a review of 
the LSETF impact analysis report, we were able to call upon empirical sources, 
and these both confirmed the theoretical analysis and were themselves 
susceptible to analysis informed by the theoretical model. 
The survey covered a sampling of about 400 SMEs within the state.619 
Interestingly, the survey identified similar problems as our arena, they note issues 
of transportation,620 interaction with officials – stating “that representatives were 
rude and communicated ineffectively”.621 The survey revealed that the borrowers 
were charged unnecessary excess fees. For example, they were charged N2, 500 
for application forms which are meant to be free by officials.622 The borrowers 
also noted that where the loans were approved, they still needed to pay an extra 
fee to get access to the money.623  
From our exercise with the action situation, this report confirms that there is a 
dissonance with the on-paper motives/functions of the organisation and the 
individuals that act for them; a problem which we note while discussing the 
‘SMEDAN-Borrower situation’ and the ‘Borrower-Lender situation’. It is suggested 
that this dissonance is not easily recognised by the conductors of the survey. 
 
618 LSETF ‘Impact Assessment Report’ Available at < https://www.lsetf.ng/downloads> Accessed 24th April 2019 
619 LSETF ‘Baseline Study Report 2017’ Available at <https://www.lsetf.ng/downloads> Accessed 25th April 2019, 7 
620 Within our action arena this was also identified. Overarching, we noted that this forms part of our exogenous 
variables. It was explored more in the SMEDAN action situation through the perspective of the SMEDAN officials. 
That is, when we considered that providing a staff bus could be a useful incentive, but as we can see, the borrowers 
also have transportation concerns. 
621 In our action situation we discussed how the possibility of humiliation may deter participants from engaging in 
the situation. Here we can clearly see that this is an actual concern. 
622 Within our action situation, we note the possibility of paying bribes to get the necessary information, or service. 
This survey has shown the added separate issue of being asked to pay for information that should be free. 
623 LSETF (n 618) 38 
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They know the problem exists, that is, officials working against the interests of 
the organisation, but it is asserted that they do not understand why it exists. It 
is argued that without viewing the problem through the lens of the action 
situation, this question of ‘why’ may continue to go unanswered. It is only 
because of the examination of the issues through the arena that it is easily 
recognisable that the problem is the dissonance. 
LSETF also conducted a controlled survey with a smaller sampling of 112 SMEs.624  
This survey revealed that LSETF suffered from an awareness problem. The survey 
showed that word of mouth was the prominent way people heard about the 
scheme. Having gone through the personal process of using the action situation 
to diagnose problems in this thesis this raised a question for me of whether the 
people whose job it is to make the information generally available are deliberately 
taking this valuable knowledge and refusing to disseminate it. It is possible that 
this potentially valuable knowledge about accessing loans is being sold, just like 
the application form, rather than being disseminated publicly. This again goes 
back to the ‘dissonance issue’ and the level of impact it can have within an 
organisation. 
The controlled survey also identified that the people whose loan applications were 
rejected were not informed as to why. Viewing this through the lens of our action 
arena, it raises Ostrom’s question of procedural fairness, under equity. Again, on 
the equity question, the website shows that to access loans, training was required 
i.e. bookkeeping. LSETF does their own training before disbursement, on the 
‘how to’ procedure video on their website, borrowers are usually given the option 
 
624 LSETF (n 618) 15 
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of accessing loans, accessing training, or training alone. With accessing loans, 
you cannot access a loan without training, but the controlled survey identified an 
inconsistency, because some borrowers were accessing these loans without 
training. This was revealed by the borrowers and we know that the knock-on 
effect of this process not being viewed as fair by participants could lead to them 
dropping out of the action situation. 
Moving away from the survey, there are some additional issues raised by our 
action situation. In terms of collateral, first we note that the collateral registry 
which is supposed to be an alternative to immovable collateral is more lender 
centric. It was asserted by our arena that more protection is being created for 
the benefit of the lender. The danger of this, as we note, is the probability of 
borrowers pulling out from the arena where they do not feel that their interest is 
secure enough. Also, on the issue of collateral, we discussed extensively in 
chapter six regarding the restrictions placed on the type of collaterals accepted, 
and the prioritisation of land as the best form of collateral. In that chapter we 
noted the problems that could arise from the use of land, and broadly 
conceptualised them as transactions costs, these transaction costs having the 
effect of keeping participants out of the situation. The importance of having a 
strong property system cannot be understated, De Soto writes extensively on 
this. Throughout his text The Mystery of Capital, he asserts that without 
establishing a strong property system, then capital is dead.625 This assertion is 
given credence within our action situation. As we see from our investigation, that 
because of the fear of the inability to enforce mortgages due to communal 
 
625 Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic 
Books 2003) 
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interference, banks have limited their options in what they can accept as 
collateral. This in turn limits the number of borrowers that can access their loans.  
Furthermore, since the Land Use Act has not been reviewed since 1977 when it 
was first created, it is suggested that the time for change is now. This review 
should take into consideration the old communal system of property rights in 
place before the Act was enacted. As Easterly suggests, our history should play 
a part in developing our solutions, if the solution is to be effective. Ostrom 
considers how our norms determine whether we accept change, this was 
identified through the discussion of the American Prohibition Era in chapter four. 
When change is at variance with our held beliefs, there is every likelihood of 
rejecting this change. This is evidenced by the fact that the LUA 1977 is often 
ignored when alienating land, creating further problems if it is to be used as 
collateral. Tom Tyler also writes extensively on this concept of ‘why people obey 
laws’. Tyler asserts that relying on threats and punishment to enforce laws is 
likely to be ineffective, rather the focus should be on aligning with social values 
and creating values like legitimacy and morality which underlie voluntary 
compliance.626 
Also, from our action situation, we asserted that the policy climate seemed more 
designed in favour of the lenders, here the newly established collateral registry627 
was cited as an example, as was having a credit information bureau. While these 
are necessary for the lender’s benefit, for the borrower we had consecutive 
schemes whose focus was on providing finance. It was highlighted that even if 
 
626 Tom Tyler ‘Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law’ (1997) 133 Swiss Journal of Economics and 
Statistics 219, 236. 
627 We note this in chapter six when discussing the exogenous variables. 
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there is an excess supply of finance, if a conducive environment is not provided 
for the borrower as well, then the demand will not be met. 
It was asserted that borrowers may want money but may choose not to borrow 
on the terms currently being offered, and our action situation illustrates why. Our 
action situation classified this as a misalignment and attempted to draw a 
distinction between the borrower’s need for money and the actual demand for 
money. It was asserted that borrowers may need money, but demand for it may 
fall short if the interest rate is not favourable, or if this is coupled with the high 
transaction costs that come with securing the loan. It was at this point we 
identified that an exit from the situation will most likely occur. The key point to 
be taken away from this, is that for the alignment problem to be resolved in our 
situation, both the supply and demand problems must be addressed. 
8.4. Remarks 
 
This section’s main aim is to make visible the way the results from our analysis 
have informed some considerations when conducting policy reform. Here the 
focus is on enforcement of contracts, bankruptcy and insolvency procedures and 
the issue of corruption. On corruption, the need for creating an incentive-based 
structure was geared mostly towards addressing and curbing the potential 
corrupt practices which occurred in both situations; thus, it shall be treated as 
one. A prevalent concern was the possibility of the borrower paying bribes to 
secure loans. While the discourse on corruption is part of the wider literature, we 
can nevertheless see its effects within our arena.  
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As part of the wider discourse on corruption, the Nigeria government have taken 
preliminary steps to resolve this with their stop gap policy on whistleblowing.628 
On the 21st of December 2016, the Federal government released an incentive-
based policy on whistleblowing. The policy approved the payment of between 2.5 
- 5% of the recovered money to any successful whistle-blower who provides 
relevant information leading to the recovered funds.629 This policy is supported 
by an external website and hotline where cases of any wrongdoings in the public 
sector can be reported.630 The policy itself shows a growing appreciation of the 
need to curb the menace and recognises the benefits of having an incentive 
structure in place. While this stop gap mostly focuses on corruption in the public 
sphere (thus relevant to the workings of SMEDAN), looking at how incentives can 
promote the right behaviour is something that should also be developed privately. 
KPMG notes that Nigeria has a culture which places heavy emphasis on benefits 
and status due to inadequate infrastructure in the country,631 because of this they 
considered what incentive structures could look like and in 2016, conducted a 
study on the emerging remuneration practices in Nigeria. The study revealed that 
typical benefits for a managerial role could include a status car, comprehensive 
insurance, fuel allowance, driver, power generator sets etc., but currently with 
 
628 The discussion on whistleblowing is currently being written as a separate article ancillary to this thesis. In it, a full 
discussion on the whistleblowing climate in Nigeria is done and the potential impact of the stop gap policy is 
considered. 
629 The Vanguard Newspaper ‘Whistle-blower to receive 5% of loot recovered’ (December 2016) The Vanguard 
Newspaper Available at < http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/whistle-blower-receive-5-loot-recovered-fg/ > 
Accessed 10th March, 2017 
630 Due to this policy the Government has begun to recover stolen funds. In 2017, the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) recovered $9.8 Million from Andrew Yakubu, the former group managing director of 
Nigeria’s state oil company, thanks to whistleblowing. See Quartz Africa, “Nigeria’s whistle-blower plan to pay 
citizens to report corruption is off to a great start” Available at < https://qz.com/africa/909014/nigerias-new-
corruption-whistle-blowing-policy-is-helping-the-government-recover-looted-funds/ > Accessed 21st April 2019. 
631 A point we considered when discussing our exogenous variables in chapter five. 
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the recession, these benefits are being monetized.632 In our action arena, for 
SMEDAN in chapter five, we outlined how we can build on this culture by perhaps 
providing, health packages and staff bus transportation to work. What this 
illustrates, is how from building on the culture, we can easily see how better 
incentives could be used to encourage the right strategies within the arena as 
discussed in chapter’s five and six and if there is a diversion from the strategy, a 
removal of these benefits as a cost. 
Specifically, for SMEs and their payment of bribes to secure loans, it would seem 
this problem is not limited to the Lagos situation. Transparency International 
recognises the problem of corruption risk when it comes to loan disbursement, 
and in a 2013 report considers mitigation strategies that could be used.633 The 
report recognises that because of the bureaucratic nature of accessing loans, this 
creates avenues for bribing,634 we see this in our action situations and in the 
LSETF report, that this could be an adopted strategy to perhaps save time. The 
report asserts that bribery to influence selection, nepotism,635 conflict of interest, 
and fraud are risks present when lending to SMEs636 thus there is a need to 
ensure effective due diligence and encourage the establishment for integrity in 
its structure.637 The report considers these strategies from two perspectives, the 
banks and the SMEs. Regarding the banks, they assert having a “four eyed 
principle,” a mechanism for limiting discretionary powers, is necessary.638 This 
 
632 KPMG ‘Emerging Trends in Renumeration Practices in Nigeria’ 2016 < 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ng/pdf/tax/ng-emerging-trends-in-remuneration-practices.pdf > Accessed 
23rd April 2019, 1. 
633 Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 
634Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 2. 
635 As we observed with the MFB’s discussed in Chapter Two 
636Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 3 
637 Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 5 
638 Ibid 
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principle operates by sending credit requests to a separate, independent 
department of the bank, using standard procedures to approve loans.639 Other 
considerations could include a staff rotation system to avoid the development of 
inappropriately close ties between credit agents and SMEs.640 On SMEs, the report 
states that incentives such as reduced service charges, improved banking 
conditions, easier access to loans or preferential repayment conditions for loans 
and training can help mitigate corruption risks.641 On the issue of training, they 
suggest that this is important to better understand corruption risks and their legal 
and ethical requirements.642 They note that the Global Advice Network, operated 
through the Anticorruption Business Portal, provides SMEs with training modules 
in anti-corruption, free anti-bribery and corruption e-learning courses and a 
business anti-corruption course.643 It is suggested that the view taken by 
Transparency International on how to mitigate corruption in SME loan 
disbursement is worth considering when moving forward. 
On the issue of enforcement of contracts, we note in the World Bank Doing 
Business Report 2018 discussed previously, that along with debt recovery, 
enforcement of contracts is also a problem. Recovery issues led to the 
establishment of AMCON in 2010, but AMCON itself, despite the resources at its 
disposal, still faces numerous issues. In chapter six, we stated that for analysis 
the banks would be representative of lenders as a whole, but this assertion must 
be diverged from here, as other lenders facing this same problem would not have 
access to AMCON, therefore being left to tackle their enforcement issues without 
 
639 Ibid 
640 Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 6 
641 Ibid 
642 Transparency International Anti-Corruption Resource (n 540) 7 
643 Ibid 
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access to the benefits and resources of AMCON. The general outcome is that a 
strengthened legal system is also needed to support recovery efforts, along with 
improving property rights within the country. 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis was an exercise in finding new ways to think about a problem, and 
hopefully gain new insights. Through the journey of achieving the aims and 
objectives set out in chapter one, I found myself immersed in unfamiliar 
literature, thus broadening the scope of my knowledge beyond my initial 
foundation. Using the IAD framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, we 
acknowledged that the framework was designed as a lens to bring different policy 
elements together while viewing and diagnosing a problem. 
As stated in chapter one, the thesis itself set out with the overarching aim of 
analysing the legal institutions such as the insolvency regime, that play a direct 
role in developing the SME sector, and the perceived failures of the sector. To do 
this, the thesis sets off with seven objectives to focus on. The first objective, met 
in chapter one, was an account of the relevant law of business forms, that is, 
corporation; the partnership; and the sole trader that businesses in Nigeria could 
adopt to trade in. The second part of this objective which focused on discussing 
debt recovery and insolvency law was met in chapter four, while discussing the 
Nigerian legal environment. 
The next objective was to provide a historical narrative of the different initiatives 
and schemes in Nigeria directed at improving finance to SMEs, this objective was 
met in chapter two, and the purpose of this was to help contextualise the study. 
This chapter built into the next objective, which was identifying the perceived 
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problems that hindered the financing of SMEs, with particular focus on the Lagos 
business. Through fulfilling this objective, I was able to identify issues such as 
the low levels of trust, weak rule of law, all this was based on the knowledge 
derived from the history of past failures. Chapter three then focused on the 
exposition of the analytical frame to be deployed in investigating the SME sector, 
and chapter’s five and six conducted the analysis using the Ostrom framework. 
The final chapter considered the results of the analysis, and reflected upon where 
possible legal reforms could occur, this chapter was also a reflection on the 
overall development of the thesis.  
It is asserted that this thesis has made contributions to knowledge in the 
following respects. The first being a contribution to the discourse on SME policy 
in Nigeria. It is asserted that the way our understanding of the Nigerian, 
specifically, Lagos SME market is better than it was before, we know that simply 
approaching the problem through established schemes is not the answer, 
something more than that is needed to develop the SME sector, this is an addition 
to human knowledge. Also, the elaboration and use of Ostrom’s framework within 
this context is new and hasn’t been done before. Ostrom’s theory and conceptual 
modelling is novel in the realm of SME funding in Lagos, thus being an addition 
to human knowledge.  
What this thesis has attempted to do, is draw together different discourses, 
starting from the perspective of institutional economics which often operates at 
a high level of abstraction and here it was brought down to a lower and more 
practical level. To what the Nigerian government has been talking about in terms 
of policies to develop the sector. Both aspects were merged and examined 
through Ostrom’s framework, producing new insights and knowledge within the 
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Lagos SME sector. A key insight being the building normative and structural 
institutions which support people in the absence of trust. 
It is attested that the thesis through the discussion of game theory has made an 
incremental addition to the literature on corruption in Nigeria and how it affects 
the economic development of the country, identifying how corruption degrades 
the quality of interaction and degrades the ability to build cooperation within the 
SME sector in Lagos. It has also made incremental additions to the overall 
literature of NIE because of the specific context in which the thesis is set. It is 
asserted that all these contributions in combination resulted in a new synthesis 
that permitted the exploring in a coherent manner the problems that have proven 
to be intractable in the past. The different aspects that were combined 
maintained a necessary breath of factors to be included in the analysis to keep it 
realistic, whilst allowing a focus on sufficiently precise and limited factors to make 
the analysis rigorous and potentially repeatable in the future. 
As a final point, it must be stated that as much as possible while doing this 
research, I tried to counter my own prejudices by using theory where possible to 
avoid my own blinkered bias because I come from Nigeria. In so much as is 
possible, I have also tried to use the networks that I have, and experiences from 
living in the country (for example information about the Omo-Nile and how they 
interrupt peaceful enjoyment of land, the police acting as debt recovery agents 
etc) and to bring them to bear within the thesis. This for me adds to the 
authenticity of the investigation conducted. 
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